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ABSTRACT  
In this thesis I investigate the interventionist concept 
of miracle and the most serious objections to this 
concept. In the first chapter I introduce the topic and 
in Chapter Two I critically analyse D. Hume's attack 
upon the evidential value of claims about purported 
miracles. Hume's critique is the more significant since 
he was the first significant philosopher to define a 
miracle as a violation of a law of nature. After lengthy 
analysis I conclude that Hume's attack fails. 
In Chapter Three I analyse the charge that the fundamentals 
of historical enquiry rule out the possibility of our 
knowing that an alleged miracle has occurred. My analysis 
concentrates on the major attacks made by Flew and Van 
Harvey and the various rebtittals offered by their critics. 
I argue that the fundamentals of historical enquiry do not 
in fact rule out, either episteMically or psychologically, 
the possibility of miracles. In Chapter Four I continue 
the debate begun in Chapter Three by focussing on the 
claim that there is no natural, as opposed to revealed, way 
of distinguishing between a violation and a falsification 
of a law of nature. On the prior assumption that such a 
distinction makes sense I find that the argument fails. 
In Chapter Five I drop the assumption that the inter-
ventionist concept is coherent and take up a number of 
challenges to its logical coherence. In Chapter Six I 
continue this line bYinvestigating the attacks from 
( v ) 
science on the coherence of the violation model. In this 
chapter I note that refinement to the traditional violation 
model is required if it is to withstand some of these major 
criticisms. In this chapter I also consider the possibility 
of rejecting the violation model in favour of a non-violation 
interventionist model. I conclude that the violation model 
is the more acceptable but note that it requirefurther 
refinement. 
In Chapter Seven I move away temporarily from the conceptual 
and epistemic appropriateness of defining a miracle as a 
violation of a law of nature and investigate the distinction 
between a violation of a law of nature and a miracle. In 
particular I look at the importance of the causal role of 
God; the sign structure of the event and its religious 
setting. I conclude that a miracle is in fact a complex 
mesh of elements bringing together the scientific and the 
religious. To define a miracle as a violation without 
giving due reference to religious factors is insufficient. 
In the final chapter I tie up a number of loose ends. I 
argue that a distinction should be made between the laws of 
science and the laws of nature and that a miracle is not a 
physically impossible event but rather a scientifically 
inexplicable event. I conclude by offering the following 
definition of miracle. 
A miracle is a violation of a law of science brought 
about by the primary action of God, occurring in 
religious context as a divine sign. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
Claims about the occurrence of miracles have a central 
place in orthodox Chri'@tian theism. If it could be 
shown that the concept of miracle was incoherent, or that 
miraculous events could not occur or be known to have 
occurred, then a foundation stone aST orthodox Christian 
belief would be washed away. 
According to the interventionist view of miracle it is 
claimed that an event is a miracle if it requires a 
causal explanation, in part or in whole, in terms of the 
action of God. Within the interventionist view one may 
further distinguish between the violation of a law of 
nature school and the non-violation school. 
Despite their widely divergent views, D. Hume in his 
dlassic 1,e,ssay 1 and Richard Swinburne 2 , agree that the 
most important concept of miracle is that of a violation 
of a law of nature worked by God. This violation concept 
has two distinct threads. The first of these is the 
notion of a special intervention by God in nature. The 
second is the notion of a rare counter instance to a law - 
the idea of a violation or transgression of a law of nature. 
Between these two elements there is taken to be a close 
nexus. 
1 	D. Hume. Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding  
and Concerning the Principles of Morals. 3rd Ed. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Section X 'Of 
Miracles', pp. 109-131. Henceforth referred to as 
Enquiry. 
2 	R. Swinburne. The Concept of Miracle. London: 
Macmillan, 1970. 
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The non-violation school adhere to the notion of a 
special intervention by God while at the same time 
dispensing with the idea of the violated law. Hume, it 
seems, rejected this idea without careful consideration. 
For him, the question of God's incursion was one which 
collapsed immediately into the question whether a law 
violation had been wrought by God. This also seems 
true of most in the debates which have centred around 
Hume's contribution. C.S. Lewis, however, not only looks 
askance at treating God's contribution as a violation of 
natural law but also offers an alternative. For him the 
divine ac,t of miracle is not an act of suspending the 
pattern to which events conform but of feeding new events 
into the pattern. 3 
Prompted by this disagreement among the supporters of the 
interventionist model I will consider the arguments for 
and against the violation thesis. At the same time I 
will outline the major interventionist but non-violation 
models. What I will press for is the acceptance of a 
suitably qualified violation concept. 
What does a defence of the occurrence of miracles in the 
interventionist sense involve? Clearly, it is necessary 
to distinguish a defence of the interventionist concept of 
miracle and a defence of the occurrence of miracles in the 
interventionist sense. To defend a certain concept of 
3 	C.S. Lewis. Miracles. London: Macmillan, 1964. 
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miracle is to argue that the concept is coherent 4 , and 
that the term 'miracle' should be reserved for events 
of such and such a type; it does not commit one to 
assert that any such events have occurred. To defend 
the occurrence of a miracle, on the other hand, is to 
argue that something has happened; it is not simply to 
defend the propriety of such and such a linguistic usage. 
In fact the defence of the occurrence of a miracle may 
be broken down into two components; first the assertion 
that a certain event has occurred, and second, that the 
event allfils the criteria set up for the miraculous. 
It is my aim in this thesis to describe and critically 
analyse the most serious objections to miracles under the 
interventionist analysis. These objections may be readily 
seen by an examination of the three steps through which 
any claim that an interventionist miracle has occurred 
must proceed. To know that a miracle has occurred we must 
know, first, that an event - the candidate miracle - did 
occur; second, we have to determine that the event had 
no natural cause, and third, that the event was caused (at 
least in part) by the direct action of God. D. Hume, in 
his Enquiry Section X 'Of Miracles', provides an argument 
against miracles based on the nature of human testimony. 
His conclusion was that there is never sufficient evidence 
to support the claim that a purported miracle had occurred. 
4 	In practice this means refuting all claims that the concept is incoherent. 
4 
Most modern objections focus on the second and third 
claim. Flew, for example, argues that we can never be 
justified, in the absence of a strong natural theology, 
in claiming that a candidate miracle does not have a 
natural cause. 
A number of writers have argued that there is in fact no 
need to look at the evidence for a purported miracle 
since the concept of miracle itself is incoherent. It 
will be my aim to examine these various objections and to 
provide a defence of the coherence of the interventionist 
concept of miracle. Having established the coherence of 
the interventionist model it will be my aim to evaluate 
the violation and non-violation models. Finally, I shall 
offer a refinement of the violation model which I believe 
LS-_? the most acceptable choice in the light of my prior 
analysis. 
Prior to the commencement of my analysis I wish to make 
two general comments. Firstly, throughout the literature 
the terms 'law of nature' and 'law of science' are used 
fairly interchangeably while a few writers have preferred 
to make distinctions between the two. Throughout this 
thesis I have for the main part accepted the predominant 
trend and used the two quite interchangeably. However, 
on a few occasions and particularly in the final chapter 
I have quite deliberately drawn a distinction between the 
two terms. Secondly, I note that during the past twenty 
5 
years or so there has been a strong current among 
religious thinkers proclaiming that despite the relevance 
of the biblical miracle accounts they did not involve an 
intervention by God. For such thinkers nothing more than 
the existential and religious significance of the 
startling event constitutes its miraculous nature. Thus 
the concept of miracle employed, lacking an interventionist 
element, is clearly different from that on which I focus 
in this thesis. Without wishing to deny its importance 
I shall nevertheless treat the existential concept of 
miracle as being beyond the sgope of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
1. 	INTRODUCTION  
From earliest Christian history, miracles have been 
the mainstay of Christian apologetics. Taking their 
cue from Jesus' own assertion that the 'one sign' to 
His generation of the truth of His claims would be 
the 'sign of Jonah' (Jesus' Resurrection) 1 and from 
Paul's catalogue of witnesses to that Great Miracle 
apart from which Christians would be 'of all men 
most miserable' . 2 Patristic apologists such as 
IrenaAus, Origen and Eusebivas of Caisatea confidently 
argued from the historical accuracy of Jesus' miracles 
to the veracity of His claims and the consequent 
moral obligation to accept them. 3 Every major 
apologist in Christian history from that day to the 
mid-18th century did likewise, whatever the particular 
philosophical or theological commitment he espoused. 
The list includes Augustine the Neo-Platonist, 
Aquinas the Aristotelian, GliotTas the Arminian 
Protestant, Pascal the Catholic Jansenist, and Butler 
1 	Mt. 12: 39-40; 	16: 4. 	Luke 11: 29. 
2 	1 Co. 15: 
3 	Joseph H. Crehan. 'Apologetics' in A Catholic  
Dictionary of Theology. I. London: Thomas Nelson, 
1962, pp. 113-15. Rene Aigrain. 	'Historie de 
l'apologetique' in Bulliant and Nedoncelle (eds.) 
Apologetique. Paris: Bloud and Gay, 1937, p. 950. 
G.W.H. Lampe. 'Miracles and Early Christian 
Apologetics' in C.F.I. Moule (ed.) Miracles: Cambridge  
Studies in Their Philosophy and History. London: 
Mowbray, 1965, pp. 203-18. 
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the High Church Anglican. 4 
But with the onset of modern rationalism in the 
'Enlightenment' of the 18th century came D. Hume's 
attack on miracles as evidence for religious truth 
claims. Coupled with Kant's critique of the 
Aristotelian-Thomist Theistic proofs for God's 
existence and Gotthold Lessing's argument that 
historical data are never certain enough to' establish 
eternal truth, Hume's attack on the miraculous altered 
the entire course of Christian apologetics. Ingeed 
Hume's Enquiry can be said without exaggeration to 
mark the end of the era of classical Christian 
apologetics. 
In this chapter I will outline the main thrust of 
Hume's attack on miracle evidence, as given in Section 
X of the Enquiry. I shall argue that Hume's case 
falls short of its intention to discredit the concept 
of miracle. However, before it is possible to 
determine the strength of Hume's position it is 
essential to establish Hume's purpose in Section X. 
Various interpretations of Hume's purpose have been 
suggested and may be given in three general forms. 
(a) A person cannot, in principle, have justified 
belief in the occurrence of a miracle. 
4 	Cf Avery Dulls. A History of Apologetics. N.Y.: Corpus; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971 and 
Bernard Ramm. Varieties of Christian Apologetics. 
Rev. ed. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1961. 
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(b) We cannot believe in miracles because the 
concept of miracle is logically incoherent. 
This is because the defender of miracles holds 
to a uniformity thesis of the laws of nature 
and denies it at the same time. But it is 
impossible to have both a true violation of a 
law and a true law; either the violation 
occurred and hence the law was false or the law 
is true and hence the violation could not have 
occurred. 
(c) Violations of a law of nature are logically 
possible but we cannot be justified in believing 
one has occurred because we have no natural (as 
opposed to revealed) means of distinguishing 
between violations and falsifications. 
Integral to an interpretation of Hume's purpose in 
Section X is the need to understand exactly what 
Hume means by 'a law of nature'. After all, we cannot 
hope to understand what is meant by a violation (or 
transgression) of a law of nature until we understand 
how Hume understands laws of nature. Unfortunately, 
nowhere in Section )C does Hume explicitly define 
what he means by a 'law of nature'. Fortunately he 
provides us with enough information, which, when 
coupled with his views on causation, provide us with 
an adequate understanding of his position. 
-9 
Hume states that 'a firm and unalterable experience 
has established these laws' 5 and 'a uniform experience 
amounts to a proof' 6 and further that 'a wise man, 
therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence ... 
and regards his past experience as a full proof of 
the future existence of that event'. 7 Hume throws 
more light on this where he states: 'By proofs meaning 
such arguments from experience as leave no room for 
doubt or opposition', 8 and 'by proofs (I mean) those 
arguments which are derived from the relation of cause 
and effect'. 9 From this it is clear that a 'proof' is 
an argument from experience derived from the relation 
of cause and effect. Two important points follow from 
Hume's 'proof'. Firstly, since it is an argument from 
experience it is never an absolute guarantee of truth. 
Secondly, although there is no absolute guarantee of 
its truth - in any logical sense - Hume claims that a 
'proof' must be entirely free from 'doubt and un-
certainty'. But how can this be when Hume also allows 
for the possibility of an opposition of proofs? 10 It 
seems that Hume must be referring to a psychological 
assurance. On the one hand we have a feeling of 
	
5 	EnquirS7,- p., 
6 	Op. cit. 	p. 115. 
7 	Op. cit. 	p. 110. 
8 	Op. cit. 	p. 56. 
9 	David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. London: 
J.M. Dent 8 Sons, 1911, p. 124. Henceforth referred to 
as Treatise. 
10 	An opposition of proofs can be expressed in the form: 
Proof (1) All A's are B's; Proof (2) All C's are -B's. 
But if we find (Aa . Ca) we have the presence of B and 
the absence of B; something must give. 
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certainty about something, but at the same time have 
a further certainty about something else. The two 
certainties, however, lead to an incompatible 
conclusion. But then according to Hume we will give 
up the belief which has less weight in favour of the 
other. A 'proof is, therefore, primarily an 
'association of ideas' - that is, having seen A type 
events and B type events constantly conjoined we gain 
a full assurance or 'proof' that they are causally 
connected. 
Hume clearly believed that the laws of nature were 
established and well known. Further it appears that 
Hume equates his idea of a 'proof' with the idea of a 
law of nature. Thus it would appear that for Hume a 
law of nature holds whenever A's are constantly con-
joined with B's and a similar habitual association 
obtains. Statements of lawful connection should in 
this light be seen as statements of a merely numerical 
universal conjunction without implying any logical or 
nomic necessity. The necessity that Hume implies must 
be taken to be a form of psychological necessity. 
A minority of philosophers have argued that Hume in 
Section X, Part I, attempts to show that it is 
impossible for miracles to occur. The reasoning behind 
this line of argument follows from Hume's belief (a) 
that laws of nature are formulated from uniform past 
experience; (b) uniform past experience with similar 
events is the only justification for our belief in 
the actual occurrence of an event; (c) miracles by 
definition an have no uniform past experience in 
their favour and therefore the occurrence of a miracle 
must be impossible. 11 
The majority of contemporary philosophers who have 
written on the Enquiry, Section X, have placed emphasis 
on the last part of Section I and contend that Hume's 
overall argument is not tailored to demonstrate that 
miracles cannot occur, but, rather, to demonstrate 
that they can never be justifiably believed to have 
occurred. I concur with the view that Flume's claim is 
epistemic and not conceptual. Specifically, the 
argument is that the wise man will never find the 
singular, unverifiable nature of pro-miraculous human 
testimony to outweigh the verifiable, public, uniform 
nature of anti-miraculous, past experiential evidence. 12 
Moreover, proponents of this interpretive stance accept 
as libral Flume's claim that it is always 'more 
probable that the witness deceive or be deceived than 
that the fact which he relates should really have 
happened' 13 as reported. Hence, they believe that 
Hume is not simply making a statement about the 
11 	See for example Kyle Wallace. 'A Re-examination of 
Flume's Essay() on Miracles'. The New Scholasticism. 44. 
Summer, 1971,- pp. 487-90. 
12 	A. Flew. Flume's Philosophy of Belief. London: R.K.P., 
1961, pp. 171-213. 
13 	Enquiry. p. 116. 
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inadequacy of past historical evidence for the 
miraculous, but an a priori statement about the nature 
of all possible evidence - past, present and future) 4 
I conclude that Hume's purpose is to show that the 
very nature of the relevant evidence rules out the 
possibility of any valid epistemological claim 
concerning the occurrence of a miracle - expressed as 
(a) above. 
Hume's critique in Section X, Part I, must be 
evaluated in terms of his definition of miracle and 
his understanding of laws of nature. Furthermore, 
the logic of his position rests heavily upon his claim 
of 'unalterable experience' and the related evaluation 
and balancing of relevant evidence. Hume 's case must 
stand or fall on the accuracy or otherwise of his 
position on these two matters, and hence it will be 
on these features of his analysis that I shall 
concentrate. 
2. 	HUME'S DEFINITION OF MIRACLE  
A number of writers have charged Hume with in- 
consistency over his definition of miracle and if 
their claims are substantiated Hume's case must fall 
before it is commenced. Pomeroy 15 , claims, for 
example, that Hume offers more than one definition 
14 	A. Flew. Op. cit. 
15 	R.S. Pomeroy. "Hume on the Testimony for Miracles'. 
Speech Monographs. Vol. XXIX, No.1, March 1962, 
pp.5-6. 
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and is therefore open to the charge of inconsistency. 
He gives these as: (a) 'a violation of the laws of 
nature' 16 ; (b) any event 'contrary to uniform 
experience' 17  and (c) as 	transgression of a law 
of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or 
by the interposition of some invisible agent'. 18 
Pomeroy claims that these definitions are not 
equivalent and hence the charge of inconsistency. 
I believe that Pomeroy is mistaken, and that Hume can 
b0 accurately interpreted as emphasizing the three 
elements in the traditional concept of miracle, viz. 
(a) a relation to experience (or laws of nature); 
(b) a dependence upon a presumed divine cause and (c) 
an apologetic use. Furthermore, in Part I, Hume 
defines a miracle as an extreme form of marvel, (a) 
above; whereas at the end of Part I he introduces 
the fuller definition, (c) above, with the three 
elements. Since in Part I Hume is considering miracles 
only in their relation to experience it is not 
essential to refer tothe fuller definition and hence 
he uses miracles as 'violations of laws of nature' as 
a working definition. To have relied on the fuller 
definition would only have distracted from his 
purpose. 19 However, this notwithstanding, it is 
16 	Enquiry. p. 114. 
17 	Op. cit. 	p. 115. 
18 	Op. cit. 	p. 115 (note). 
19 	Flew hints at this in A. Flew. Op. cit. pp. 181-3. 
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unfortunate that Hume employed the word 'transgression' 
in his full definition in preference to the 'violation' 
of his working definition. Nevertheless, I take them 
to be synonymous. 
It should also be noted that Pomeroy has made a slip 
when he has implied that because the definitions are 
not equivalent they are therefore inconsistent. In 
fact non-equivalence does not entail inconsistency. 
For example, if I define a triangle as an enclosed 
three-sided plane figure, and as an enclosed three-
angled plane figure, these are not equivalent in the 
sense that three-sided and three-angled do not mean 
the same but clearly they are not inconsistent. 
B. Langtry has claimed that Hume employed two different 
accounts of miracle. The first (c) above and the 
second given by Langtry as 'the limit case of the 
extraordinary and marvellous, viz., an event of such 
a kind that there is uniform experience 'against' its 
occunrence'. 20 I maintain that Langtry is incorrect 
in his claim that -these are two different accounts of 
miracle. I would contend that the second account 
given by Langtry is simply an illumination of the first. 
That is, as I have already established, Hume regards 
laws of nature as reflecting uniform past experience 
and, therefore, a miracle, as a violation of a law 
20 	Bruce Langtry. 'Hume on Testimony to the Miraculous'. 
Sophia. Vol. XI, No. 1, 1972, pp. 20-25. 
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of nature, must be an event of such a kind that there 
is a uniform experience 'against' its occurrence. A 
violation of a law of nature is an exception to an un-
alterable experience. 
Although in disagreement with Langtry I do believe 
that he, like others before him, 21 has sensed some 
element of inconsistency in Hume's definition, without 
actually pinpointing this element. I hold that the 
inconsistency is not in Hume's definition of miracle, 
per se, but rather, in defining miracle as an 
unprecedented event. Hume is out of step with the 
usage employed by the 18th century apologists. In 
Hume's own words: 
A miracle is a violation of the laws of 
nature; and as a firm and unalterable 
experience has established these laws, the 
proof against a miracle, from the very 
nature of the fact, is as entire as any 
argument from experience can be imagined 
... nothing is esteemed a miracle if it 
ever happened in the common course of 
nature ... There must, therefore, be a 
uniform experience against every 
miraculous event. 22 
flume's use of the word 'violation' does express some-
thing of the orthodox view that considered a miracle as 
21 	See in particular C.D. Broad. 'flume's Theory of the 
Credibility of Miracles'. Proceedings of the  
Aristotelian Society. XVII, 1916-17, pp. 77-94. 
22 	Enquiry. p. 113. 
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'beside or contrary to the fixed laws of nature'. 
In fact Hume's definition is very similar to that 
given by S. Clarke. 23 However, as Clarke, and in more 
recent times, Downey 24 , have been quick to establish, 
nowhere do the orthodox apologists consider that a 
miracle violates or transgresses nature. This follows 
from their belief that the course of nature is nothing 
more than the will of God producing effects in a 
regular and uniform manner. On this view, as stressed 
by Aquinas, it does not make sense to say that God 
violates his own laws since they are not in opposition 
to him. 
It is not against the principle of craft- 
manship if a craftsman effects a change in 
his product even after he has given it its 
first form. 25 
As I have already stressed Hume does not define what 
he means by law of nature in Section X. However, he 
does use it in such a way where 'law of nature', 
'uniform experience' and 'proof are useeinter-
changeably. 26 Thus a law of nature appears to be 
regarded by him as any generalization for which extensive 
23 	S. Clarke. Works. Vol. II. London: J. & P. Knapten, 
1738, p. 701. 
24 	R. Downey. 'Divine Providence' in The Teachings of  
the Catholic Church. Ed. by G.D. Smith, 2nd ed. London: 
Burns Oates, 1951, p. 227. 
25 	Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles.. Bk II, Ch. 100. 
26 	Perhaps not .surprisingly not all contemporary writers 
hold this view. See for example D. Ahern. 'Hume on 
the Evidential Impossibility of Miracles'. -American  
Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph Series No. 9. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1975, pp. 2-8. 
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human experience can offer no counter-examples; that 
is, they are Humean 'proofs'. Hume refers to such 
experience as 'unalterable', whereas, in actual fact, 
all he is entitled to claim is that it is 'hitherto 
unaltered'. Hume uses the former firstly, because in 
either case any experience which was not highly 
consistent could not entitle us to infer a law of 
nature and secondly, he is concerned with the establish-
ment of an event as miraculous. Events are believed to 
be miraculous because they are seen as violations of 
the (real) laws of nature. Hume does not view violations 
of anything less than (real) laws of nature as 
miraculous events. Clearly, it is necessary that the 
law be real not merely apparent. Naturally, Hume was 
limited by an inadequate conception of the laws of 
nature prevalent in the 18th century. Strictly 
speaking Hume is only entitled to argue on the 
supposition of a hitherto unaltered experience but 
his inadequate conception of the (laws of nature force 
him to make the stronger claim. 
The orthodox apologists undoubtedly viewed miracles 
as rare events, however, they certainly did not deny 
the possibility that God might wish to repeat an extra-
ordinary event. Yet Hume quite clearly wishes to 
maintain that the laws of nature which miracles 
contravene are of such generality and supported by 
such uniform experience that a miraculous occurrence 
- 18 - 
must be unprecedented. Why does Hume adopt a view 
that was not accepted by the proponents of the 
miraculous? 
Hume could not admit to the existence of God without 
undercutting the main thrust of his own argument, 
however, this posed a difficulty for him. The theistic 
view of laws of nature, as I have outlined above, was 
in terms of the will of God. From this viewpoint 
laws of nature were seen as somewhat analCtgous to 
civil laws. Since such laws are prescriptive they 
could quite easily be saspend-6'dby the sovereign - in 
this case, God. Furthermore, this religious view 
said nothing about the logical status of laws of 
nature and hence gave no criteria by which it was 
possible to distinguish laws from mere accidental 
regularities. If Hume were to be able to tackle the 
problem of the miraculous he had first to offer some 
more philosophically satisfactory accounts of the 
laws of nature. 
As scientific explanation continued to reduce the 
workings of nature to orderly causal sequences the 
greater was the pressure to define miracles as 
exceptions. If miracles were not exceptions they 
must have either natural causes or be uncaused, and 
neither of these views could be accepted by the
•orthodox apologist. Hume could not admit that the 
- 19 - 
laws of nature were simply the regular workings of 
God, nor could he allow that laws of nature be both 
true and yet less than uniform. It followed from 
this that Hume believed that miracles had no place 
in the scientific view of the world since laws had 
to be universal and it had to be assumed that every 
event occurring in nature had a natural cause. Further-
more, the orthodox believers' main interest lay in the 
apologetic use of the miraculous rather than in the 
correct formulation of the laws of nature. If they 
had to adhere to an unscientific or seemingly in-
consistent conception of the laws of nature in order 
to prop up their concept of miracle they were content - 
so Hume may have reasoned. 
In offering his definition of miracle Hume may well 
have thought that he had satisfactorily solved the 
dilemma. The apologist accepted that miracles were 
exceptions to the laws of nature. Hume taking hold of 
this offerred his 'proof' in place of the more 
conventional conception of laws of nature. Thus, Hume 
is able to argue that miracles are exceptions to 
'proofs' and quite clearly any event which is an 
exception to a 'proof' must be unique and unprecedented. 
In this way Hume may have some justification for his 
use of 'violation' and 'proof'. In particular, 
Hume has clearly demonstrated some of the inherent 
- 20 - 
stresses in the concept of miracle. Nevertheless, 
his conclusion that a miracle must be unique attempts 
to force upon the apologist something that he simply 
will not admit to. Furthermore, the charge of in-
consistency can be pushed further. Despite the fact 
that in Part I of Section X Hume goes to great lengths 
to stress the unprecedented nature of miracles, in 
Part II he appears to tacitly admit that an abundance 
of miracles is not considered to be inconsistent with 
the orthodox concept of miracle. 
Et appears that Hume may have created a straw-man and 
then proceeded with his demolition. However, there is 
still one possible line of escape, from the apparent 
inconsistency, open to him. 27  It might be argued at 
this point, on Hume's behalf, that his line of thinking 
here is: 'If I have refuted the view that there can 
be even a single occurrence of a miracle (violation of 
a law of nature), then a fortiori, I have refuted the 
view that there can be several repetitions of such an 
occurrence'. That is, he may hold the view that his 
argument against the modest view that a miracle of a 
certain kind occurs once, has even more force against 
a more extravagant view which holds that a miracle of 
a certain kind can occur several times. And why? If 
you cannot even have one, how can you have two, or 
three ...? The textual support for this view originates 
27 	This line was suggested to me by Dr. Edgar E. STlias 
of the Philosophy Department, University of Tasmania. 
- 21 - 
from the fact that if it were accurate it would 
reconcile the inconsistency, mentioned above, of Part 
I and Part II. 
The reasoning in this line of argument relies heavily 
on the implication that Hume had already demonstrated 
that miracles could not occur, or be known to have 
occurred, prior to his specification of a definition 
of a miracle in terms of a single exce6tion. 
Alternatively, it implies that Hume could demonstrate 
his case even if he assumed that evidence for more 
than one exception existed. However, contrary to this, 
his argument depends upon his assertion that a miracle 
is an exception to a proof. Furthermore, the argument 
implies that Hume is attempting to demonstrate that 
miracles cannot occur whereas I have argued above that 
there is more textual support for the view that he is 
attempting to show that we cannot know that a miracle 
has occurred. 
In the light of this reasoning it becomes clear just 
how essential it is for Hume to claim that a miracle 
is a single exception to a 'proof'. If this were not 
the case there would be no 'opposition of proofs' and 
hence no strong case against the occurrence of a 
miracle. It must, therefore, be concluded that Hume's 
definition of miracle is to some degree stipulative, 
only reflecting the contemporary conception in part 
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and being at variance on the very critical (for the 
purpose of his argument) element of rarity. 
3. 	TESTIMONY 
The main thrust of Part I may be viewed firstly as 
consisting of discussion and evaluation of testimony 
in the case of the extraordinary and marvellous and 
secondly, an application of the results of that 
discussion to the evaluation of testimony to the 
miraculous. However, it is in this very crucial area 
of testimony and evaluation of evidence that Hume 
commits .a number of errors. 
(a) Type of Evidence  
Hume claims that evidence comes from human 
testimony. He does not claim that this is the 
only source of evidence but he does (conveniently) 
neglect any others. It seems, however, that this 
neglect can only weaken his position. Hume 
claims 'I should not believe such a story were it 
told (to) me by Cato'. 28 But what if he had made 
the observation himself? It appears in that case 
Hume would have had to disbelieve his own senses. 
But what if his observations were supported and 
verified by observations made by others? Would 
Hume still be prepared to doubt his own senses? 
It would appear that he would be committed to 
28 	Enquiry. p. 113. 
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this even though the self same senses have been 
relied on and trusted while observations of past 
regularities were made. Why should he doubt his 
senses only when he observes a break in the 
regularity and not when he observes the regularity 
itself? We may always distrust the extraordinary 
testimony of others since we can never be certain 
that they are not lying. But when the event is 
corroborated by our own senses what do we say? 
We don't lie to ourself! 
Why does Hume ignore the availability of physical 
traces and the possibility of using indirect 
evidence, working from consequences to causes? 29 
For example, we may make a case for the occurrence 
of a particular event E by arguing that certain 
states of affairs, the existence of which we 
cannot deny, can be best (only) explained by 
postulating the occurrence of E. In particular, 
in the miracle case, if we have evidence that 
some non-natural agent with the power to cause 
events contrary to the course of nature does exist, 
and evidence about the probability of that agent 
wishing to exercise that power, we have ipso facto 
reason to assign a higher probability to the 
occurence of an event contrary to the 'normal' 
course of nature, than if we have evidence for its 
29 	C.D. Broad. Op. cit. p. 83-85 offers a good 
discussion on this point. 
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negation. 
In the case of miraculous events the question of 
evidence must relate to the wider question of 
whether or not nature is an open or closed system. 
We must ask whether the event 'makes sense', 
whether it fits into an intelligible framework. 
Hence, for the theist, the action of God might 
serve as a causal explanation; it could not do 
so for the non-theist, any more than a disbeliever 
in Martians could countenance an appeal to their 
presence in explanation of the origin of human 
civilization. It follows then, that events which 
are possible for the theist are, in an important 
sense, impossible for the non-theist. The 
problem of evidence, in the content of miracle 
claims, must therefore be seen as hinging on the 
wider question of finding sufficient evidence for 
the existence and character of God independently 
of miracles, to assign a reasonably high 
probability to miracles. 
(b) Balancing of Evidence  
Hume regards a miracle as an un■gyecedented event; 
that is, an event which runs counter to our past 
uniform experience. According to him, one must 
balance testimony in favour of such an event 
against the prior presumption against it which is 
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generated by our experience. Only if the im-
probability of the testimony being false is 
greater than the prior improbability of the 
alleged event will one be justified in accepting 
the occurrence of the event. However, Hume goes 
on to point out that even if the testimony in 
favour of the miracle is impressive - even 
totally persuasive 	it will always be outweighed 
by the vast mass of past contrary experience. It 
follows •that no-one (Hume actually limits his 
claim to the wise and learned) could be justified 
in believing that a miracle had occurred. Thus: 
Suppose, having apparently observed an 
A that is not a B, one reasons: sensory 
experience is, on the whole, reliable. 
My sensory experience is, on the whole, 
in favour of all A's are B's. So if I 
rely on my sensory experience I will 
accept all A's are B's. 30 
Yandell 31 and Langtry32 , among others, have been 
quick to point to the defective logic in Humels 
reasoning here. Both claim that what is involved, 
when one apparently observes an A that is not a B, 
is not which body of evidence is the greater but 
30 	Keith E. Yandell. 'Miracles, Epistemology and Humels 
Barrier'. International Journal for Philosophy of  
Religion. Vol. 7, No. 3, 1976, p. 406. 
31 	Ibid. 
32 	Bruce Langtrky. 'Investigating a Resurrection'. 
Interchange. No. 17, 1975, pp. 41-47. 
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rather what does the total body of evidence 
indicate. Prior to the occurrence of the 
candidate miracle my sensory experience has 
supported the contention that all observed A's 
have been B's. However, now my sensory 
experience gives evidence that all A's but one 
are B's. If I were to deny this contention (in 
the absence of some independent evidence) I 
would be rejecting my sensory evidence. But once 
I reject my sensory evidence I can no longer re-
tain any faith in the original contention that 
all A's are B's. 33 It is not the balancing of 
evidence that is relevant, but rather, whether or 
not, the occurrence of the candidate miracle is 
supported by one's total body of evidence. 
Simply to contend that there is an 'unalterable 
experience' against miracles and then to conclude 
that miracles do not occur is to engage in 
cit'cular reasoning. Only a truly inductive 
approach to miracle claims (examining without 
prejudice the first-hand evidence for the alleged 
miracle) can ever hope to answer the question as 
to whether they in fact occur. 
4. 	LAWS OF NATURE AND PARTICULAR EVENTS 
Hume's faulty logic involved in his 'subtraction 
33 	Strictly speaking, Hume is interested in the total body of human evidence rather than in any one observer's 
evidence; but this case can easily be extended to 
cover this. 
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principle' is due in part to his unsatisfactory 
conception of a law of nature as a report of our 
past uniform experience. This inadequacy produces 
a number of problems which Hume either fails to 
understand or overcome. Firstly, Hume fails to 
distinguish between the type of evidence required to 
support a particular law of nature all A's are B's 
and that required to support a particular event, 
this A is a B. Hume correctly points out that a law 
of nature is as a matter of fact, supported by a 
voluminous quantity of observation and experimentation; 
however, he appears to overlook that whereas laws of 
nature are universal in character, historical events 
are particular, expressed by singular propositions. 
This being the case it is unwarrimted to require that 
any claim for such an event should be supported by the 
same quantity or cgeight of evidence as required to 
support a law of nature. 
Secondly, Flume's conception of a law of nature to-
gether with his subtraction principle would prevent 
the falsification of any law of nature. This may not 
have mattered to Hume, who clearly believed that the 
laws of nature were well established but it is in-
contestably a feature of empirical laws that they are 
corrigible by experience. On Flume's account, no 
matter how strong the evidence for a particular event 
which appears to be an exception to the mass of past 
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uniform experience, it cannot be used to falsify 
that uniform experience - the law of nature. But ... 
If the testimony of others does not shake 
our belief in the law, there is no reason 
for me to think that there is anything 
that needs explanation or investigation. 
If scientists had actually proceeded in 
this way, some of the most important 
natural laws would not have been discovered. 34 
Langtpy 35  describes two quite different ways in which 
on occasions we make plausible judgements ruled out 
by Flume's account. First, the original evidence t 
gether with the new event E may support a new theory 
replacing the old one. Second, the evidence for E 
may lead us to withdraw the current theory despite 
the apparent lack of an alternative. Gill 36 commenting 
on Langtry's observation notes that any wholesale 
rejection of the evidence for the unique and marvellous 
is inadmissable. He then asks, however, whether a 
wholesale rejection of the evidence for a sub-class 
of the unique and marvellous, the miracle is admissable. 
Flew37 answers this when he says: 
It (is) impossible for Hume himself to 
justify a distinction between the 
marvellous or the unusual and the truly 
miraeulous. 
34 Broad. 	Op. 	cit. 	p. 	87. 35 Langtry. 	'Hume on Testimony to the Miraculous'. 	pp. 	23- 
36 John B. 	Gill. 	'On Miracles: A Case for Violations of 
Nature'. 	Unpublished Paper. p. 10. 
37 Flew. 	Op. 	cit. 	p. 	204. 
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Hence, Gill's question cannot be resolved by Hume. 
Thirdly, as pointed out by a number of writers, Flume's 
notion of 'proof' and his case against miracles cannot 
be easily reconciled with his general position on the 
relationship between cause and effect. Blackman 
elucidates this point well: 
What we take to be a natural law is merely a 
kind of summary of constant conjunctions, 
which as far as we are able to determine, have 
held universally in the past and which we are 
led to believe will hold in the future, but no 
necessity is involved. If no necessity is in-
volved, it is always possible that what we 
have taken to express a natural law will turn 
out to be false. Hume claims ... that in 
reasonings of matters of fact it is possible 
to reach conclusions which achieve the status 
of a 'full proof', but there is no way of 
reconciling this claim with his analysis of 
causality. It follows that there is no good 
reason, on Humean evidential grounds, to re-
ject the claim that a miracle has occurred a 
priori. Hence the argument of Part I fails. 38 
5. 	HUME'S SUBSIDIARY ARGUMENTS  
In addition to my analysis of Flume's critique at the 
end of Section X, Part I, I propose to round off my 
consideration of Hume by considering several further 
arguments from Part II. 
38 	Larry Lee Blackman. 'The Logical Impossibility of 
Miracles in Hume'. International Journal for Philosophy  
of Religion. 	Vol. IX, No. 3, 1978, Pp. 186-187. 
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The first three of Hume's subsidiary arguments 39 make 
purported factual claims and whether they are correct 
or not is essentially a matter for historical inquiry. 
However, as Swinburne ° rightly claims, while Hume's 
standards of evidence are high, he appears to believe 
that it makes sense to suppose that they could be 
satisfied, that there could be sufficient evidence to 
show the occurrence of a miracle. But, when he comes 
to discuss in detail three stories of purported 
miracles, his standards seem to be so high that it 
does not make sense to suppose that there could ever 
be sufficient evidence to satisfy them. In the story 
of the miracles wrought in France upon the tomb of 
Abbe Paris, Hume dismisses the credibility of the 
witnesses, not in terms of their number, integrity 
and (071TETa--61-6-ii= which is regarded as irrelevant - but 
because the miraculous nature of the events is alone 
sufficient to convince all reasonable people that they 
did not occur. 41 Hume, it would appear, rules out the 
very possibility that there could be sufficient evidence 
to satisfy his standards. Furthermore, Swinburne 
correctly notes that Hume's third claim that miracles 
39 	Thee are (a) History contains no miracle attested by 
witnesses of such character and in such circumstances 
as to prevent suspicion; (b) The natural human love 
of the marvellous operates with particular force in the 
case of miracles; (c) Miracle stories are most common 
in barbarous nations; civilized nations accepting such 
stories received them from barbarous ones. 
40 	R. Swinburne. The Concept of Miracle. London: Macmillan, 1970, pp. 16-17. 
41 	Enquiry. pp. 124-5. 
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abound chiefly in ignorant and barbarous nations, 
could be analytically true if Hume means by an ignorant 
and barbarous nation 'one which is disposed to believe 
purported miracles' • 4 2 
In Section X, Part I, Hume admits the logical 
possibility of miracles but laims in Part II that as 
a matter of fact there never has been, nor ever will 
be, sufficient evidence to support a claim that a 
miracle has occurred. However, when judging specific 
reports Hume appears to cut short the process of 
investigation. He adjudicates the question not on 
the basis of evidence but upon the prior assumption 
of t-A-T-&-i-rimpossibility. He refers to Tacitus # reports 
as 'so gross and so palpable a falsehood'; to the 
Cathedral door-keeper's report as 'more properly a 
subject of defision than of argument' and to the Abbe 
Paris reports as 'the absolute impossibility or 
miraculous nature of the events which they relate'. 
He then concludes that 'no testimony for any kind of 
miracle has ever amounted to a probability much less 
a proof'. Yet Hume did not even bother to 
investigate the evidence! 43 
Hume does not apply his own conceptual skepticism to 
the purported miracles but simply short-cuts the 
enterprise and criteria which he set himself. But 
42 	Swinburne. Op. cit. pp. 16-17. 
43 	Enquiry. pp. 122-127. 
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this short-cut is inappropriate. The question whether 
miracles have occurred is just the question whether 
the course of nature has been uniform, we cannot 
appeal to the uniformity of our past experiences as an 
argument against miracles. The problem with Humels 
short-cut is that it must appeal to considerations 
which could be known to be true only if the evidence 
for individual miracles had been examined and shown 
to be false. Only if we have some way of demonstrating 
the uniformity of nature which does not beg the 
question of the truth of miracle narratives could we 
short-cut the need to examine the evidence in each 
case. But despite the fact that Hume admits the 
logical possibility of miracles he attempts to 
adjudicate the question not on the basis of evidence 
but upon the prior assumption of fffe- rimpossibility. 
Humets fourth subsidiary argument is more philosophic-
ally interesting. Hume argues that any two religious 
systems are incompatible with each other. Thus every 
alleged miracle whose occurrence would be evidence in 
favour of a given religion is such that its occurrence 
would be evidence against any religion contrary to 
the first. Furthermore, Hume claims that the various 
bodies of testimony should be seen as conflicting, and 
so as wholly or partially cancelling each other out. 
The argument has been well put as follows: 
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Let R 1 and R 2 be two incompatible religions. 
And let it be supposed that miracles occur 
only in connection with true religion ... 
Then the assertion 'Miracles occur in 
connection with R 1 1 implies that R 1 is 
true; this implies that R 2 is false and 
this implies that miracles do not occur in 
connection with R 2' Similarly, the 
assertion 'Miracles occur in connection with 
R 2 ' implies that miracles do not occur in 
connection with R 1' Now both these 
assertions are made (though of course by 
different sets of people). The compund 
proposition implies its own contradictory 
and therefore must be false, and therefore 
one of the separate assertions may be false, 
and both may be. 44 
As Broad correctly states, this argument is somewhat 
subtle and contains a suppressed premise which is 
essential to its validity: 'Miracles only occur in 
connection with true religion'. 45 Clearly, there are 
those who would be quick to give their assent to this 
premise 46 but clearly the onus is on Hume to show its 
truth - but this he patently fails to do. Even if 
the suppressed premise were true it does not follow 
automatically, despite what Hume says, that a miracle 
in favour of one religion must also be evidence 
against another. In actual fact it may be the case 
44 Eldon R. Hay. 'A Contranatural View of Miracle'. Canadian Journal of Theology. Vol. XIII, 1967, No. 4, 
p. 275. 
45 Broad. Op. cit. pp. 81-82. 
46 	See for example J.B. Mozley. Eight Lectures o -W Miracles. London: John Murray, 1838. 
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that the occurrence of a miracle offers very strong 
evidence in favour of one religion but at the same 
time offers evidence in support of another religion. 
That is, the evidence in favour of the 6econd religion 
is stronger than it was prior to the advent of the 
miracle. Furthermore, Hume is only partially correct 
in his claim that two conflicting miracle claims 
cancel each other out. The conjunction of what I 
learn from the conflicting miracle claims may give no 
grounds for preferring religion A to religion B but 
nevertheless may give good reason for preferring each 
to religion C. 47 
Clearly, Hume's argument from contrary religions is 
too strong and assumes too much. What would be 
necessary to threaten the argument from miracles for 
the truth of a particular religion would be genuine 
miracles worked in opposition of the claims made by 
that religion or in favour of incompatible claims. 
However, if the religion is to be falsified, and not 
merely revised, then the claims would have to be 
fundamental. But contra Hume, most paFported miracles, 
do not appear to be of this type. 48 
6. CONCLUSION  
In this chapter I have attempted to outline and 
47 	Bruce Langtry. 'Hume on Miracles and Contrary Religions' Sophia. Vol. XIV, No. 1, March 1975, pp. 29-34. 
48 
	
	See Richard L. Purtill. 'Proofs of Miracles and Miracles as Proofs'. Christian Scholars Review. Vol. 6, 1976, 
P. 45. 
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• critically analyse Hume's critique of miracles given 
in Section X of the Enquiry. Hume was the first 
significant philosopher to define a miracle as a 
violation of a law of nature and it is with Hume that 
the violation model gains its credence. I have 
shown that Hume's conception of miracle was limited 
by his 'crude' understanding of a law of nature and 
hence his conception of a violation of such a law. 
The main thrust of Hume's critique is centred on an 
analysis of human testimony and the consequent 
notions of proof and opposition of proof but he also 
concerns himself in Part II with a number of 
interesting subsidiary arguments. I conclude that 
despite the tenacity of his argument, and the effect 
it has had on classical apologetics, the argument 
itself is unsound. However, the important question 
for the apologist is this: 'Givena better conception 
of a law of nature, (and consequently a better L 
conception of a violation of that law) would the 
a priori epistemic argument Hume develops have more 
force?' To attempt to answer this question it is 
appropriate to turn to the writings of Antony Flew 
on miracles and to a lesser extent to those of Van A. 
Harvey on historical methodology. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
1. 	INTRODUCTION  
In the previous chapter I indicated that Humets 
criticism of the evidential claims associated with 
purported miracles was severely weakened by his 
inability to distinguish between the marvellous and 
the miraculous. This inability is understandable 
given his unsatisfactory account of the logical 
character of a law of nature. Flew notes that as a 
result of this serious defect Hume: 
Could not offer any sufficiently persuasive 
rationale for employing, as canons of 
eRclusion in historical enquiry, propositions 
which express, or which are believed to 
express, such natural laws. 1 
However, Flew emphasises that what Hume has established 
is that the apolLOgist is faced with a conflict in 
the evidence whenever he claims that a miracle has 
occurred. 
The notion of a miracle is 1 (,agically 
parasitical on the idea of an order to 
which such an event must constitute 
some sort of exception. This being so, 
a strong notion of the truly miraculous - 
a notion involving something more than 
the notion of the merely marvellous, the 
significant or the surprising - can only 
1 	The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 	'Miracles'. p. 351. 
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be generated if there is first an 
" equally strong conception of a natural 
order. The inevitable tension between 
the idea of a rule and of exception 
thus gives concepts of the miraculous 
an inherent instability. 2 
Flew maintains that exceptions are logically dependent 
upon rules. It is only when there is a strong order 
that it is possible to show that the order has been 
broken. Flew contends that the difficulty for the 
apologist is to simultaneously hold the strong rule 
and the genuine exception to it. The problem be-
comes: how can we infer from a purported miracle 
that the natural regularities have been interfered 
with when it is clearly possible that the event, if 
it happened as described, only indicates that the 
law-regularities with which we are working are in-
adequate. The task then is to discover the law which 
will explain the event. 
Flew's position does not necessitate that genuine 
violations of true (real) laws be 13gically impossible, 
all that he has to show is that even if a true 
violation were to occur there would be no natural, 
as opposed to revealed, method available by which 
we could determine that the event did represent a 
violation rather than a falsification of the law. 
The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 'Miracles'. pp. 
346-7. 
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Flew is steadfast in his assertion that he, like Hume, 
is questioning the epistemic, not the logical, 
possibility, of miracles. 
Prior to an examination of the substance of Flew's 
critique of the violation concept of miracle, it is 
essential to discover Flew's conception of a law of 
nature and subsequently what he understands by a 
violation of such a law. Let us begin with a number 
of semi-technical terms. 
Flew takes a proposition to be whatever can be asserted 
or denied; a proposition is what comes or can come 
after the word 'that' in sentences like: 'He said 
that the cat was on the mat' or 'He said that it was 
all a load of rubbish'. A universal proposition is 
one that asserts that all or any such-and-such is 
this or that, or that no such-and-such is this or that. 
Flew divides universal propositions into those that 
are logically necessary and those that are logically  
contingent. The former is one whose denial would 
involve a self-contradiction. To deny the latter, 
however, does not commit the denier to a self-
contradiction. 
Within the class of logically contingent universal 
propositions, Flew makes a further distinction between 
those that are nomological and those that are non-
nomological. Propositions of the former sort state 
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what are thought to be either laws of nature or 
causal connections: they state that certain things 
in fact must happen or in fact cannot happen, al- 
thoAgh, since they are logically contingent, these 
propositions assert not that something is logically 
necessary or logically impossible (inconceivable) 
but that it is in fact necessary or in fact im-
possible. 3 Flew maintains that nomological 
propositions, unlike merely numerical universal 
conjunctions, entail counter-factual conditionals - 
a warrant of the form, if A were not to have occurred 
no B would have occurred. 4 
Flew argues that a law of nature, as a universal 
nomological proposition, can in theory be tested at 
any time by any person. Whatever falls within its 
scope is physically necessary, and whatever it 
precludes is physically impossible. 
So just as it (the law of nature) possesses, 
and is designed to possess, the logical 
strength required, when combined with 
appropriate particular premises, both to 
licence and to demand inferences to 
substantial conclusions transcending those 
premises, it is also constitutionally 
adapted to serve as a criterion of 
exclusion, which must rule out a range of 
3 	See Antony - Flew. 'Parapsychology Revisited: Laws, 
Miracles and Repeatability'. The Humanist. May/June 
1976, pp. 28-29. 
4 	Antony Flew. A Rational Animal and Other Philosophical  
Essays on the Nature of Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1978, pp. 50-55. 
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logical possibilities as impossible in fact. 5  
In Flew's sense a violation of a law of nature is, 
therefore, logically possible but physically impossible. 
The physically impossible being understood as that 
which contradicts a law of nature. 6 Furthermore, Flew 
even concedes that miracles might occur, but he 
maintains that we have no natural (as opposed to 
revealed) criterion which enables one to say, when 
faced with something which is found to have actually 
happened, that here there is an achievement which 
nature, left to her own unaided devices, could never 
encompass. 7 
2. 	THE FIRST ARGUMENT - FUNDAMENTALS OF HISTORICAL INQUIRY 
RULE OUT MIRACLES 
It is essential to Flew's position that he does 
not deny that a miracle might actually occur. 
Flew simply argues that by our normal methods of 
evaluating evidence we must reject any clar i-fn 
that a particular event was a miracle. He claims: 
Whether or not anything did in fact 
happen in the past inconsistent with 
what we at present believe to be a 
5 	Antony Flew. Hume's Philosophy of Belief. London: 
R.K.P., 1961, p. 208. 
6 	More correctly 'What is physically impossible is what- 
ever is inconsistent with a true nomological'. A Flew. 
'Miracles'. The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. p. 351. 
7 	A. Flew. 	'Miracles'. Op. cit. pp. 347-349. 
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law of nature, one cannot possibly know 
on historical evidence that it did so 
happen. The reason is simply that, if 
something miraculous is to have occurred, 
the miracle is precisely something that 
in the light of present knowledge is 
thought to be impossible; it is precisely 
an event overriding, or an account in-
consistent with, what we presently believe 
to be a law of nature. To the extent that 
we have good reasons for thinking that 
there are laws of nature, that there are 
nomological regularities or necessities in 
the world that rule out such and such on-
goings, as historians we have to say that 
one thing we cannot know on historical 
grounds is that a miracle occurred. After 
all, what we are doing as historians is 
applying all we know, or think we know, 
to the intei:Nretation of the evidence. 
Suddenly to say that in the past things 
were different and that miracles occurred 
is to abandon quite arbitrarily fundamental 
principles of historical inquiry. 8 
Thus, in the case of miracle there is an opposition 
between the law and the candidate miracle and either 
we must reTect that the event, as described, occurred 
or that the evidence in favour of the event is so 
great that we Must question the validity of the law. 
In the latter case we look for modification or 
rejection of the law. In either case the event is 
rejected as a miracle because it is no longer an 
8 	A. Flew. 	'Parapsychology Revisited'. Op. cit. p. 29. 
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exception to a law of nature. 
It should be noted here that Flew does not commit 
Hume's error of rejecting the occurrence of an 
event, which violates a law of nature, regard-
less of the evidence available in support of it. 
What Flew contends is that we will, as a first 
step in historical enquiry, reject claims of 
miraculous events unless the evidence for their 
occurrence is substantial. Flew maintains that 
It) 
	 the occurrence of such events may lead to a re- 
evaluation of the accepted law(s) of nature. 
This, however, is still not discovering that a 
genuine mirale did occur, since the violation 
was a violation of an assumed, not actual, law 
of nature. However, it may not be immediately 
possible to discover an appropriate 'new' law, 
under which the apparent anomaly can be subsumed. 
In (his case Flew argues that we can never give 
up the hypothesis that there is an as yet un-
known law which explains the occurrence of the 
event. 
The nomological proposition might 
survive even our further tests 
Yet in this case, no matter how 
impressive the testimony might 
appear, the most favourable verdict 
that history could ever return must 
be the agnostic, and appropriately 
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Scottish, 'not proven'. 9 
Flew, it should be noted, does not directly rule 
out the possibility of a theistic universe. In 
such a universe, Flew believes we could still 
formulate laws of nature which expressed 
natural necessities, such that everything that 
happens must be determined by these laws save 
in so far as these natural necessities are on 
a few occasions overridden by exercises of 
supernatural power. Flew then sees the problem 
for the scientist, in such a world, as that of 
identifying those seeming exceptions, to what 
he had thought was a law of nature, which are 
in fact supernatural overridings. Such really 
supernatural overridings will look to the 
stubbornly atheist scientist like falsifications 
of what had previously been thought to 
constitute a true law of nature. Without a 
well supported claim to possess an authentic 
revelation, what in the different context 
would be recognized as an authentic overriding 
would have to be dismissed as simply evidence 
that the law of nature, the statement of natural 
necessity, did not in fact hold. 
Flew, who adheres to a standard covering law 
9 	A. Flew. 	'Miracles'. 	Op. cit. 	p. 352. 
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model of scientific explanation, 10  claims that 
laws of nature are like a geographer's map. 
Just as the geographer uses his map to describe 
the actual landscape, so the scientist uses 
laws to describe what actually occurs in our 
experience. Hence, just as discrepancy between 
the actual landscape and a map necessitates a 
change in the map, an unusual event which is not 
presently subsumable under a law of nature 
demonstrates only that the relevant laws are in-
adequate and in need of revision or extension. 
This is not to say that all such revisions will 
be immediately forthcoming. Some observable 
occurrences might remain in 'explanatory limbo' 
for lengthy periods of time. Nevertheless, as 
a result of the descri(P3ive nature of the 
scientific enterprise, even the most recalcitrant 
of events must be seen as, in principle, sub-
sumable under scienfic laws. 11 This in turn 
means that every evento-L)no matter how unusual 
or bizarre - must be seen as, in principle, 
explicable scientifically. 
10 	The fundamental idea in the covering law (C.L.) analysis 
is that the occurrence of an event is explained when it 
is subsumed under or covered by a law of nature. Under 
this model of explanation, the crucial 'permanent in-
explicability' question is whether all observable 
phenomena are, in principle, subsumable under scientific 
laws. Only if the answer is no, is the concept of a 
'permanently inexplicable' event intelligible. 
11 	Flew has never adumbrated any distinction between laws 
of science and laws of nature. 
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Flew's case rests heavily on a number of 
distinctions. Flew makes it clear that talk 
about violations of a law of nature is coherent 
talk. That is, he is happy to make the 
conceptual distinction between a violation of a 
law of nature and a falsification of a law of 
nature. However, where Flew is prepared to 
distinguish on conceptual grounds he is not 
prepared to do so on epistemic grounds. Flew 
is adamant that there is no natural method 
available by which one could know that an 
exception to a nomic regularity was a violation 
rather than a falsification. Flew also makes 
much of his distinction between what is logically 
possible and what is physically possible. 
Miracles when defined as a violation of a law of 
nature are accordingly not inconceivable but 
rather impossible in fact. A number of critics 
have in fact argued that Flew is mistaken in 
this distinction and I shall take this up below. 12 
(b) Van Harvey 13 
Although his conclusions are not identical with 
those of Flew Van Harvey does cover common ground. 
Harvey argues that modern methodological principles 
12 	See Section 3, p. 51455-15-6-1ow. 
13 	Van A. Harvey. The Historian and the Believer: The  
Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief. 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. 
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of historical enquiry produce an inevitable 
clash with the supernatural Weltanschauung of 
orthodox Christianity. He argues that the 
Christian's will-to-believe must be subordinate 
to the modern historian's canons of historical 
knowledge. Harvey's questions about historical 
method involve neither the problem of discovery 
(as discussed for example by Collingwood in terms 
14 of his detective model) 	nor the problem of 
explanation (with the Dray-Hempel dispute about 
the historian's use of laws) 15 , but the problem 
of justification. How do historians defend 
their assertions? 
In chapters two and three of his work, Harvey 
develops his critical philosophy of history under 
four rubrics: the radical autonomy of the 
historian, rational assessment of the historian's 
judgements, sound judgement, and the role of 
present knowledge in the evaluation of reports of 
past events. The crux of his argument is his 
contention that the historian must presuppose 
ptesent knowledge. The principles of autonomy, 
rational assessment and sound judgement are 
essentially formal in character. They have, 
since the Enlightenment, produced an intellectual 
14 	R.G. Collingwood. The Idea of History. Oxford: 
O.U.P., 1935. 
15 	See for example Sidney Hook (ed.). Philosophy and 
History. New York: N.Y.U.P., 1963. 
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revolution only because they have been informed 
by the new scientific view of the world. Harvey 
is quite aware that if one judges past reports 
on the basis Of present thought, one may preclude•
discovering new events because one's very method 
compels one to force the witnesses' experience 
to conform to one's own. 16 Nonetheless, he is 
very certain that present scientific knowledge 
is important for historical investigation. 
Present scientific laws play the negative role 
of telling us what could and therefore what 
could not have happened in nature. 
Harvey's discussion of the historian's use of 
present scientific knowledge deserves careful 
examination. 17 He believes that it is necessary 
to update and modify Bradley' s 18 view that 
modern science with its presupposition of the 
uniformity of nature provides the standard for 
determining what the modern historian can or 
cannot accept as fact. First, since history is 
a field-encompassing 19  field, the present 
knowledge presupposed by the historian is (contra 
Bradley) much broader than just scientific 
16 	Harvey. Op. cit. p. 71. 
17 	Harvey. Op. cit. pp. 68-99.• 
18 	F.H. Bradley. Collected Essays. Oxford: O.U.P., 
1935. 19 	Harvey borrows this idea from Stephen Toulmin. The 
Uses of Argument. New York: C.U.P., 1958. 
knowledge. Thus he accepts Collingwood's view 
that scientific laws tell us 'What could have 
happened' only in the case of natural events. 
At the same time, Harvey insists that we@ot 
minimize the importance of such negative 
judgements, for it has been the historian's 
adoption of knowledge produced by the sciences 
which ha' s3 led to the development of the concepts 
of myth and legend. Secondly, as a result of 
the 'new physics one should no longer speak of 
'a natural order governed by immutable laws'. 
However, in the final analysis Harvey's 
modification of Bradley's position is rather 
limited.. 
It is difficult therefore to conceive•
... of the new physics precipitating 
an angonizing reappraisal of reports 
of ... men in chariots ascending 
bodily into heaven. Nature to be sure, 
may be far more refractory to 
mathematical description at the sub-
atomic level than hitherto believed, 
but this does not warrant a return 
to ... credulity. 20 
One might suggest that Harvey has fallen into 
21 the trap of Troeltsch's 	position that history 
is a closed causal nexus immune to supernatural 
20 	Harvey. The Historian and the Believer: The Morality  
of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief. New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1966, p. 76. 
21 	Ernst Troeltsch. 'Uber historische and dogmatische 
Methode in der Theologie'. Hamburg. 1898. 
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intervention. That is, miracles are impossible 
as a result of metaphysical presuppositions. 
However, this cannot be the case because Harvey 
has been quick to argue that the historian qua 
historian should carry along as little meta-
physical baggage as possible. Harvey frequently 
cautions against saying that miracles are 
'impossible'. 22 On the other hand he also writes 
of 'reports of the impossible'. 23 The 
'impossibility' envisioned is neither logical 
impossibility nor presumably, the metaphysical 
impossibility which follows from dogmatic 
uniformitarianism. In what sense thpin is it 
'impossible' to accept reports of alleged 
miracles? It becomes clear that Harvey is talk-
ing about what is taken to be extremely im-
probable in the light of present experience 
Since this probability is essentially a 
psychological factor the impossibility involved 
turns out to be a historically conditioned 
psychological impossibility on the part of the 
modern historian. Harvey identifies himself 
with those: 
Who believe that it is impossible to 
escape from the categories and pre-
suppositions of the intellectual culture 
22 	For example Harvey. Op. cit. pp. 85, 229. 
23 	Harvey. Op. cit. p. 75. 
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of which one is a part, the common 
sense of one's own time ... We are 
in history as fish are in water, 
and our ideas of possibility and  
actuality are relative to our own  
time ... That is, no doubt, what 
Bultmann meant when he wrote that 
'it is impossible to use electric 
lights ... and believe in the New 
Testament world of spirits and 
miracles' ... We in fact do not  
believe in a three story universe 
or in the possession of the mil-4c , 
by either angelic or demonic beings. 
It is to say more however. It is 
to say that we cannot see the world 
as the first century saw it ... 
These beliefs are no longer 
practically possible for us. 24 
Harvey, like Flew, arguing from the warrants of 
historical methodology arrives at the conclusion 
that in a very important sense miracles are 
impossible. Both are quick to emphasize that 
there is no logical reason for this impossibility; 
however, in an important sense they remain 
impossible. In Flew's terminology miracles are 
physically impossible; in Harvey's view they 
are both psychologically and epistemically 
impossible. Do their arguments stand up under 
criticall-anaiysisi? 
24 	Harvey. Op. cit. pp. 114-115. 
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3. 	FIRST REPLY: D.M. AHERN  
Ahern 25 argues that FJew's conceptual distinction 
between logical possibility and physical possibility 
is, given his conception of the physically impossible 
and law of nature, no distinction at all. He claims, 
therefore, that Flew's analysis, resting on a mistaken 
conceptual division, is open to severe criticism. 
According to Ahern, Flew defines a miracle as: 
(a) An event is physically impossible and a violation 
of the laws of nature if and only if the state-
ment that the event occurred is logically in-
compatible with the statement of the laws of 
nature. 26 
Flew then argues that laws of nature support counter-
factual claims 27  but according to Ahern there is an 
ambiguity in the precondition that accompanies such a 
counterfactual. This ambiguiLty may be demonstrated by 
showing that the precondition may be stated as either 
(b) or (c) below. 
(b) There are no other causally relevant (natural 
or supernatural) forces presentp 
25 	Dennis M. Ahern. 'Miracles and Physical Impossibility'. 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. VII, No. 1, March 
1977, pp. 71-79. 
26 	Ahern. Op. cit. p. 72. 
27 	Counterfactual claims are variously described as 
counterfactual conditionals and subjunctive conditionals. 
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(c) There are no other causally relevant natural 
factors present. 28 
Ahern argues that (c) together with (a), although 
seemingly preferable, is not, because if there were 
supernatural forces present the laws of nature would 
be false since they would entail false counterfactuals 
about what would happen when no other natural forces 
were present. Consequently, one must prefer (b) to-
gether with (a). This combination, unfortunately, 
produces incompatability since the precondition now 
includes both natural and supernatural forces and 
consequently it does not make any sense to say that 
a violation could occur. Therefore, (b) together 
with (a) simply show, contra Flew, that it is not 
logically possible for the physically impossible - in 
Flew's sense - to occur. 
Ahern claims that: 
Whatever basis there may be for believing 
in supernatural interventions in nature 
i-also a basis for rejecting such 
formulations of nature (that is laws with 
(c) as precondition) as inadequate. 29 
It seems to me that Ahern is incorrect here. If we 
were to prefer .precondition (b) to (c) we would 
automatically impose special and perhaps 
28 :Ahern. Op. tit. p.74. 
29 	Ahern. op. cit. p.77. 
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insurmountable obstacles in the path of falsification 
of laws. If laws of nature are equated with the LgeD 
laws of science then given that the scientist qua 
scientist does not have the methodology or the 
equipment to investigate the supernatural, how could 
one save laws of nature from the threat of them be-
coming analytically true and immune from revision? 
To illustrate this point, take for example, the 
following statement of a law of nature L. 
(a) L = P --0.(x)(Fx • Gx). Here P stands for 
supernatural forces in the conditional form. 
'God does not intervene to make it otherwise'. 
If this law L were to be shown to be false the scientist 
would need to find an occurrence E as follows: 
(b) E = P-4-(Fa 	). 
However, the test of falsification does not stop there. 
In order to be certain that (b) is a falsifying 
instance of (a) the scientist must be certain that P 
has the same truth value in (a) and (b). He must be 
certain that the P in (b) is correct and should not 
be replaced by 	P. Unfortunately, the scientist qua 
scientist has no means of establishing the truth 
value of P. Consequently any scientist faced with a 
purported falsification of a law would reject the 
candidate and maintain the law on the ground that the 
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truth value of P in E was not identical to that in L. 
Ahern claims in addition that: 
If the laws of nature do not determine the 
limits of the physically possible then 
first, they could not be used to accurately 
explain or to accurately predict, and 
second, they could not be given as support 
for counterfactual conditionals. 30  
Now all this rests on the prior assumption that there 
are supernatural forces operating in nature. But why 
sould the scientist, if he is framing ,la.-W-s- -o--f -_fiature- -3 
make this assumption? Without evidence to support 
the claim the scientist cannot either assume that 
supernatural forces exist or do not exist. The 
scientist simply attempts to explain what happens by 
offering the best laws that he can. If it turns out 
that there are no supernatural forces, then there are, 
a fortiori, no miracles. If it turns out that there 
are supernatural forces then it is true that the laws 
of science cannot accurately explain, accurately 
predict and support counterfactual conditionals all 
the time. However, so long as supernatural inter-
ventions are rare, such laws will determine the limits 
of the physically possible most of the time and hence 
they can be used to explain, predict, and support 
counterfactuals which will be true unless God does 
30 	Ahern. Op. cit. p. 75. 
- 55 - 
intervene to make it othergise. 
Faced with the possibility that we live in a theistic 
world the scientist has two possible avenues open to 
him. Either he can offer laws of science which 
explain and predict most of what happens most of the 
time but cannot explain and predict everything or he 
can refuse to offer laws at all. The former 
alternative is clearly the more appropriate especially 
on the assumption that supernatural forces operate on 
rare occasions. The laws of science are true in so 
far as they are the best that science, in principle, 
could offer. To add a P clause to the laws of science 
does not improve the predictive power of the laws. 
In fact, as I have argued above, adding a P clause 
would only create additional problems for the 
confirmation, revision and rejection of laws. I 
therefore conclude that Ahern's case against Flew 
fails and that there is a legitimate distinction to 
be made between the 1fiD3gical and physical possibility 
of a violation of a law of nature. 
4. 	SECOND REPLY 
Flew claims that every historical claim purporting 
that a violation of a true law has occurred generates 
a serious evidential conflict. On the one hand we 
have the evidence of historical testimony affirming 
that the event in question did occur; on the other, 
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we have the evidence of scientific experimentation - 
upon which the relevant laws of nature are based - 
ruling against the possibility of such an occurrence. 
It would be a mistake, Flew contends, to regard the 
historic and scientific claims, as having equal 
evidential value. The historical testimony affirming 
the occurrence of such an event is always 'singular, 
particular and in the past tense', 31  but the scientific 
evidence implicitly denying the occurrence of such an 
event is always general and presently testable, in 
principle, by any person at any time. On this basis 
Flew is certain that no amount of historical evidence 
supporting the occurrence of a purported 'violation' 
could ever be stronger than the scientific evidence 
supporting the relevant nomologicals. 
The basic propositions are: first, that 
the present relics of the past cannot be 
interpreted as histori'cal evidence at all, 
unless we presume that the same fundamental 
regularities obtained then as still obtain 
today; second, that in trying as best he 
may to determine what actually happened 
the historian must employ as criterion all 
his present knowledge, or presumed knowledge, 
of what is probable or improbable, possible 
or impossible; and, third, that since 
miracle has to be defined in terms of practical 
impossibility the application of these criteria 
inevitably precludes proof of a miracle. 32 
31 	Flew. Hume's Philosophy of Belief. p. 208. 
32 	Flew. God and Philosophy. London: Hutchinson, 1966, 
p. 146. 
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It follows, according to Flew, that such scientific 
evidence is adopted to serve as a criterion of exclusion 
which must rule out a range of logical possibilities as 
impossible in fact. In short scientific evidence has 
'ultimate precedence' co-Ver its historical counterpart. 
This entails that the historian must always rule that 
the 'true violation' 33 in question could not have 
occurred in its purported form. 34 In other words 'we 
now have the best of reasons for insisting that what it 
(the true violation) purports (to have occurred) is 
in fact impossible'. 35 
Swinburne 36 argues that, contra Flew, 'historical 
evidence' is in some ways presently testable. The 
number and reliability of witnesses, and the avail-
ability and amount of physical indirect evidence - e.g. 
traces - are all presently testabl,e by scientific 
method. He claims: 
... apparent memory, testimony and traces 
could sometimes outweigh the evidence of 
physical impossibility. 37 
I think that Swinburne's remarks are helpful here, 
33 	Violations of 'assumed but not true' laws are ultimately 
scientifically explicable; at least in principle by a 
'best science'. 
34 	It should not be assumed that the argument applies only 
to temporally distant historical occurrences although 
the case is stronger the more djistant the event. 
Flew's argument is relevant whether the event is 
temporally past or present. 
35 	Flew. Hume's Philosophy of Belief. p. 208. 
36 	Richard Swinburne. The Concept of Miracle. London: 
Macmillan, 1970, pp. 33-51: 
37 	Swinburne. Op. cit. p. 51. 
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but I think he is partly mistaken. On the positive 
side he is successful in establishing that the 
distinction between 'historical' and 'scientific' 
evidence is not nearly as great as Flew contends. 
If the historical event occurred in the more recent 
past, the evidence for the occurrence of the event 
would be open to much the same sort of tests as the 
relevant nomological which excludes it. Despite this, 
he has not established that such indirect evidence 
could ever be as 'general and as well confirmed 'by 
any person at any time' as directly testable 
'scientific evidence'. Furthermore, it is pointless 
to argue against Flew, that no matter how strongly 
confirmed the law is, it may nevertheless be false. 
This would simply fall into Flew's hands as he adds 
'and that goes to show that since the law was not 
true but apparent the violation was also apparent, 
not real'. Consequently, even if Flew were to admit 
that his distinction between 'scientific' and 
'historical' evidence is too strong, he could still 
argue that in relation to 'permanently inexplicable' 
events 38  , the direct presently testable 'scientific 
evidence' would in every case outweigh0 the indirect 
presently testable historical evidence. 
Having demonstrated that there is a greater similarity 
between science and history than Flew had allowed 
38 	That is, a violation of a true law of nature. 
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Swinburne misdirects his attack. Blackman notes, for 
example: 
Swinburne does a disservice to his own cause 
in arguing that the two kinds of claims are 
similar, and hence that both call for 
essentially the same sort of verification. 
He does this because he believes one might 
in fact adduce sufficient evidence to make 
plausible the claim that a given miracle 
occurred. But in granting that the kind of 
evidence required in support of such a 
claim is on an epistemological par with that 
required in support of natural laws, he 
merely plays into ... (Flew's) hands. The 
skeptic need only point out that one may 
believe in the genuineness of a natural 
law or the occurrence of a miracle, not 
both, and the quantitative evidence in 
favour of the former always exceeds that 
in favour of the latter. The proper re-
sponse is to point to the disanalogy 
between the two kinds of claims and hence 
the unreasonableness of the a:)equirements 
that as much evidence be required in 
support of a miracle as that in support of 
a natural law. 39 
Flew's claim against the possibility of a violation 
rests heavily on his general premise that established 
laws of science serve as the primary criteria for 
judging the 'occurrence status' of past events. 
Specifically, he believes that an event must be 
39 	L.L. Blackman. 'The Logical Impossibility of Miracles 
in Hume'. p. 186. 
- 60 - 
subsumable under, or not inconsistent with, established 
nomologicals before the historian can legitimately 
claim that the event actually occurred. 
Flew's argument may be taken in two ways. On the one 
hand, it might be argued that he seems to be saying 
that the proponent of miracles has no right to argue 
for them on the basis of a consistent underlying method 
of investigation (empirical method), since one cannot 
assume its absolute regularity and applicability and 
then use it to prove deviations from regularity. 
Once a miracle is granted, there would be no reason to 
consider empirical method as necessarily applicable 
without exception, so it could perfectly well be in-
applicable to the investigation of the miracle claim 
in the first place! 
This argument involves a confusion between what may 
be termed formal or heuristic regularity and substantive 
regularity. To investigate anything of a factual 
nature, empirical method must be employed, and it 
involves such formal or heuristic assumptions as the 
laws of non-contradiction, the inferential operations 
of deduction and induction, and necessary commitments 
to the existence of the investigator and the external • 
world. Empirical method is not 'provable'; its 
justification is necessity - the fact that we cannot 
avoid it when we investigate the world. (To prove it 
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we would have to collect and analyse data on its be-
half, but we would then already be using it). One 
cannot'emphasize too strAngly that this necessary 
methodology does not in any way commit one to a 
substantively regular universe; to a universe where 
events must always follow given patterns. Empir1 
method always investigates the world in the same way - 
by collecting and analyzing data - but there is no 
prior commitment to what, the data must turn out to be. 
In short, whereas irregularity in basic empirll 
methodology would eliminate the investigation of any-
thing, the discovery of unique, non-analogous events 
by empirical method in no way vitiates its operation 
or renders the investigator liable to the charge of 
irrationality. 
The second way of taking Flew's argument appears to 
involve an inconsistency with his own claim about the 
status of laws of science. Flew maintains that these 
laws may be represented as descriffTve statements which 
map certain regularity patterns existing within the 
realm of empirical phenomena. This raises two questions: 
first, why does Flew regard violations as subsumable 
under a law when violations are not regarded as part of 
a regularity pattern and second, if they are to be 
covered by the law, as these law statements are 
descriptive, however well founded a law may be, 
intransigent factors may yet be found such that a 
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revision of the law is required, no matter how drastic. 40  
However, if scientific laws are (a) descriptive state- 
ments about existing phenomena and (b) revisable in 
the face of recalcitrant counter examples, the 
question of whether an event has actually occurred must 
be seen as prior to and separate from any question 
concerning the relationship between such and such an 
event and various scientific laws. It therefore seems 
that Flew is mistaken or confused about his claim that 
laws determine the occurrence status of events. 
According to Flew, laws are used as the primary 
evaluative factor when judging the 'occurrence status' 
of past anomalous events, It therefore seems that no 
matter how strong the actual a posteriori evidence may 
be, the notions of what seems probable or improbable 
contained in the relevant scientific laws must always 
be given priority over it. This approach to historical 
investigation runs the risk of choosing laws without 
regard to hisorical limits, and then attempting to 
rewrite history to fit the law. 41 Furthermore, since 
Flew believes that every past anomalous event has only 
past tense, particular 'historical evidence' favouring 
its actual occurrence, but general, public, present, 
'scientific evidence' ruling against it, his 'occurrence 
40 	See R.C. Wallace. 'Hume, Flew and the Miraculous'. The 
Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 20, No. 80, July 1970. 
41 
	
	Gordon Clark. 'Miracles, History and Natural Law'. The 
Evangelical Quarterly. Vol. 12, January 1940, p. 34. 
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criterion' actually applies to all presently (as well 
as to permanently) inexplicable events. Clearly few 
scientists would want to claim that - on the basis of 
present laws of science - every past event which has 
been labelled 'presently inexlicable' must now be 
considered not to have occurred in its purported form. 
Flew, it appears, has simply failed in his argument to 
make any meaningful distinction between permanently 
and presently inexplicable events. Thus, in his 
desire to offer a strong a priori epistemological 
argument against the former, his conclusions in-
advertently also apply to the latter. 
Flew's confusion appears to have resulted from his 
failure to distinguish between the following positions: 
(a) Given no independent evidence to the contrary 
it is unreasonable to believe that the 
physically impossible will occur. That is, 
given a uniformity in our experience, it 
is reasonable to suppose that the unpformity 
will continue. 
(b) Given an exception to the uniformity of our 
experience it is reasonable to believe that an 
exception to a law of nature has g)ccurred. But 
then the reasonable question is: is this a 
falsifying exception or a violation? 
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Since Flew is prepared to make a conceptual distinction 
between a falsifying exception and a violation of a law 
of nature the fundamental questions involved are ones 
of rational belief. Is it always rational to believe 
either (a) that the event did not occur in its 
purported shape, or (b) that the event is explicable 
by science, at least in principle? 
I believe, contra Flew, that we could have good evidence 
to rationally believe that an anomalous event of the 
kind which believers have wished to call 'permanently 
inexplicable' has actually occurred. This follows 
from 4anecessity of deciding whether an event has 
actually occurred prior to a decision regarding the 
relationship of the event to the laws of science. 42 
Having got this far the apologist faces the second of 
Flew's hurdles. Given that we have good reason to 
believe that an inexplicable event has occurred can we 
be justified in claiming that the event in question is 
not simply presently inexplicable but permanently 
scientifically inexplicable? 
5. THIRD REPLY  
Harvey is quite correct in arguing that present 
42 	Of course where there is very little evidence to support the occurrence of an event which if it had occurred as 
reported would have been an exception to a law of nature 
we would normally use the law to infer that the event 
did not occur. The relevant question here is: how 
much evidence is required to pursuade us to take reports 
of recalcitrant events seriously? 
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scientific knowledge is relevant to historical inquiry. 
The fact that an alleged event is not what one would 
exp'ect on the basis of observed regularity in a given 
scientific field 'activates a warning light'. 43 The 
historian knows better than anyone that many 
miraculous tales have been concgcted and passed on by 
dishonest or superstitious persons. However, in the 
case of an alleged miracle what does the historian do 
after he has taken note of the warning signal and is 
on guard against knaves and fools? One can, Harvey 
suggests, either attack the warrants upon which similar 
judgements generally are made or enter a rebuttal. The 
alleged resurrection of Jesus provides a good example. 
Jesus died (data). Since, on the basis of observed 
regularity, dead men stay dead (warrant), Jesus was 
not alive on the third day (conclusion) unless in this 
particular case the usual warrants do not apply 
(rebuttal). Obviously, iriOrone could successfully 
challenge the warrants in this case and Harvey believes 
a similar failure awaits the attempt to develop a 
rebuttal. 
Harvey describes a.miracle as 'an event alleged to be 
absolutely unique, which is to say, an event to which 
no CaTh79 or warrants grounded in present experience 
can apply'. 44 In the case of something absolutely 
43 	Harvey. Op. cit. p. 87. 44 	Harvey. Op. cit. p. 225. 
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unique, one would not know what one was talking about 
nor could one bring arguments for or against it, 'for 
there are no criteria for dealing with an event unlike 
any other'. 45 
Harvey may be correct in asserting that one could 
neither perceive nor conceptualize an absolutely unique 
event but are alleged miracles 'absolutely unique'? 
Frequently the only unusual aspects of a reported 
miracle are its basic structure (e.g., the supposed 
phenomenon of living again after death) and its 
apparent non-explicability in terms of scientific 
knowledge. Lesser aspects of the total event, on the 
other hand, are quite common and analogous with present 
experience. For example, in the case of the reported 
resurrection of Jesus, by analogy with one's experience 
of how living men appear, one could in principle at 
least decide whether or not one were seeing a living 
person and whether he bore any continuity with some 
person who had died. The historian would want to 
examine the accounts of alleged meetings, visits to 
the place of burial, and so forth. In principle, then, 
the historian can isolate data and mount arguments on 
the basis of the non-unique aspects of alleged miqDacIes. 
Even if in specific instances the historian decides 
that he lacks sufficient evidence to arrive at a firm 
conclusion, it will not be because of 'the absolute 
45 	Harvey. Op. cit. p. 228. 
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/ 
uniqueness' of the alleged event, but because of the 
inadequacy of the sources. One must conclude that al-
though Harvey correctly asserts that there are no 
criteria for dealing with absolutely unique events, 
he has confused the issue by his definition of miracle. 
Consequently his argument that the historian cannot 
deal with miracles because of their uniqueness fails 
completely. 
The historian qua historian cannot assume that 
traditional theism is either true or false, since to 
do either would be to include a significant meta- 
physical presupposition in one's historical methodology. 
The historian must remain methodologically neutral. 
Personally, the historian may be a theist or a non-
theist, but qua historian he ought to be an agnostic. 
As a methodological agnostic, he knows that the God 
of traditional theism just may happen to exist and that 
miracles would therefore be a 'real possibility'. 
If God exists, miracles are not merely 
logically possible, but really and genuinely 
possible at every moment. The only condition 
hindering the actualization of this 
possibility lies in the divine will. For 
the theologian to say that scientific know-
ledge has rendered belief in miracles 
intellectually irresponsible is to affirm 
that scientific knowledge provides us with 
knowledge of limits within which the divine 
will always operate. Since the question of 
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morality has been introduced, one may 
p(J9rhaps be permitted to inquire about the 
intellectual integrity of such an affirm-
ation. Is peace with one's age to be 
purchased at any cost? 46 
I conclude that Van Harvey is incorrect in his claim 
that modern historical methodology prevents a positive 
evaluation of some report of an alleged miracle. I 
believe that the historian could say that the evidence 
for the event was strong enough to warrant his 
affirming its historicity even though the event was 
inexplicable in terms of present scientific knowledge. 
Thus, in the case of the alleged resurrection of Jesus, 
the historian might, if he found the evidence adequate, 
conclude that Jesus progably was alive on the third 
day. What still has to be ascertained is whether or 
not the 'alleged miracle', the scientifically anomalous 
event is in fact a bniracle', a scientifically in-
explicable event; not just in the present but by a 
'best science' in the future. This question will be 
taken up in the next chapter. 
6. 	CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have investigated the claim made by 
Antony Flew and Van Harvey that the fundamentals of 
historical enquiry rule out the possibility of us 
46 	Merold Westphal in his review of The -Historian and 
the Believer. Religious Studies. II. 1967, p. 280. 
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knowing or having a rational belief for believing that 
an alleged miracle has occurred. I have argued that 
neither writer has produced a convincing argument 
and that in the final analysis nothing in the 
application of historical methodology rules out the 
positive affirmation of alleged miracles. What has 
been established is that the important question is 
whether or not it is reasonable to believe that some 
alleged miracles are real miracles, i.e. permanently 
inexplicable by the scientific enterpri&e. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I dismissed the claim that 
the fundamentals of historical enquiry rule out the 
possibility of our knowing that an alleged miracle has 
occurred. Having jumped this hurdle the apologist 
faces yet another in his defence of a violation concept 
of miracle. It is not enough for the apologist that 
any recalcitrant event regarded as a miracle cannot 
be explained presently by science. If the event is a 
miracle, and not merely an assumed miracle, it must be 
not only presently inexplicable by science but 
permanently inexplicable by science. In a theoretical 
sense the miracle is scientifically inexplicable by a 
'best science'. 
The apologist needs both a true law and a legitimate 
exception to establish rational belief in a miracle as 
a violation. The rationality of this move depends on 
the one hand on the legitimacy of a distinction between 
a vicious falsifying exception to a law of nature and 
a non-vicious violating exception, and on the other 
on the rationality of accepting that in certain 
circumstances it is possible to justify a belief that 
the recalcitrant event is a violation not a falsification 
of the law. 
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As I noted in the previous chapter, Flew is happy to 
accept that a legitimate distinction can be made 
between a violation of a law of nature and a 
falsification of a law of nature. Throughout this 
chapter I shall assume that Flew is correct on this 
matter but later (see Chapter Five) I shall critically 
examine the validity of such a distinction. In this 
chapter my attention will be devoted to a critical 
assessment of Flew's claim that one can at best be 
agnostic with regard to any claim of knowledge of a 
miracle (expressed as a violation of a law of nature). 
Flew maintains that if it can be shown that an event 
E is an exception to a law of nature L there is no 
natural way of knowing that E is a violation since 
this knowledge would entail that we also knew that L 
was true. However, Flew argues that it is aGays 
possible that science, at least in principle, could 
explain E and then modify or replace L by L l . Flew 
correctly maintains that the apologist, in claiming 
that miracles are violations, is committed to the 
claim that when E is a miracle it is scientifically 
inexplicable. Flew backs the case that it is always  
appropriate to believe that science could explain E. 
I argue against this, that there cannot be any a priori 
argument excluding the possibility of rational belief 
in the scientific inexplicability of E. 
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2. 	THE - CLAIM OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLICABILITY 
In this section I shall review and answer two some-
what related considerations which induce people to 
believe that one could not rationally believe that an 
exception to L is actually a violation of L. 1 The 
first consideration deals with the success of modern 
science in explaining events once thought to be in-
explicable. Thus, it is argued that any actual event 
alleged to be a miracle would fall under some law 
though it be presently or perhaps forever unknown. 
The second consideration rests on a theory about the 
revolutionary nature of science and urges us to regard 
all present laws as likely to be overthrown with the 
elapse of sufficient time. It follows from this, so 
the argument goes, that since all laws are open to 
revision or wholesale rejection in this way, we cannot 
know presently which laws are true so equally we 
cannot know what would be a violation of a true law. 
(a) The argument against rational belief in a violation 
of a law of nature from the progress of the 
scientific enterprise may be viewed under two 
headings: (i) all events alleged to be miracles 
will in the end be explained by science and (ii) 
continued failure to discover a natural factor 
as cause of an event never permits belief in its 
1 	These two considerations and some of the illustrations I 
use in this section were first drawn to my attention by 
John Gill in an untitled, unpublished paper. 
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absence. The former suggests that since in the 
past science has been able to explain more and 
more anomalous events in the future science will 
be able to explain what we now regard as 
violations. Erlandson 2 argues along these lines: 
-- Events have occurred in the past which 
have been extremely bizarre and 
disruptive to the then present laws of 
nature. Many such events have 
subsequently been explained. That the 
present cases are more bizarre and 
disruptive merely shows that the 
explanation will be extremely difficult 
to achieve, at most that the laws of 
nature are more complex than we had 
until now supposed. We cannot 
legitimately infer from bizarreness 
and disruptiveness no matter how extreme 
that we are confronted by the permanently 
inexplicable or the miraculous. 3 
Erlandson argues from the premise that some bizarre 
and disruptive events have been explained by 
science tbthe conclusion that all bizarre and 
disruptive events are at least in principle 
explainable by science. However, his actual 
argument falls short of reaching its desired 
conclusion. On the one hand, the fact that many 
extremely bizarre and disruptive events have 
2 	Douglas K. Erlandson. 'A New Look at Miracles'. 
Religious Studies. 13, pp. 417-428. 
3 	Op. Cit. p. 419. 
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subsequently been explained would only seem to 
warrant our believing that many similarly bizarre 
and disruptive events would later be explained. 
However, Erlandson himself admits that 'the 
present cases are more bizarre and disruptive'. 
On the other hand he might contend that the 
bizarre and disruptive features, no matter how 
significant, cannot by themselves make us despair 
of explaining the events scientifically. Of 
course this simply amounts to a begging of the 
underlying question itself. The issue being 
whether all natural events can be naturally 
explained he cannot then assume from the start 
that the explanation achieved will only be got 
with extreme difficulty or that the laws of 
nature are far more cemplicated than those we have 
yet obtained. 
The critic may attempt to strengthen his case by 
showing that much of what was once put down to 
acts of God is now explicable by science. 
Occurrences such as lightning, eclipses, and 
general meteorological and astronomical phenomena 
have in the past been attributed to God and in 
some places still are. Today it is believed that 
science can explain such phenomena and hence it 
might be concluded from this by induction that all 
physical events attributed to God will gain a 
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scientific explanation. This conclusion is, how-
ever, too strong. In the former cases science 
has managed to explain the natural causes of a 
whole class of observably similar phenomena 
allegedly caused by God. In the miracle case we 
are concerned rather with single or exceptionally 
few instances of observable phenomena. To use 
results about the first as a reliable indicator 
for the second is clearly a mistake since the two 
are not analogous. 
The second argument under this heading, namely 
that continued failure to discover a natural 
factor as cause of an event never permits belief 
in its absence, rests on a number of subtle 
assumptions. Nielsen 4 offers the following 
example illustrating this line of argument. 
Suppose certain very extraordinary events 
suddenly and inexplicably began occurring 
in great numbers; for example, suppose 
all over North America it turned out that 
sick people get well whenever they 
sincerely with their whole heart and mind 
ask God for help. Suppose further that 
this happens even when they have diseases 
that doctors believe are quite incurable. 
Those who have faith, that is, those who 
can really bring themselves to believe in 
God, and who ask God for help in this 
4 	K. Nielsen. 'Theoretical Constructs and God'. Journal of Religion. 54(3), July 1974, pp. 199-217. 
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manner get well; those who are with-
out unwavering faith do not. No known 
medical account of how they could have 
gotten well exists. There is not, let 
us suppose, even a plausible psycho-
somatic account. Further suppose that 
no naturalistic explanation is found 
for their getting well when they pray, 
and yet these happenings go on 
regularly for several generations. If 
these extraordinary but quite (eLnp-i-Fical-iy 	) 
describable events were to take place, 
would it not then become reasonable to 
assert that there is a God or that there 
probably is a God who answers te prayers 
of those who truly beseech him?' 
Nielsen claims that the correct response to such 
a fantastic circumstance would be to admit that 
ther-Oe are extraordinary events of a thoroughly 
baffling kind. Nevertheless he would be right 
in asserting that he sees no reason for saying 
that in principle there can be no naturalistic 
explanation of such events. The apologist is 
not, it should be clear, committed to the view 
that for every presently inexplicable occurrence 
there is no natural explanation or cause. The 
apologist backing the violation argument only has 
to support the view that there is not always a 
natural cause. How does the critic mount his 
argument against this position? 
5 Nielsen. Op. cit. p. 200. 
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Firstly, he might contend that every event has a 
natural cause. Nielsen, however, is careful to 
avoid this position since it involves a meta-
physical dogmatism and clearly begs the question. 
Secondly, he might resort to the claim that it 
must always remain logically possible for a 
natural cause to be present and discovered. Now 
it seems to me that there is ambituilgy in the 
notion of logical possibility when applied in 
this case. Given a definition of a miracle as a 
violation of a law of nature and which therefore 
has (tgnselessly) no scientific explanation, it is 
logically necessary that if an event E is a miracle, 
then E has (tenseless1) no scientific explanation. 
In this sense it is logically impossible that a 
miracle has a scientific explanation. On the 
other hand it is not logical) 	for any 
particular event that it be miraculous, and hence 
it is not necessary for any particular event that 
it be scientifically inexplicable. In this sense 
it is not logically necessary that a miracle has 
no scientific explanation. Clearly the apologist 
need not believe that it is logically impossible 
(sense 2) that the event have a natural explanation. 
He need only believe (sense 1) that it is logically 
impossible. He need believe only that in fact the 
event will receive no scientific explanation 
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(because there is none), not that it could not 
do so. Furthermore, he believes that he has 
positive backing to support his claim that the 
event is in fact a miracle. 
Thirdly, the critic might resort to the claim that 
no matter how detailed the search for the natural 
cause, it might be of such a type that it might 
always fall outside of the scientific net. That 
is, the search is cut short, or it is not wide 
enough in its span. The apologist does not deny 
that at times this does explain failure by the 
scientific enterprise to ascertain the cause of 
unusual events. However, given positive backing 
for his belief that certain events are caused by 
God, he will not accept that it is never rational 
to believe that some extraordinary events are 
violations of a law of nature. 
It seems, therefor 	that on close examination 
progress in science gives us no overriding grounds 
for supposing that the reputed major miracles 
will be reduced to normal occurrences. In fact 
it would seem that if an argument from scientific 
progress were to be-effectively employed against 
the legitimacy of miracle claims it should be 
• couched throughout in terms of miracles. In other 
words it would make more sense if it could be shown 
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that many bizarre events - bizarre in the sense 
of being supposedly mi(aculous;c for example, 
the raising of the dead, walking on water, 
turning water into wine - had with the passing 
of time been explained by science. In actual 
fact these events have remained as bizarre and 
disruptive today as they have ever been, and 
there is no sign that science is any closer to 
offering an explanation of them. 
(b) NAwell-§mith 6 has strongly supported the argument 
against rational belief in a violation of a law 
of nature taking his stand from the revolutionary 
nature of the scientific enterprise. He argues 
that today's science is not committed to 
yesterday's science. In other words science is 
not committed to any law, theory or concept but 
rather it is committed to a particular method of 
explanation. He argues that the scientific 
vocabulary is continually being revised and en-
riched 7 and that the history of science strongly 
indicates that many of our present laws and 
theories will also go by the board. 8 From this 
6 	Patrick Nowell-Smith. 'Miracles'. Hibbert Journal. 
1950, pp. 354-60. Reprinted in Flew and 
MacIntyre (eds.). New Essays in Philosophical Theology. 
SCM. London, 1955, pp. 243-253. My references are to 
the latter volume. 
7 	Nowell-Smith. ,Op. cit. p. 247. 
8 	Friedman. 	'Hume on Miracles: A Critique'. 	(1974 un- 
published paper), p. 10 claims that 'the probability in 
favour of any actual formulation of a law of nature is 
not close to one, but instead, is rather low, at any 
givenD—:Fdin,12-i-sjtory'. 
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Nowell-Smith argues that even though we may not 
know which present laws will suffer that fate it 
may well be those very laws which, for example, 
make men rising from the dead sound so impossible. 
In this light those who now claim that a 
particular law has been violated will have the 
ground swept from under them. The supposed 
violation becoming just one of a range of cases 
falling under the new law. 
In reply to Nowell-Smith it should be noted that 
science is a multi-level enterprise and while it 
may be granted that science is revolutionary at 
the highest levels there are a minimum of changes 
at the lowest levels. Yandell supports this 
contention. He claims that generalizations 
couched in terms of ordinary observable 'middle 
sized objects' seem unlikely to be revised in the 
light of progress in knowledge and are little, if 
any, subject to revision in the light of paradigm 
shifts. 
Unless such shifts are purely arbitrary, 
there are criteria for appraising them. 
Unless such criteria are purely formal, 
appraisal will include reference to what 
some philosophers have called 'empirical 
fit'. Part of the empirical data to 
which theories must render their due - 
must 'fit to', so to say - is just that 
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which confirms such generalizations. 
Without supposing our knowledge of 
these generalizations, or of their 
confirming instances, is incorrigible 
or indubitable, or completely safe 
from revision, one can nonetheless 
hold it in high regard as part of the 
touchstone any theory must satisfy. 9 
Furthermore, while science may be reolutionary 
at the higher levels at the lower levels it tends 
to be progressive and cumulative. At the lower 
level, generalizations if they change at all, 
change only in detail leaving much of the scope 
of the law unchanged. On this basis I would 
argue that an adequate consideration of the 
revolutionary nature of science does not rule 
out knowledge of the miraculous on the ground that 
each and every law currently held will be revised 
or rejected by some future revolution in science. 
Nowell-Smith, faced with this answer to his 
charge, might well reinforce his position by 
accepting much of what has been said and yet 
argue that strictly speaking, any change in a 
law results in a new and different law. Since 
the old formulation did not in fact express a 
true law, there was in fact no violation either. 
On the surface this renewed charge against the 
9 Keith E. Yandell. 'Miracles, Epistemology and Flume's 
Barrier'. International: JoUrnal for Philosophy of  
Religion. 	Vol. 7, No. 3, 1976, pp. 414-415. 
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violation theory poses substantial difficulty 
in the path of rational belief , of a violation of 
a law of nature. In actual fact the difficulties 
are not as severe as they seem. 
In the vast majority of miracle claims the 
supposed violation occurs within a range of cases 
where the operation of the law has been 
thoroughly tested and yet the event is markedly 
discordant with the law. Since typically 
purported miracles are markedly discordant or 
anomalous events any small modification to the 
lower level law in question would mean that what 
has been regarded as a violation of the former 
law will also be a violation of the new law; 
its closely related successor. Since most lower 
level laws and reports of purported miracles are 
normally couched in observational 10 terminology 
a statement of the supposed violation will clearly 
contradict the new law as much as it did the old 
one. It might well be argued, in effect, that no 
matter how infinite the changes to law forlIulation 
at the revolutionary levels of science we could 
still be certain that a particular event couched 
in observational language is a violation of the 
lower level laws. 
10 	Bruce Langtry. 	'Investigating a Resurrection'. Inter- 
change. 	No. 17, 1975, p. 42. 
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In this section I have examined the claim that one 
could never have positive reason for believing that 
reputed violations of laws of nature could not be 
brought within the embrace of science. I have 
examined this claim from the broad perspectives of 
the progress of scientific explanation and the 
revolutionary nature of science. My analysis of the 
claim from both perspectives leads me to conclude 
that there is no positive reason for believing that 
all reputed violations will be, or could be, 
explained by science. 
3. 	IS IT REASONABLE TO BELIEVE THAT SOME EVENTS WILL 
NEVER BE EXPLAINED BY SCIENCE? 
The violation theorist may gain some solace from the 
argument of the preceding section, but the absence of 
any cogent argument against the rationality of belief 
in the occurrence of a violation of a law of nature 
does not of itself amount to an argument for genuine 
violations. In this section I hope to show that on 
the assumption that a coherent dichotomy of exceptions 
to laws of nature*.into falsifications and violations 
can be made, 11 given certain circumstances one would 
be irrational to believe that a purported violation 
could in principle be explained by science. 
Langtry12 argues that certain types of events if they 
11 	See Chapter Five and Six for a critical examination 
of the coherence of this assumption. 
12 	Bruce Langtry. Op. cit. p.44. 
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occurred would indicate God as their cause and hence 
would justify the (1, ■elief that they were scientifically 
inexplicable. He offers the following example: 
Suppose that a great voice were simultan-
eously heard over all the earth, speaking 
to each nation in its own language; 
suppose also that the voice claimed to be 
from God, and in support of this claim 
issued detailed predictions about events 
unforecast by human scientists, predictions 
which were subsequently verified. Clearly 
one would be justified in saying that al- 
most certainly there was some non-human 
intelligent and purposive agent at work. 13 
If this event were to occur a number of possible 
hypotheses concerning the origin of the voice could 
be given. The scientific enterprise could examine 
many of these in practice, such as the possibility 
that the voice was issued from a number of radio 
stations throughout the world or that the voice was 
projected from a satellite. On the assumption that 
no natural cause could be found, after exhausting all 
the apparent possibilities, I believe that the 
predictive element in this event compels one to accept 
that the rational choice in the situation is to accept 
that the voice did in fact come from God. Clearly to 
say that the rational choice is to accept that the 
voice came from God does not entail any degree of 
13 	Ibid. 
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infallibility in the matter. It may in fact turn out 
that a being from another planet caused the event. 
Nevertheless, lack of infallibility cannot encourage 
one not to make a decision based on all available 
evidence. The very strong evidence in this case 
supports the hypothesis that the voice came from God. 
Let us imagine that when Moses returned from Mt. Sinai 
he actually carried with him a tablet of stone with 
the ten commandments engraved on it. 14 Let us imagine 
further that Moses claimed that God, by directing 
bolts of lightning, had caused the engraving. What 
should one believe?. We could imagine a large number 
of alternative hypotheses. Perhaps Moses did the 
engraving himself, perhaps someone else did it, or 
perhaps it just happened by chance. However, let us 
imagine that upon investigation it is discovered that 
the technology required to engrave on stone was in 
fact not available at that point of time and that 
scientific tests made upon the rock support the 
hypothesis that bolts of lightning were the most likely 
cause of the marks upon the stone. If the engraving 
upon the stone were not intelligible one might conclude 
that this event happened by chance. However, the 
intelligible nature of the marks together with the 
lack of suitable alternative hypotheses leaves no 
alternative but to believe that some intelligent agent 
14 	See EXODUS 19,.20. 
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more advanced than ourselves and commanding a superior 
technology caused the event. The question is then 
whether we have more reason to believe that the 
intelligent agent was God or some other being. 
In both preceding examples it was the inability of 
science to offer a viable alternative which led us to 
the conclusion that the event was 2cientifically in-
explicable. Of course one might attempt to counter 
the violation theorist by arguing that in principle 
at least it is possible that sooner or later science 
will offer such an alternative hypothesis. This•
claim might be based on the fact that in these cases 
science has an indication of some of the possible 
causes of the event. It knows what sorts of things 
might count as causes, the problem is that they 
appear to be absent. In the face of this objection the 
violation theorist can strengthen his case by 
indicating that many events if they occurred would be 
scientifically inexplicable because science would not 
even be able to hypothesise as to what would count as 
causes. 
Firstly, imagine that there are, as a matter of fact, 
no elephants in Australia. Imagine further that 
2,000 people are seated in a closed auditorium when 
sudden, what appears to be a live elephant appears 
in the midst of the audience. One might imagine that 
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an illusion has been created. However, scientific 
investigation indicates that the supposed elephant 
is alike in all respects to other elephants. Later, 
another elephant is brought into the country and 
both elephants are placed in a zoo where they 
eventually have offspring. Secondly, imagine that 
there is an apple orchard in which there are one 
hundred apple trees all of the same variety, all with 
the same characteristics except •that one of the trees 
produces bibles rather than appl's.j Both of these 
events are totally baffling. The scientist faced 
with the task of offering some explanation for the 
events is faced with an insurmountable problem. The 
method of investigation used by science is dependent 
on the underlying principles of cause and effect; 
the notion of cause implies some sort of 'constant 
connection' between events. Unfortunately for the 
scientist in each of the preceding cases there is no 
constant conjunction, the scientist is given no clues, 
no idea, where to even look for a possible cause, he 
has no starting point whatsoever. The rationality of 
a belief that an event has a natural cause rests 
partly on the ability to decide what sorts of things 
would count as causes followed by an investi&tion to 
determine whether or not they were in fact present. 
When one is faced with an event for which one cannot 
even suggest the sorts of things which would count as 
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natural causes, one has no idea where to begin an 
investigation, one has no grounds for optimistically 
expecting that even in principle science can offer 
an explanation. Rationality demands that one accept 
that the event is scientifically inexplicable. 
In the preceding examples I have attempted to draw 
out some of the positive reasons characteristic of 
reputed violations which strengthen our resolve that 
these events would never be brought within the embrace 
of science. It is now time to attempt to sharpen the 
analysis and draw together 	criteria for recognition 
of the scientifically inexplicable. 
A number of writers 15 have suggested that one of the 
very important criteria is the demand that any law of 
nature must pass the restriction of simplicity. That 
is, given a choice of two laws which predict 'and 
explain in the same array of cases, science will prefer 
the one with fewer concepts and tiqpITIT,6s 
with more. Likewise, the demand for a 6-\-iterion of 
simplicity puts a brake on theorists who add bits to 
an established theory or law everyaliWthe facts look 
as though they will tell against it. Swinburne 16 
15 	See for example (a) R.F. Holland. 	'The Miraculous' . 
American Philosophical Quarterly., January, 1965, pp. 
48-50. (b) Margaret A. Boden. 'Miracles and Scientific 
Explanation'. Ratio. XIN1, December.1969, pp. 140-141. 
(c) Tan. Tai Wei. 'Recent Discussions on Miracles'. 
Sophia.. XI/3, October 1972, p. 24. (a)) Richard 
Swinburne. The Concept Of Miracle. London: Macmillan, 
1970, pp. 29-32. 
16 	Richard Swinburne. Op. Cit. pp. 29-32. 
- 8 9 - 
argues that it is unreasonable to believe, for example, 
that the anomalous case of water turning into wine 
could be incorporated into the set of laws covering 
water and wine. He'claims that to modify existing 
laws in the face of this one event, which despite 
considerable attempts has never been repeated, would 
be ad hoc and unreasonable. Any apparent gain in 
achieving trouble-free-regularity from such a 
modification would be more than counter-balanced by 
the loss of rationality in one's interpretive ctechnique. 
The argument for belief in violations of a law of 
nature from simplicity has not gahaD without criticism. 
Robert Young 17 urges that we cannot rule out the 
possibility of some quite unthought formulation being 
discovered in the future, which will successfully 
cover the supposed violation. He argues that to claim 
otherwise is to claim that we can know the future and 
he believes that it is more likely that it is our lack 
of imagination which prevents us coming up with a law 
to cover both the old law and the alleged violation. 
Young's app41 to possible lack of imagination is only 
strong if the initial case for the violation is 
relatively weak. Paucity of imagination is never by 
itself a sufficient argument that there is not just a 
slim chance but a considerable likelihood that something 
17 	Robert Young. 'Miracles and Physical Impossibility'. 
Sophia. October, 1972, pp. 29-35. 
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has been overlooked. In fact the imagination argument 
is weak in aother way; it is extremely double edged. 
One could argue 0 that it is only our paucity of 
imagination which blinds us from realizing that 
certain events which appear to be in conformityd with 
laws are in fact not. These events having character-
istics of which we have not conceived which make them 
exceptions. Imagination is quite neutral and works 
for both sides; it cannot be used to favour one side 
over the other. More imagination may enable us to 
fit more apparent exceptions(lnto regularities, but 
then it may enable us to find more exceptions to our 
apparent regularities. 
Is there then any positive reason to believe that 
even the most fertile of imaginations would not be 
able to accommodate the purported violation into a 
law? Is there reason to believe that no other theory 
is in fact available? On this issue let me make the 
following observations. 
At the lower levels of science it is usual to have 
only one theory in any established area. This to-
gether with the fact that such lower level theories 
are couched in observational terms would seem to 
indicate that there is in fact only one theory adequate 
to the data and that we already have it or at least 
some very close approximation to it. Since the 
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theories we have are good predictors it seems 
intuitively implausible to suggest that there are 
as yet undiscovered, quite different and significant-
ly more complex laws and theories covering the same 
areas. 
If the alleged violation is taken as indicating that 
our present formulation of law is mistaken, then, 
by modus tollens, any theory from which the original 
law could be derived would equally be mistaken. To 
demand wholesale changes to a body of theories and 
laws simply to accommodate one recalcitrant occurrence 
seems too high a price to pay. 
If there were a set of initial conditions which in a 
law like way triggered the anomalous event - for 
example, water into wine - one might suspect that it 
might have chanced to happen again. Yet as a matter 
of fact, despite the ready availability of water, it 
has remained impossible to reproduce. 
J.C. Carter 18 and K. McNamara 19 both argue that we 
are able to discern the scientific inexplicability of 
part of the set of presently inexplicable events as a 
, result of the sign structure or meaning of the event 
together with the religious context associated with 
the event. Carter claims that once an event has been 
18 	James C. Carter. 	'The Recognition of Miracles'. 
Theological Studies. Vol. XX, 1959, pp. 175-193. 
19 	Kevin McNamara. 'The Nature and Recognition of 
Miracles'. Irish Theological Quarterly. Vol. 27, 
1960, pp. 294-322.. 
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testified as definitely 'beyond the known powers of 
nature' 20  or in other words, is presently inexplicable 
by science, we are able to discern whether the event 
is a miracle through the recognition of its meaning. 
It follows from this that while there is presently 
no scientific explanation for water turning into wine 
in the Cana context or of a man coming back to life 
after three days in the grave the sign-context and 
the religious significance of these events give 
positive reinforcement to the rationality of a belief 
that these events will never be explained by science. 
Thus, as Langtry suggests: 
The mere occurrence of a resurrection would 
not by itself justify appeal to the direct 
primary causal actigity of God. What is 
normally involved is a claim of a 
resurrection plus an accompanying word 
of interpretation, allegedly coming from 
God. The context is crucial, and so is the 
preferred description of the purposes and 
motives of God. 21 
22-, It is the religious coherence ‘LA---t-he-----'.eventch 
providesVisTaienbacking for the claim that the event 
20 	Carter. Op. cit. p. 194. 
21 	Bruce Langtry. Op. cit. p. 45. 
22 	Christopher M.N. Sugden makes some interesting points 
about coherence.and resurrection in 'The Supernatural 
and the.Unique in History'. Theological Students  
Fellowship Bulletin. Vol. 67, 1973, pp. 1-5. 
- 93 - 
is a miracle. 23 
4. 	CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have been concerned with the 
question of the recognition of a miracle expressed 
as a violation of a law of nature. In the first 
part of the chapter I concluded that there were no 
compelling reasons why we should reject the view 
that a purported violation of a law of nature was 
scientifically inexplicable. In the second part of 
the chapter I have attempted to outline a positive 
program for the recognition of the scientifically 
inexplicable. I conclude that while our reasoning 
can never be infallible, nevertheless, given the 
occurrence of certain recalcitrant events we would 
have good reason for accepting that the event was 
permanently scientifically inexplicable. In fact 
I maintain that to insist that an alternative 
explanation is correct would be unreasonable. 
23 	E. Dhanis ('Qu'est-ce qu'un miracle?' Gregorianum XL, 
1959, pp. 201-241, particularly p.213) argues that 
it is sometimes possible to prove with certainty 
the physical -i-FanScendence, of' an effect solely from 
an examination of the effect itself. These 
circumstances are given as: 
First, the phenomenon must depart from the habitual 
course of nature observed in very many and varied 
circumstances. Further, it must appear in an ordinary 
environment, so as to exclude the suspicion that un-
usual natural circumstances or new artificial factors 
may be responsible. Finally, there must be no know-
ledge of the existence of a phenomenon of the same type 
and more or less comparable, unless perhaps it be a 
sacred prodigy, intelligible precisely as an exception 
of natural laws. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
1. 	INTRODUCTION  
The epistemological defence of the violation model has 
of necessity rested on the coherence of the underlying 
assumption that it makes sense to distinguish between 
a falsifying exception to a law of nature and a non-
falsifying exception or violation to a law of nature. 
In fact I noted earlier that there was an implicit 
argument in Hume's Section X to the effect that such 
a distinction is in fact incoherent. 1 This argument 
undeveloped by Hume and rejected by Flew has been 
taken up by a number of contemporary writers. In 
fact there is no longer a single argument for the 
incoherence of the violation model, but rather a 
number of arguments which may be grouped collectively 
' under two major headings. The first of these may be 
termed the 'definitional attacks 1 ; the second, as 
the 'scientific attacks'. 
The arguments under the former heading attempt to 
demonstrate that there is an ine&apable logical in-
consistency in the concept'- that is, that it involves 
a self-contradiction. Arguments under the latter 
heading attempt to show that the violation concept 
of miracle is incompatible with the scientific 
enterpri§e and that the concept could never be 
1 	See Chapter 2, page 10. 
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legitimatelypr-'-e-cricat—e-d, on an observable occurrence, 
and is therefore meaningless. Clearly it is not 
possible to outline all the attacks made under these 
two headings nor is there always a clear indication 
available to determine under which heading the attack 
fits best. Nevertheless, it will be my aim to 
analyse the major arguments in both areas. In this 
chapter I shall investigate the definitional attacks 
and leave the attack from science to the next chapter. 
2. 	McKINNON 2 
McKinnon has attempted a refutation of the claim that 
a miracle should be defined as 'a permanently in-
explicable event'. McKinnon's refutation is based on 
two arguments and I shall look at each in turn. 
(a) Miracles are normally defined as events which 
violate or suspend natural laws; that is, 
they are scientifically inexplicable. 
But natural laws are simply 'shorthand 
descriptions' of how things do, in fact, happen. 
Or in other words natural law is definitionally 
equivalent to 'the actual course of events'. 
Thus to claim that an event is a miracle is 
implicitly to assert both that such an occurrence 
2 	Alistair McKinnon. 'Miracle and Paradox'. American  
Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1967, 
pp. 308-314. 
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is (i) an observable phenomenon, part of the 
actual course of events; and (ii) as a 
violation or suspension of a natural law, 
not part of the actual course of events. 
But such an affirmation and denial of the same 
statement is obviously self-contradictory. 
Accordingly, the 'miraculous' as initially 
defined, must be viewed as conceptual nonsense. 
Whether or not one accepts McKinnon's first argument 
will depend largely on wfiether his definition of 
natural laws as summary statements about what happens, 
is acceptable. Swinburne, for example, claims that 
such laws should not be understood in this way, but 
rather, should be understood as descriptive 
generalizations about repeatable natural phenomena. 
Laws do not describe things that happen in an entirely 
irregular and scientifically unpredictable way. He, 
therefore, concludes that since laws should be under-
stood in this way they do not cover 'non-repeatable 
counter instances' and therefore they do not cover 
all events. 3 If Swinburne's claim is accepted the 
laws of 'best science' would in fact be ones with 
restricted generality. Now one might object to this 
by claiming that if there is an attested counter-
example to a supposed law of science this shows not 
3 	Richard Swinburne. The Concept of Miracle. London: 
Macmillan, 1970, p. 26. 
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that the law has to be understood as weakly 
- quantified but that it is false. A supposed law of 
nature either describes what happens or it does not, 
and in the latter case it must simply be abandoned. 
N. Smart 4 provides a good illustration of this point. 
How then can a miracle violate a law of 
nature? If it is an exception to it, then 
the law of nature is already (so to speak) 
destroyed. There seems to be a paradox in 
the definition of miracle. The miracle 
seems forever frustrated in its attempt to 
violate; for as soon as it imagines that 
it has succeeded, it finds that there was 
nothing there after all to violate! IN ifO) 
like someone trying to live in a state of 
conjugal bliss with a bachelor; for as 
soon as there is conjugality, there is (by 
definition) no bachelor. 5 
Smart believes that this illustration is based on a 
falle„cy. He points out that a falsifying negative 
instance to a supposed law of nature is not a single 
event, but a repeatable event. Smart refers to this 
as the operation of 'a small scale law of nature'. 
It is described as of the form 'under these s4ecial 
conditions that occurs'. 
The large scale law of nature , is supposed to 
apply to a number of particular types of 
4 	Ninian Smart„ 	Philosophers and Religious Truth. 
N.Y.: 	Macmillan, 1970, pp. 15-44. 
Ninian Smart. Op. cit. p. 25. 
situations; these these are its instances, not 
single events. Suppose the law of 
gravitation (a large scale law) implies that 
balls will roll down an inclined plane at a 
certain pace, given the mass of the earth, 
the angle of the plane, and so on. And 
suppose that the experiment always comes 
off as predicted; the small scale law
•holds. And then suppose that one unfine 
day some new Galileo finds that we had not 
gat the conditions as we thought we had, in 
their purity, and that some unseen factor 
always entered into our experiments. And 
suppose that we remove that factor and lo! 
the balls move at the wrong pace. Now we 
have a new small scale law which is an 
exception, an anomaly. Now we have to 
scrap or modify, that is, to scrap the 
large scale law. 6 
According to Smart's thesis, miracles, not being 
experimentally repeatable are not small scale laws 
and consequently they cannot force modification upon 
or destruction of large scale laws. Uncaused events 
would be counter-instances to known laws of nature; 
they would by definition be experimentally Vnrepeatable 
counter-instances mid as such they would not falsify 
these laws. It is only events which are, at least in 
principle, scientific(qlly repeatable that falsify 
scientific laws. If an event E is an unrepeatable 
counter-instance to a law L it would be folly to 
6 Ninian Smart. Op. cit. pp. 29-30. 
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abandon or modify L in the light of E. Any new 
formula which accommodated the occurrence of E would 
allow us to predict similar events in similar 
circumstances, but since E is an anomalous event 
which does not fit into any patterns of natural 
causation, this new formula would yield false 
predictions in a whole range of future cases. The 
character of E is such that we know that like 
circumstances will not yield like events in future. 
If any law of science is operative here it is L. 
Any modifications of L which allowed it to encompass 
E would yield false predictions in a wide range of 
future cases and hence would be of less value than L. 
If the world is not completely regular, scienigific•
laws have to be understood in a weakly quantified way 
in the light of irregularities which are unrepeatable; 
and hence do not generate new universal statements. 
At least some true scientific laws would have to be 
understood as applying to not quite all of the events 
that strictly fall under them. A genuine counter-
example to a scientific law - one that falsifies it - 
can at least in principle be reproduced and will 
therefore generate a new universal statement about 
what happens under stpecified conditions. This may in 
turn be incorporated 'into the statement of the original 
law, so that although it may be more detailed and more 
complex as a result, it can still be affirmed 
universally. Where the counter-example is not 
repeatable a weakly quantified law would be the 
best that science could offer and I therefore conclude 
that the first of McKinnon's arguments fails. What 
then of the second? 
(b) Miracles are normally defined as events which 
actually violate or suspend true laws of nature. 
But these true laws of nature as adequate 
descriptive statements about the way things 
actually happen, are non-violable. If an 
event occurs which can be proven to be a vp.11,d 
counter-instance to a present law of nature, 
this only demonstrates that such a law is not 
truly adequate. 
It follows that anyone claiming that a miraculous 
event has occurred has involved himself in an 
inescapable dTI§mma - or mutual destruction of 
arguments. If such a person wishes to hold that 
a valid counter-instance has actually occurred, 
then - as we have seen - he must deny that the 
supposed counter-instance is truly valid. In 
either case the believer is forced to give up 
something essential to his definitional 
conception of the miraculous. 
Consequently, it is obvious that any believer 
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contending that a miracle is a violation or 
suspension of a true natural law is uttering 
conceptual nonsense. 
believe that McKinnon's second argument rests on an 
ambiguous use of the term 'adequate law of nature'. 
It appears that he is claiming that if everything 
that occurs in nature cannot be adequately explained 
by the laws of nature then by definition they are in-
adequate. He seems to be saying that: 
... Anything which happens I propose to call 
a 'natural' event. On this showing there 
can be no supernatural events (or violations) 
because there is, so to speak, no basket for 
them; anything that happens will be 
classified in a different basket. 7 
This move is clearly sleight of hand and does not 
offer an adequate response to the problem. To look 
for regularities in the behaviour of data is entirely 
legitimate, and pragmatically to expect such 
regularities is the quintessence of wisdom, but to 
insist that all data conform to ordinary expectations 
and fit a non-miraculous model is the antithesis of 
the scientific spirit. Models must arise as constructs 
to fit data, not serve as beds of Procrustes to force 
data into alien categories. 
7 	T.R. Miles. 'On Excluding the Supernatural'. 
ReligidUs . Studies, 1, 1966, p. 144. 
1 og. 
The truth of this166-17a=may be demonstrated with 
reference to modern studies of the nature of light; 
it could be argued that today's physicist 6,) finding 
empirically that light tests out in a contradictory 
fashion as both undulatory and corpuscular (wave-like 
and particle-like), is even willing at that point of 
necessity to shelve normal standards of rational 
consistency for the sake of the facts and conceptualize 
the unit of light as a 'wave-particle' (the photon). 
If the true scientist is willing to subordinate inter- 
pretation/explanation to the facts even if rational 
consistency suffers in the process, surely he cannot 
i4ist on forcing facts into the mould of substantive 
regularity. Regularity (like consistency) is properly 
employed up to the point where the data are no longer 
hospitable to its operation as an interpretive category: 
in the face of recalcitrant, non-analogous uniqueness, 
regularity - not the facts - must yield. 8 
McKinnon might push his case by arguing that a law of 
nature is inadequate if it is not strictly universal. 
There are two replies to this charge open to the 
violation theorist. Firstly, it might be emphasized 
that many philosophers of science are now prepared to 
accept that some laws of nature may be accurately 
represented in statistical form and hence on this basis, 
8 	I am offering this interpretation of the 'wave-particle' 
model for the purpose of discussion. It may be argued 
that there is another more acceptable interpretation of 
the model. 
10(:3) - 
lack of universality cannot be used to infer that a 
law is inadequate. Although the law may not be 
strictly universal it is adequate as a law of science 
if'it is the best predictor that science can offer. 
Secondly, if the idea of a not strictly universal law 
is unacceptable it could be replaced by a universal 
law whose quantifier (x) applies to only those x's 
which occur naturally - that is, which occur as the 
result of scientifically investigatable causes. Now 
the law is strictly universal but provides for 
exceptions to it through its limited domain. 9 
M. Diamond 10 suggests that McKinnon's case involves 
the following assumptions: (a) all true exceptions to 
present laws are natural exceptions, and (b) any true 
exception necessarily shows the natural law in 
question to be inadequate. He concludes: 
	 This a priori argument can be refuted by 
noting that a supernaturally caused 
exception to a scientific law would not 
invalidate it, because scientific laws 
are designed to express natural 
regularities. 11 
However, despite this claim that supernatural exceptions 
-to laws of nature are logically possible occurrences it 
9 	Further implications and discussion of this suggestion 
will be left until later. See page 114fT -.7----3 
10 	Malcolm L. Diamond. 	'Miracles!. Religious Studies. 9. 
1973, pp. 307 - 324. 
11 	Malcolm L. Diamond. Op. cit. pp. 316-317. 
seems that McKinnon could still defend his claim, 
that only natural exceptions occur by appeal to the 
theory of universal determinism. That is, the 
commitment that all events in nature are connected by 
causal laws. Kant, for example, in the Second Analogy 
of his Critique of Pure Reason argued that universal 
causation is a necessary condition of our experience 
of an objective world. According to Kant if we are 
to have knowledge of the world of objective particulars, 
that is, objects which exist independently of our 
experience of them, it must be the case that the 
behaviour of these objects is in complete conformity 
with the laws of cause and effect, all changes must be 
causally explicable. However, as Bennett 12 and 
Strawson 13 have convincingly argued, this project will 
not succeed. The most that Kant can show is that for 
objective experience to be possible it must be of a 
world which manifests a high degree of causal order. 
But, this high degree of causal order is compatible 
with the occurrence-of events which are causally in-
explicable. 
I conclude that there is no acceptable basis for 
McKinnon's assumptions and hence his second argument 
against the coherence of miracle defined as a violation 
of a law of nature fails. It is neither possible to 
Kant's Analytic. Cambridge, 1966, 	pp. 219- 12 J. 	Bennett. 
220. 
13 P.F. 	Strawson. The Bounds of Sense. 	London, 1966, 	pp. 
140-146. 
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demonstrate that it is a necessary truth that all 
natural events have a natural cause, nor is it possible 
to rule out some degree of indeterminism in nature by 
means of a Kantian transcendental deduction. 
3. 	P.S. WADIA 
A more recent attempt to illustrate the incoherence of 
the concept of miracle, when defined as a violation of 
14 a law of nature, has been proposed by Wadia. 	Wadia 
directs his attack at the claim made by the violation 
proponent that when a miracle occurs the physically 
impossible occurs. Wadia claims to clearly demonstrate 
that the argument for vindication of the violation 
model is based upon an inconsistency and lb therefore 
fallacious. 
Wadia presents what he claims is a schematic presentatior 
of the violation model and claims that premise (a), al-
though obviously necessary to the argument, is clearly 
inconsistent with premise (j). Wadia also claims that 
the violation argument for the rationality of belief 
in miracles is not one argument among many but the only 
reasonable argument. Thus by demonstrating that the 
violation argument is invalid he believes that he has 
demonstrated that belief in miracles cannot be 
justified and must be rejected as irrational. Wadia 
- 14 	P.S. Wadia. 'Miracles and Common Understanding'. 
American Philosophical Quarterly. 26, 1976, pp. 69-81. 
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presents the following eleven point schema. 15 
(a) Law L is a law of nature. 
(b) Event E is an exception to L. 
(c) 0 is an observer. 
(d) E, though physically impossible, 
is logically possible. 
(e) It is not unreasonable to believe 
that the physically impossible may 
sometimes occur. 
(f) Assume that E occurs. 
(g) It is logically possible for 0 to 
perceive E. 
(h) 0 perceives E. 
(i) It is logically possible for E to 
have an as yet unknown natural cause 
which, if and when discovered, would 
necessitate a revision of L. Thus 
it is logically possible that E is 
merely an apparent exception to a 
law of nature. But though such a 
thing is logically possible, it is 
physically impossible. 
(j) But it is unnable for 0 (or 
anyone else) to believe in the 
occurrence of the physically im-
possible. 
(k) nerefore, in the circumstances 
described in (h) above, it would be 
reasonable for 0 to believe that E 
was a real, and not merely an 
apparent, exception to a law of nature. 
Prior to an examination of the main thrust of Wadia's 
attack I think that it would be wise to Point totatie 
15 	P.S. Wadia. Op. cit. 	p. 81. 
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existence of a number of weaknesses and sources of 
ambiguity in his schematic presentation. The first 
difficulty is that we are not told how many of the 
points are premises, how many are derivations, and 
from which of the premises the derivations are made. 
Secondly, there is an element of ambiguity involved 
in his use of the key terms 'law of nature' and 
'physically impossible'. It is integral to the 
violation model that a miracle is an event which 
occurs and is an exception to a true law of nature. 
Therefore, one assumes that by law of nature L in (a) 
Wadia refers to a true law and not merely to a supposed 
law. However, this is not so clear because in (i) 
he introduces the possibility of revision of L. But 
if L is true it is not possible to revise it without 
replacing it with a new L i which is inferior. If L 
is not a true law then clearly a counter-instance to 
it might well be a falsifying instance. It is my view 
that Wadia is somewhat confused between conceptual and 
epistemological issues. His own claim is that he is 
investigating conceptual claims, however, it seems 
likely that when he talks of the possibility of the 
revision of L what he is getting at is the 
epistemological problems inherent in the recognition 
of a violation. That these epistemological questions 
have a bearing on the issue of the coherence of the 
violation model is something that needs to be 
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demonstrated and cannot just be assumed. 
From Wadia's lines (b), (d) and (f) it appears that 
what is physically impossible is an event E where E 
occurs and is an exception to L, where L is true. 
Yet i line (i) Wadia uses the physically impossible 
to refer to something relating to the law L rather 
than to an event. To claim that it is physically 
impossible that L could be revised appears to mis-
apply the term. Keeping these problems in mind I 
now move on to an analysis of the schema proper. 
Wadia claims that lines (e) and (j) are essential to 
• the violation case but since they are quite clearly 
inconsistent he concludes that the violation case 
is fallacious. In line (e) he claims that the 
violation apologist argues that it is not unreasonable 
to believe that the physically impossible may sometimes 
occur. Furthermore, it appears from the schema that 
• Wadia is proposing that the apologist believes this 
even prior to having observed E the exception to L. 
Let us first of all be clear about what this claim 
entails. 
It.might be contended that what is being claimed is 
' that it is reasonable to believe that not all supposed 
laws of nature are true laws of nature; to claim 
otherwise would be to claim infallibility. If this 
is the claim then it is rather trivial. Clearly 
this cannot be what is meant since the violation 
argument is built upon the assumption that L is a 
true law; if L were known to be false there could be 
little credence for a miracle claim. It seems that 
the claim being made is that it is not unreasonable, 
prior to E, to believe that true laws of science may 
have exceptions. If this is the claim, and I think 
that it must be, it seems to be unjustified t Prior 
to the occurrence of E the reasonable thing to believe 
is that E is impossible and therefore will not occur. 
If it were reasonable to believe that E were impossible 
and yet at the same time believe that it might occur 
it would appear that the meaning of possible in the 
two instances has changed. But why would one claim 
that it is physically impossible for a normal man to 
run a mile in less than two minutes if at the same time 
the same person actually believes that this might 
nevertheless actually occur? We believe something to 
be impossible precisely because we do not believe that 
it can occur, if we think it may occur we don't believe 
that it is impossible. 
Line (e) in the schema does not appear to be an accurate 
reflection of the violation argument for rational belief 
in miracles; how should it be expressed? I think 
that line (e) should follow line (h). That is, the 
apologist may only reasonably believe in the possibility 
of the physically impossible occurring if he has 
observed an event E which he is certain has actually 
occurred and which at the same time cannot be explained 
by any law of nature. Line (e) should go something 
like: 'It is not unreasonable to believe that certain 
events which occur are physically impossible'. That 
is, they could not have occurred if natural processes 
of cause and effect had been operating unindered. It 
seems that Wadia has confused the belief that the 
physically impossible can occur prior to E, with the 
belief that the physically impossible can occur after 
E has occurred. There appear to be no reasonable 
grounds for justifying the first whereas the latter 
may be reasonably held. No doubt it is logically 
possible that a man might fly, without artificial aids, 
but does the mere logical possibility provide us with 
reasonable grounds for the belief that it might happen? 
Surely not! However, having observed a man flying un-
aided, is it now reasonable to believe that what 
occurred was p*sically impossible? Clearly the two 
positions are entirely different. 
Wadia claims, line (j), 'But it is unreasonable for 0 
(or anyone else) to believe in the occurrence of the 
physically impossible'. It seems rather paradoxical 
that the violation apologist should wish to claim this 
since it would appear to be contrary to the whole 
thrust of his argument. The violation model rests on 
the rationality of believing that an event which 
actually occurs is scientifically inexplicable. That 
is, its occurrence cannot be explained by any of the 
true laws of science. How can he possibly include 
in his argument this line which appears to undermine 
his entire case? How then is this line to be inter-
preted? 
It might be contended that the intention of line (j) 
is simply to point out what I have argued above; 
that is, that it is unreasonable to believe in the 
occurrence of 	impossible prior to the 
actual occurrence of E. I do not believe that this 
can be the intention. It seems that the only reasonable 
explanation for (j) is that either it does not mean 
what it appears to mean or that it is not a true 
reflection of the violation argument. Let us turn to 
an examination of line (i) in an effort to discover the 
origin and intention of line (j). 
In line (i) Wadia represents the violation theorist as 
claiming that 'it is logically possible for E to have 
an as yet unknown natural cause ...'. At first glance 
this may seem to be paTfectly reasonable but this is 
far from the case. In line (b) we are told that E is 
an exception to L. Clearly it is logically possible 
that L is false and it therefore follows that it is 
logically possible that 	hS a natural cause. This 
would imply that L needs revision or replacement. The 
violation theorist is claiming, however, that E is 
not an exception to L where L is false but an 
exception to L where L is true. Once this is granted, 
it no longer makes sense to say that it is logically 
possible for E - where E is an exception to a true 
law of nature - to have an as yet unknown natural 
cause. Clearly the fundamental distinction rests on 
the status of L; is it true or false? 16 The apologist 
has never claimed that an exception to a false law is 
a miracle, nor has he claimed that an event E given 
the status of miracle might in fact turn out to be a 
falsifying instance to L and hence no longer be regarded 
as a miracle. That is, all claims about (Vidolation.s, 
like all claims about laws must be open to revision. 
Nevertheless, one should not confuse the fundamental 
issue. If an event E occurs in nature it is logically 
possible that E has a natural cause - known or unknown. 
However, if E occurs in nature and is a violation of 
a true law of nature then it is not logically possible 
that E has a natural cause - known or unknown. There 
is no conceptual contradiction involved, however, 
since the apologist does not claim infallibility, he 
must, in the light of new evidence, be prepared to 
revise his claim that a particular event E is a miracle. 
It is clear that line (i) is not a correct representation 
16 	It should. be (borne.in mind that we are talking about 
conceptual distinCtions here not the epistemological 
difficulties discussed in the previous chapter. 
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of the violation argument. Wadia's confusion stems 
from his ambiguous use of logical possibility and his 
failure to designate L as a true law of nature. 
Furthermore, his conclusion '... though such a thing 
is logically possible, it is physically impossible' 
is confusing. How can it be logically possible that 
a true law requires revision? The apologist does not 
deny that it is possible that what are regarded as 
true laws maa turn out to be false. Since our claims 
about laws are open to revision and since the 
violation concept of miracle is in some degree 
parasitic upon the claims about the truth of laws it 
follows that claims about miracles must also be open 
to revision. This does not, however, mean that these 
claims are irrational or incoherent - since being 
rational or coherent does not entail being right. 
I conclude that Wadia's lines (i) and (j) do not 
accurately represent the violation apologist's 
position and therefore the apparent contradiction 
between the lines does not indicate that the violation 
model as correctly represented is fallacious. I think 
however that something of the spirg: 70O7f line (j) can 
be retained. Part of the violation argument hangs 
on the reasonableness of believing that L is true 
and not.merely apparent.° Although the possibility 
of error is recognized, nevertheless the apologist 
argues that in certain circumstances it is rational 
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to believe that L is a real law and yet has an 
exception. This, the fact that L has an exception 
should not, of itself, guarantee that L is false. 
Thus perhaps line (j) could be rewritten as: 
(j) It is not unreasonable for 0 to belive that L 
is a truelaw and that L has an exception - E. 
4. 	REFINEMENT OF THE WADIA CRITIQUE  
Having demonstrated that Wadia's attack upon the 
violation model fails through inaccurate representation 
of the apologist's position it still needs to be 
determined whether or not, when accurately portrayed, 
the violation model is incoherent. In particular, 
does it make sense to claim that the physically 
possible may occur? 17 Smith18 claims that it does 
not make sense. He bases this belief on the following 
argument: Either miracles are incompatible with the 
laws of nature and therefore they do not occur or 
miracles are not incompatible with the laws of nature 
and hence they are not physically impossible or 
violations. More formally: Given that by modus tollens 
it is possible to declare a counter-instance (E) to a 
law (L) physically impossible when the law (L) is true, 
then the occurence of the counter-instnace (E) leads 
us to conclude that the law is false (rbL), while the 
17 	At this stage I shall assume Flew's view that by 
physically impossible is meant those events which are 
logically incompatible with the true laws of nature. 
18 	Adrian Smith. 'Mirables as Violations'. Unpublished 
paper delivered at a seminar at La Trobe University 
during 1979. 
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existence of the law (L) leads us to conclude that the 
counter-instance is false (.,^ E). However, the violation 
theorist requires that there is no incompatibility in 
holding that the law (L) is true and at the same time 
that the counter-instance (E) actually occurred. 
Smith argues that in holding both these propositions, 
that is: 
(a) (L 	E) 	(L • E) 
(b) (L • E) • (L 	E) 
the violation theorist is in fact, since (a) and (b) 
are clearly inconsistent, holding that the logically 
impossible can occur. Since the violation theorist 
would want only to support a view that the physically 
impossible and certainly not the logically impossible 
can occur, what possible defence does he have against 
this seemingly powerful attack? 
Firstly, the violation apologist might contend that 
typically, the possibility of event E is not implied 
by the law L but by the law L together with a set of 
initial conditions (L• IC). Furthermore, the validity 
of the argument by Smith rests on the assu4tion that 
in (a) and (b) the sets of initial conditions are 
identical. However, this begs the question. The 
violation theorist claims that the initial conditions 
are not the same since when the canter-instance (s/^E) 
occurs, it is God's causal activity as part of the set 
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of initial conditions which ensures that the counter-
instance (-1" E) will occur. If God is present as an 
active agent factor the initial conditions are 
different and different in a causally relevant way. 
Hence one cannot use laws of nature alone to argue 
that a particular unusual situation is logically im-
possible. 
This reply has some merit but it presents further 
difficulties for the violation model. Firstly, if 
God is written into the set of initial conditions it 
would appear that no violation has occurred since the 
law is inapplicable when God acts or the law itself 
covers God's acts and so miracles are no longer 
physically impossible. On the other hand, if one 
does not write God into the set of initial conditions, 
the law is either falsified or must be understood in 
some weakly quantified way. Let us examine the 
implications of these two possibilities. 
The second attempt at resolution of the paradox, takes 
the now familiar line of expounding the law statement 
of the form L.= (x)(Fx----, Gx) as not strictly aAlying 
to all the x's that might be supposed tozfall under it. 
Swinburne claims that we have to understand the law L 
as stating that 'so and so's always do such and such' 
and yet allow for E 'this is a so and so and does not 
do such and such'. 19 Swinburne claims that we must be 
19 	Richard Swinburne. Oi . cit. p. 27. 
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prepared to accept this apparent paradox or be prepared 
to say that no law of nature operates in the field. 
To say that there is no law does not, however, do 
justice to L's success in prediction. Gill 20 believes 
that this explanation is insufficient; he states: 
This is indeed correct and very important, 
yet it leaves a major part of the original 
problem, that of alleged contradiction, un-
answered. Be it on a class of its own among 
counter-instances and insufficient to 
justify the scientist in seeking a new law, 
the violation is nevertheless incompatible 
with the complete universality expressed 
in the standard account. 21 
In an attempt to come to grips with this dilemma Flew 
contends that laws of nature or natural necessities 
should not be depicted as logical necessities, that is, 
they do not have to be universal; something may at a 
given time, or for a given group, be necessary and in- 
evitable without being necessary and inevitable for 
all men at all times; and of course, something can 
. be a natural necessity, necessary and inevitable for 
and by one-one or anything within the universer;with- 
out being a contingent necessity which limits God. 22 
What Flew says certainly provides a way out of the 
logical contriction but since it is no longer 
20 	John Gill. Revamping the Violation Concept. (Un- 
published paper). 
21 	John Gill. Op; Cit. p. 20. 
22 	See for example Antony Flew. A Rational Animal. Oxford: 
Claredon Press, 1978, pp. 49-74. 
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regarded as impossible for miracles to occur it seems 
also that the miraculous is no longer ruled out by 
the laws of nature. But if this is the case how can 
a miracle be regarded as a violation of a law of 
nature, since the law permits it? 23 
.• 
Gill 24 believes that `he has been able to restate the 
violation model in such a way that it clearly escapes 
the problems of contradiction and yet at the same 
time remains as a violation model. His revamp 
includes the following points: 
(a) No genuine law statement is less than an exception-
less, universal one. (It is assumed that there 
are no statistical laws.)6 
(b) Cgrtain laws are false and yet acceptable. 
(c) Certain regularities, complete but for a solitary 
counter-instance, are registered by an acceptable 
law. 
The law statements referred to in (b) are false solely 
because of the existence of non-repeatable cases. 
Likewise, the regularities referred to in (c) are less 
than complete solely because of the existence of non- 
repeatable counter-instances. A violated law would, 
23 	It is interesting to note how Flew's views about 
contingent necessity have been shifting in the last few 
years. He now stresses the essential relativity of 
contingent necessity while this was almost unnoticeable 
in his God and PhilosophL and Hume's Philosophy of  
Belief. 
24 	John Gill. Op. cit. pp. 10-15. 
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on this account, be a statement of completely 
universal form registering a regularity, complete but 
for a solitary - or very rare - counter-instance. 
Gill's (b) amounts to a partial redefinition of the 
term law in so far as it no longer has truth built 
into it. 
Gill argues that a- violated and hence strictly false 
law is better than no law at all. To reject the use 
of the violated law would be to reject the use of any 
law since this must be the inevitable consequence if 
there were indeed a non-repeatable counter-instance. 
In these circumstances no matter how alike we were to 
make the circumstances, we could not obtain repeat-
ability. It follows that neither the counter-instance 
nor the opposite and repeatable instances could be 
covered by a law registering complete universality. 
Gill's revamp of the violation model has the advantage 
of avoiding the conflict between complete regularity 
and genuine exceptions and it also has the added 
advantage of highlighting the inadequacy of laws of 
science as comprehensive explaniory devices. Gill's 
fundamental distinction is between false and replaceable 
laws, and false and unreplaceable laws. The latter are 
false because they are not strictly universal but 
they are still laws because they are the best that 
science can in principle offer. Gill, no doubt, 
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avoids the attack of incoherence but he creates 
certain other difficulties. 
Firstly, consider the possibility that a non-repeatable, 
counter-instance, such as water turning into wine, 
occurs on; occurs twice; occurs a hundred times! 
1 
What faith would we have in a false law violated so 
often? What would happen to the predictive power of 
the law? It seems that the notion of a false but 
best law of nature relies heavily on the belief that 
violations are extremely rare and close to one. 
Secondly, by avoiding the problems of contradiction 
in this way Gill may at the same time somewhat deflate 
the value of the concept of miracle. In one sense, 
at least, since there is no longer contradiction there 
is no longer special interest. Since there is no 
longer special interest why should the scientist not 
regard the law as statistical thereby explaining both 
E and 	E. In this way the events are explained and 
the law has no peculiar properties. Taking this a 
step further it seems that Gill's account makes it 
somewhat obscure as to why God's intervention or 
causal activity is required in the production of a so 
called miracle. On the normal conception of miracle, 
things would have been different if only the laws of 
nature had operated.without God's intervention. On 
Gill's account which permits laws with rare exceptions, 
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thef)e is no guarantee that the exceptional event would 
not have occurred without the intervention of God. 
Put differently, how are we to distinguish a single 
non-God caused exception to an otherwise sound law, 
to a single God caused exception. The critic could 
argue that if allowance is made for the former much 
drive will be taken out of believing in the latter. 25 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have investigated and analysed the 
charge that the violation concept of miracles is in-
coherent by definition. Having dealt with the major 
attacks in this area I have concluded that none of 
these are persuasive, although I have indicated that 
refinement of the violation model has been necessary 
to deal with the charge made by Smith. 26 
25 	Development of this idea and further refining of the 
violation model will be developed later. See Chapter 
Eight, Section 2. 
26 	I have chosen to deal sPCifically with Smith's 
criticisms although other writers have made similar 
claims. See for example R. Young. 'Miracles and 
Physical Impossibility'. Sophia. October 1972, pp. 
29-35. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I shall outline and examine the major 
attacks upon the violation model which stem from the 
claim that the violation model and the scientific 
enterprige are in conflict and consequently the 
concept of a violation of a law of nature could never 
be legitimately p—r--.edi_cated on an observable occurrence. 
2. G. ROBINSON 1  
It has become increasingly popular to argue that because 
of the insatiable explanatory capacity of the 
scientific enterprise the concept of a 'permanently in-
explicable even'is incoherent. That is, it is 
illegitimate since to accept its coherence would under- 
mine the scientific enterprise. G. Robinson, one of 
the chief advocates of this position argues the case 
as follows: 
Some people believe a miracle to be an event 
which 'prima facie belongs to the scientific 
sphere - of the right type to get a 
scientific explanation - but somehow will 
never get such an explanation' . 2 In other 
words some people believe a miracle to be 
a permanently inexplicable event. 
1 	Guy Robinson. 	'Miracles'. Ratio. 9, 1967, PP. 1 55- 
166. 
2 	Guy Robinson. Op. cit. p. 155. 
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But before we could conclude that any 
observable phenomenon is permanently 
inexplicable, we would need to show that 
there could be no theory which we called 
scientific, which could explain it. 
Before we could be certain that no 
relevant scientific theory could be 
forthcoming we would need to be certain 
(a) that 'the class of the scientifically 
explicable was finite' 3 and (b) that this 
class had within its boundaries no 
relevant, but as yet undiscovered, 
scientific theory to offer. 
But we do not even have any reason to 
believe that (a) is true, let alone any 
way to verify (b). Th@refore, a scientist 
could never legitimately claim that an 
event is permanently inexplicable. This 
means that the concept of a 'permanently 
inexplicable event' is incoherent. 
Robinson suggests that we should think of a miracle as 
something permanently excluded from scientific 
explicability only if this exclusion were necessary and 
,conceptual. The necessary and conceptual exclusion of 
an event from a particular class could be made, it 
seems, only if its inclusion were logically impossible. 
Thus, Robinson appears to be claiming that we could 
believe that an event was miraculous only if we could 
show that it was logically impossible that it be given 
3 	Guy Robinson. 00. Cit. p. 162. 
(A 
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a natural explanation. But because miracles are 
events occurring in the natural world, and because 
events so occurring are candidates for scientific 
explanation, a proof that miracles cannot (logically) 
be candidates for scientific explanation is impossible. 
I believe that Robinson is mistaken and that his error 
is based on an ambiguity in his notion of the logical 
impossibility that a miracle be scientifically in-
explicable. Given a definition of a miracle as an 
event which has (tenselessly) no scientific explanation 
it is logically necessary that if an event E were a 
miracle then E would have no scientific explanation. 
In this sense it is logically impossible that E, where 
E is a miracle, has a scientific explanation. However, 
it is not logically necessary for any particular event 
that it be miraculous, and hence it is not necessary 
for any particular event that it be scientifically in- 
explicable. In this sense it is not logically necessary 
that E, where E is thought to be a miracle, has no 
scientific explanation. 
If the apologist calls an event E a miracle he thereby 
states his belief that E will never be given a natural 
explanation, but he need not believe it logically 
impossible that it will, at some future time, be given 
such an explanation. He need only believe that it will 
not do so, not that it could not. He may not argue 
z 
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that E could be given a natural explanation and still 
be appropriately termed miraculous, but he may argue 
that the event could - logically - be given a natural 
explanation someday, upon which occasion he would 
admit his mistake and withdraw the label 'miracle' 
from it. 
Robinson commits himself to the view that there are 
events where despite intensive efforts, an anomalous 
result cannot plausibly be escaped by assailing 
testimony, experimental accuracy or background 
assumptions. However, despite this, he urges that a 
corollary of any miracle claim is that: 
It would necessarily be a matter of whim 
whether one invoked the concept of 
miracle to explain an awkward result or 
on the other hand accepted the result as 
evidence of the need to modify the 
theory one was investigating. 4 
Gill 5 argues, contra Robinson, that even in this case 
it is method not whim which governs the scientific 
enterprise. Gill is happy to accept that the strong 
initial presumption from a result contrary to present 
formulations of laws is that the result does in fact 
indicate weakness in those formulations. This is the 
way scientific change is brought about. However, he 
Guy Robinson. Op. cit. p. 159. 
John Gill. 	'Miracles with Method'. Sophia. XVI. 3 . 1 9i-13, 
pp. 19-26. 
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then argues that one should not follow this presumption, 
come what may. In particular consider the presumption 
in the light of the following additional factors. 
(a) The case is closely scrutinized and 
can't be indentified as of some 
repeatable type despite observing 
and experimenting with everyone and 
every set of conditions which it is 
thought could have produced the 
contrary result. 
(b) The law or regularity was a strongly 
confirmed one and no less so in the 
type of circumstances where the 
extraordinary occurrence had happened. 
(c) Not only is the case not consistently 
repeatable but it never (or only in 
very exceptionally rare cases - to 
allow for claims of repeated miracles) 
occurs again. 
(d) The contrary result diverged widely 
from the law or regularity. 6 
The presence of each of these factors, when an awkward 
result occurs, offers a very strong counter to the 
underlying presumption that the exception was an 
indication of the inadequacy of the law. By relying 
on these factors as the criteria for exclusion, it 
is clearly method not whim which determines which 
anomalous events will be regarded as violations and 
which as falsifications. Gill believes that whilst 
6 	John Gill. Op. Cit. p. 20. 
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the scientist is guided by the criteria above ) the 
progress of science would not be adversely affected 
were he to claim that a violation had occurred. This 
follows from the fact that his investigation would be 
much the same regardless of whether the event 
represented a violation or a falsification of a law. 
At the point that (a) and (c) have been met there is 
little incentive for the scientist to continue 
investigations. If (a) is met, all the possible 
conditions suggested as possible explanations of the 
anomAlous event would have failed to provide any 
repetition. Once (c) has been meLE-,-- potential 
source of new sets of promising conditions needing 
investigation has been unproductive. At this point 
there is nothing left to offer the investigator even 
a slight hope of success, and hence further effort 
must be regarded as unprofitable. Clearly, once 
these criteria have been satisfied even the agnostic 
should recognize that further investigations should 
be abandoned. It should, therefore, be apparent that 
the claim that the awkward result is a violation, 
should not prematurely halt the investigation into the 
possible causes of the event. 
It follows from the adoption of the criteria above 
that the claim that an awkward result is a violation 
should not rule out the possibility of re-consideration 
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and further investigation of the event in the light 
of new evidence. Miracle claims should not be re-
garded as immune from revision, and as new evidence is 
always a possibility it may turn out that upon 
further re-consideration the anomilous event can be 
explained scientifically and the law revised to 
accommodate it. However, there is no conflict between 
the scientific enterprise and the violation theory 
here since any new evidence indicating that new 
investigations should be undertaken would clearly 
remove an essential element of the scientific backing 
for the miracle claim. Thus the claim that an event 
is a violation does not justify any delay in the re-
opening of the investigations following the discovery 
of new and relevant information. 
3. 	M. DIAMOND 7 
In an attempt to reinforce and strengthen Robinson's 
position, Diamond claims that autonomy is essential to 
the scientific enterprise. He believes that scientists 
cannot function as scientists if they must appeal to 
leading figures in other fields - in particular to 
those in the religious enterprise - to tell them what 
to do. Scientists, as scientists, must operate with 
autonomy, that is, they must set their own rules and 
referee their own games. Therefore, although nothing 
7 	Malcolm Diamond. 'Miracles'. Religious Studies. 9. 1973, pp. 307-324. 
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logically would prevent a scientist from accepting the 
supernatural interpretation of an utterly extraordinary 
occurrence, on the function level, this would involve 
a sell-out of science. 8 Diamond builds up his 
argument by 'sketching a far fetched scenariol. 9 
Scientists arrange to test a thermoaTICI —d-6-1. 	All 
mechanisms are properly triggered but the bomb remains 
intact and there is no explosion. There is no blast 
even after repeated attempts. The situation is 
scientifically baffling and so a top expert is called 
in to form an investigation team. The team hear of a 
priest twhose protests against the tests had culminated 
in a prayer vigil. The investigating Pam admit the 
possibility of a supernatural exception to the 
scientific status quo; their techniques however are 
not capable of investigating supernatural interventions. 
If supernatural intervention were known to have 
occurred there would be no need to pursue expensive 
and time 	 ear'hinto the detonating 
mechanism. On the assumption that the scientists do 
not want to spend large amounts of money unnecessarily 
Diamond concludes that the head of the team would have 
to 'phone he Pope and ask him to send one of his 
investigating teams t 
Diamond's scenario is indeed far fetched and weak at 
8 	Malcolm Diamond. Op. cit. p. 321. 9 	Malcolm Diamond. Op. cit. pp. 320-321. 
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crucial points. Firstly, his general conclusion 
follows from an example which is quite atypical of 
events associated with miracle claims and secondly 
from the contingent expense of scientific research 
in a difficult area. Economic costs aside, there 
does not appear to be any genuine reason why the 
scientific investigation should be cut short. 
Diamond's emphasis on the cost of scientific research 
is quite unjustified. What is being focussed upon is 
the coherence of the concept of miracle, not the cost 
of scientific investigation. Since it is the coherence 
of a concept that is being debated, only conceptual 
analysis, not economic analysis, should be used to 
test this coherence. To attempt to illustrate the 
incoherence of a concept through the intuction of 
contingencies - such as the lack of funds - is 
completely unfounded. Whether or not the concept is 
coherent is completely independent of these non-
conceptual matters. 
Since the four underlying scientific requirements of 
any miracle claim ((a) to (d) listed above) have not 
been met it is difficult to see any scientific 
justification for giving up the scientific 
investigation. Diamond makes it clear that, while 
failure to detonate was utterly extraordinary, there 
still remains a real hope that future scientific 
enquiry, though expensive, might identify a natural 
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cause. Quite clearly the scientific preconditions 
for a violation ascription are not fully satisfied 
and therefore there can be no justification, other 
than expediency, for the surrender of scientific 
autonomy to an outsider. 
Under the pressure of these objections to his example 
and consequent conclusions Diamond might well attempt 
to justify his position by arguing that the true 
scientist never reaches a position where continuing a 
scientific investigation of an utterly extraordinary 
event is a waste of time. There is always a 
possibility, Cil , matter how slim, that we might discover 
a natural cause. Clearly, it is undeniable that there 
is always a logical possibility that the extraordinary 
event is not a violation and hence possible that some 
natural cause will be found. However, mere logical 
possibility is not a sufficient reason for continuing 
the investigation since mere possibility does not tell 
us anything about actuality. It is equally true for 
instance that it is logically possible that the extra-
ordinary event is a violation. A time comes when 
reason demands that the enquiry be concluded. Once 
this point has been reached, and only at this point, 
will the requirements for the scientific conditions 
for a violation ascription be met. I therefore conclude 
that even this suggested amendment to Diamond's case 
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fails. 10 
4. 	R. YOUNG11 
R. Young argues, in much the same vein as'. Ahern 12 , 
that the account of laws demanded by the violated 
concept ultimately fails to mark them off from mere 
de facto universal generalisations like 'all the 
apples in the basket are red'. Young supports this 
contention by pointing out that genuine laws are 
normally distinguished from mere de facto universal 
generalizations by their power to support counter- 
factuals. Since the counter-factual associated with 
a violated law cannot be relied upon in all cases 
Young claims that the criterion for dividing the 
genuine laws from the merely accidental regularities 
is lost. The admission of a counter-instance to a 
law effectively denies the law of its counter-factual 
backing. 
I believe that this attack is far too strong. Firstly, 
as I have argued previously, 13 the existence of a 
counter-instance to a law of nature does not entail 
For further discussion of the resolution of conceptual 
disparity between the scientific enterprise and the 
religious entqqprise see D.M. MacKay. 'Complementarity 
in Scientific and Theological Thinking'. Zygon. Vol. 
9, No. 3, September 1974, pp. 225-244 (particularly pp-
237-244). 
Robert Young. 'Miracles and Physical Impossibility'. 
Sophia.. October 1972, pp. 29-35. 
Dennis M. Ahern. 'Miracles and Physical Impossibility'. 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. VII, No. 1, March 
1977, pp. 71-79. See my Chapter 3, 3. First Reply: 
Dennis M. Ahern for earlier discussion of this point. 
See Chapter 3, Section 3. 
1 0 
1 1 
12 
1 3 
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that the law does not support counter-factuals. 
Since the law of nature will determine the limits 
of the physically possible almost all of the time they 
can be used to explain, to predict and to support 
counter-factuals. In short, to subscribe to the 
miracle of water turning into wine would not prevent 
us from asserting the following counter-factual. 
'If John Smith were to pour water into an empty wine 
cask, it would suffer no change'. Clearly, the same 
counter-factuals would be assertable as before the 
law's violation. 
Secondly, in emphasising the role of counter-factuals 
as the criterion for dividing genuine laws from merely 
accidental regularities, Young overlooks the role of 
a number of other factors which may be used to fulfil 
this task. Swinburne suggests the criteria of 
simplicity, scope, near or complete generality and the 
lack of suitable alternatives to mark off the class 
compr,fiirig—Trited—finviolated laws from the class 
comprising de facto exceptionless generalizations and 
de facto generalizations with a solitary exception. 
These criteria, according to Swinburne, warrant the 
use of acceptable laws in making predictions and in 
backing counter-factuals. 14 
5. ARE VIOLATED LAWS LAWS? 
Undoubtedly the most persuasive argument against the 
14 	Richard Swinburne. The Concept of Miracle. London: 
Macmillan, 1970, Ch. 3. 
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coherence of the violation concept of miracle can be 
made in the form of the following alemma. As one 
horn: the generalizations which have traditionally 
been advanced as the violated laws, cannot be so, 
being too crude to be laws. As the second horn1:9 
the genuine law, the modern scientific one, as a 
complex type of evidential backing, effectively pre-
cluding the identification of specific violated laTWs. 
Either way the theist cannot single out a law at 
once genuine and violated. 15 
The first horn is that, with traditional examples of 
alleged violations, the laws in question are not laws; 
a fortiori, not violated ones. Cgneralizations such 
as 'All men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, 
remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, 
and is extinguished by water' 16  are hardly the sort 
of law mentioned by modern scientists. Indeed, in 
discussion about miracles not just the examples above 
but virally all the statements which are termed 
laws and which have been supposedly violated seem to 
lack these features regarded as essential elements of 
any law. 17 One can thus conclude, the objection goes, 
that statements singled out as being violated are 
15 	John Gill outlines this dilemma in Revamping the  
Violation Concept (Unpublished paper). Although it is 
also implicitly mentioned by a number of writers. See 
for example James Wills. 'Miracles and Scientific Law'. 
Review and -Expositor. • Vol. 59, 1962, Pp. 137-$45. 
16, 	David Hume. D4uiries. Section X, Part I, p. - 114. 
17 	See for example E. Nagel. The Structfure of Science. 
London: R.K.P., 1961, PP. 47-78. Laws of nature may be 
represented by true universal statements which contain 
no individual names and whose predicates are all purely 
qualitative. 
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mistakenly described as laws. A fortiori,. they are 
not violated laws. 
The second horn of the dilemma alleges that the pin-
pointing of violations is impossible. It is argued 
that when modern scientific laws are used, the 
explanation or prediction of any situation is 
calculated by adding up the various forces or factors 
involved. On the assumption that tor any given situation 
we could be close to certain that all the kinds of 
natural force factors present were detected', if God 
were to intervene the actual outcome would not conform 
to the scientific calculations based on the knowledge 
of those force factors. Even if we knew for certain 
that God had intervened there would be no way of 
knowing which of the force factors he violated. Indeed 
we could not be certain that he had not introduced 
some 'supernatural' force with a counter-vailing 
effect. If we did in fact know that the latter had 
not occurred there would still not exist a method by 
which we could pinpoint the force which did not have 
its customary effect; a fortiori, we could not pin-
point the violation. 
The epistemological difficulties associated with the 
typical contemporary use of 'law' has been the 
dominant reason why it ha fp)not been adopted in the 
miracle context. Typically it is very such harder to 
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argue for there being a violation of a modern 
scientific law than it is to argue for a violation of 
a garden-variety law of nature 18, 	such as 'water never 
of itself turns into wine'. In these cases it would 
appear that we do not have to rely on the dependability 
of anything other than our normal sensory powers. It 
would, therefore, seem to be a great deal easier to 
detect - Tiiolations of these than of the typical modern 
law. Likewise, if violations could only be detected 
at the scientific level the symbolic significance 
associated with the miraculous would be lost since the 
ordinary person would not be able to detect them. 
Clearly, it is at the garden-variety level and not ' 
the highly complex level of modern science that 
significant miracle claims have been made. But what 
then of the first objection; if the violation theorist 
works with something less than a generalization, 
appropriately called a law, neither would there be a 
Violation thereof. 
It would appear to be quite clear that the violation 
model depends for its coherence on a wider use of 
law. If it were to regard the modern scientific 
sense of law as the only legitimate one, its 
tenability would be cast into the most serious doubt. 
The crucial question before us is, therefore, whether 
18 	This term is borrowed from Ci),eith E. Yandell. 'Miracles, 
Epistemology and Hume's Barrier'. International  
Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Vol. 7, No. 3, 
1976, pp. 414-415 for example. 
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or not this widening of the modern use of law is 
legitimate within the context of miracle claims? 
The answer to this question is far from easy but 
would seem to depend on a number of factors. Firstly, 
are there shared features common to the garden-variety 
law and the modern scientific law and do these features 
help to divide these 'laws' from merely accident 
generalizations? Secondly, can it be shown that one 
or more of these shared features is essential to the 
underpinning of violation claims? 
The first of the two requirements listed above appears 
to be satisfied since the 'laws' used in miracle 
discussions share crucial features with the standard 
account of laws. It would appear that both forms can 
be properly expressed in universal form; both may be 
used to support counter-factual conditional claims; 
both register contingent necessities, not mere 
conjoinings; both provide a sound.basis for predictions. 
The second of the two requirements, that one or more of 
these shared features is essential to the underpinning 
of violation claims, also appears to be met. It is 
the shared characteristic of universality which is 
crucial for the presupposition of an alleged violation. 
It would seem, therefore, that there is nothing amiss 
in the extension of the modern term 'law' in the 
context of the miracle debate. In effect this amounts 
to a retention of the older - pre modern science - use 
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of law. However, as I have noted, it is largely the 
claim of universality upon which this widening is 
based. Is this assumption that the two 'laws' are 
universal justified? A number of writers have 
suggested that this may not be the case. 
Nicolls 19 suggests that: 
When Peter, for example, did not sink as 
he walked on the Sea of GAilee, the 
apostles witnessed an extraordinary event 
and recognized therein the hand of God. 
Now the modern scientist would realize 
how extraordinary Peter's walking on the 
water actually was. However, the scientist 
might modestly suggest that the probability 
of the natural occurrence of such an event 
as a man's walking on qiater is not zero, 
but only very, very small. After all, a 
still atmosphere and a calm sea really 
consist of myriads of sub-microscopic 
molecules moving randomly at large 
velocities. Now, one possible situation in 
which the molecules could find themselves 
is this: the air molecules immediately 
above Peter's head are moving quite slowly, 
so that the resulting downward force on 
Peter is so diminished that he no longer 
sinks into the water; rather, the earth's 
gravitational pull on Peter is now balanced 
by the unusually large buoyant force of the 
air and water. The probability of 
occurrence of such a situation is small, 
19 	William H. Nicholls. 'Physical Laws and Physical 
Miracles'. Irish Theological Quarterly. Vol. XXVII, 
1960, pp. 49-56. . 
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exceedingly small, but it can be calculated. 
Strictly speaking, then, walking on the 
water is not in itself an exception to 
physical laws. 20 
Likewise, Langtry 21 claims that: 'most laws couched 
in observational terms are not universal in form. They 
contain implicit qualifications, what I call 'other 
things being equal' clauses'. Langtry contends that: 
... an important truth is conveyed when one 
says, 'men cannot walk on water'. But if 
ot-Optook it as universal in form, it would 
turn out false: I can walk on water in an 
indefinite number of circumstances, for 
example, by equipping my feet with suitable 
rubber floats. 22 
Keith Yandell 23 claims that this widening of law is 
subject to at least two defects. 
For one, the class of 'true garden-variety 
generalizations' is obviously ill-defined. 
For another, such generalizations are 
eminently qualifiable. Iodine kills (with-
out antidote); water quenches fire (except 
grease fires); and even when no known 
qualification is required, there remains 
the possibility that a qualification be made 
without destroying the generalization. Dead 
bodies stay so - except $erhaps (in Hume's 
hypothetical case) or Queen Elizabeth's or 
20 	William H. Nicholls. Op. cit. p. 49. 
21 	Bruce Langtry. 'Investigating a Resurrection'. Inter- 
change. No. 17, 1975, pp. 41-47. 
22 	Bruce Langtry. Op. cit. p. 42. 
23 	Keith E. Yandell. Op. cit. 
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the more famous instance which provides 
the model for Hume's hypothetical case. 
To be direct: suppose Jesus Christ died 
and then rose on the third day. The 
garden-variety generalization that dead 
men remain dead would strictly be 
rendered false, but, since eminently 
qualifiable, could be easily itself 
resurrected as 'On the whole, dead men 
remain dead' or 'The bodies of non-divine 
persons remain dead' or the like. A world 
view whose eole parameters are set by 
garden-variety generalizations is plastic; 
its shape is alterable. 24 
These writers have pinpdnted a source of real 
difficulty for the violation theorist. As a result 
of the fact that garden-variety laws are framed in 
observational terms and not in the technical language 
of the modern scientist they are not typically true 
unless they are accompanied by some form of ceteris 
paribus clause, either explicitly or implicitly. A 
modern scientific law which accords with criteria of 
generality of terms may be represented in the following 
simplified way: 
(a) L s = (x)(Fx--->Gx). That is, the law of science 
states that for any x if x has F-ness, then x 
will have G-ness. However, typically a true 
garden-variety law of nature must be formally 
24 	Keith E. Yandell. Op. cit. p. 415. 
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represented as: 
(b) Ln = Q---->(x)(Fx--,.Gx). Here Q has the meaning 
of 'all other things being equal'. 
The introduction of ceteris paribus clauses - or 
'escape clauses' 25 - poses certain difficulties for 
the violation theorist. To begin with it is essential 
that the ceteris paribus clause is not used as a 
'waste-paper basket' where come what may L n is true 
because any apparent falsifying instance is explained 
by a change - known or unknown - in the surrounding 
conditions; that is, other things are not equal. 
Kurtzman argues that if ceteris pariPbs clauses are 
to avoid this difficulty they must, at least in 
principle, be eliminable. This means that if a law 
of nature (La ) is true it must, at least in principle, 
be reducible to a set of true fundamental 26 laws of 
science (L s ) together with a set of initial conditions. 
However, although it is clearly possible for the un-
trained observer to know that 'other things are not 
equal' in certain circumstances - for example, the 
addition 43 rubber floats - in other circumstances - 
for example, those described by Nicholls above - this 
is clearly impossible. It is not such a simple matter 
to pick out a violation of a garden-variety generalizatio 
as was at first thought. This is so, since one of these 
25 	D.R. Kurtzman. 'Ceteris. Paribus Clauses: Their .  
Illumination and Elimination'. American Philosophical  
Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1973, p. 35. 
26 	Fundamental in Nagel's sense. 
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generalizations when expressed as a law of nature 
(Ln ) includes a ceteris paribus clause and therefore 
it maybe either that the regularity ((x) Fx--->Gx) is 
violated or that the ceteris paribus clause (Q) is 
false. A violation only occurs where the regularity 
(x)(x— Gx) is true and the counter-instance occurs 
yet there are no unusual features about the situation. 
That is where E = (Fa • ,v Go) and Q is true. 
A number of problems clearly confron(t, the violation 
theorist. It will be remembered that the reason for 
introducing a wider use of 'law' was to avoid the 
immense difficulty of determining in any extraordinary 
situation, which, of the many laws covering that 
situation, if any, were violated. Now, however, it 
appears that this difficulty has been replaced by 
another. The garden-variety laws being by definition 
less technical rely for their accuracy such more on 
the 'normality' of the surrounding conditions. That is, 
a true law of saence which is completely general, 
not restricted in time and space, and which is composed 
of purely qualitative predictes, will be true for any 
and all circumstances (for all possible worlds). How-
ever a garden4lriety law such as 'men cannot walk on 
water' is not true for a possible world where, a 
situation, as described by Nicholls above, is quite 
usual, or where a special force operates below the 
surface of the water to prevent a person from sinking. 
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Furthermore, even within this actual world, it is 
possible that such a generalization is geographically 
limited. There may, for example, be some areas of 
water which have such a high saline content that the 
water is so buoyant that a man may walk on water. 
Since the truth of the garden-variety law may be 
restricted in this way, one cannot simply rely on the 
sense to determine that a violation has occurred. 
Furthermore, if a violation of the garden-variety 
law has not occurred it follows that the fundamental 
laws will likewise not have been violated. 
Various writers have suggested that a law of nature 
which includes a ceteris paribus clause (what I 
have been referring to as garden-variety laws) cannot 
be violated by God because if God were to act in an 
unusual way, the initial or surrounding conditions 
would not be normal. C.S. Lewis, 27 for example, argues 
that the ceteris paribus clause is an essential element 
of every law of science and hence when God intervenes 
in nature the law is not violated since the law only 
explains what happens when God does not intervene. He 
argues that since the law loses application, it cannot 
be violated. Young, who argues along the same lines 
as Lewis, suggests, for example, the following law: 
'Ceteris paribus bodily resurrection is altogether 
improbable'. However, he adds 'but if God raised 
27 	C.S. Lewis. Miracles. London: MacMillan, 1964, PP. 
59-65. 
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Jesus a new factor was involved in the incident and 
the probAilities change'. 28 Young claims: 
If God were to act as a causal agent in 
situations then he would (other things 
remaining equal) count as a not in-
significant agent-factor change. Suppose 
that one happened to boil water at the 
Mexico Olympic Games and that the water 
did not boil at 100 ° C. Would this give 
ground for dismay? We know that it would 
not of course ... (because of) the 
presence of the new factor in the water-
boiling situation (height above sea-le .Liel) 
... God was an agent factor in the 
occurrence of the miraculous event such 
that since he does something he does not 
normally do, a new (possibly unique) set 
of factors becomes causally operative. 
Thee is no violation. 29 
Clearly if Lewis and Young are correct, the violation 
model will have to be abandoned. In the next section 
I will critically analyse their non-violation inter-
ventionist alternatives. 
6. 	NON-VIOLATION INTERVENTIONIST MODELS 
If laws of nature include either an indefinitely vague 
and expansive ceteis paribus clause or a rider 
'unless God intervenes to make it otherwise', they 
could not be violated when God acts to bring about a 
28 	Robert Young. 	'Miracles and Epistemology'. Religious  
Studies.: p.. 124. 
29 	Robert Young. 015. cit. p. 124. 
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miracle since the law itself is compatible with such 
events. 30 Nevertheless, one should note that 
fundamental regularity 31 would be violated. What 
has to be determined is whether or not the laws of 
science should include such riders? 
I have already indicated 32 that the ceteris paribus 
clause attached to garden-variety laws are there to 
indicate that these laws are not the sort of 
generalization that any scientist would considerGas a 
modern law of science. Furthermore, I believe that 
such generalizations can only be true if in principle 
the ceteris paribus clause can be eliminated. That 
is, the truth of the garden-variety law gains its 
backing from the truth of a set of fundamental laws of 
science together with description of the initial and 
surrounding conditions. Is it, however, legitimate 
to use the availability of a ceteris paribus clause 
to cover the presence of God when he acts as an 
active agent factor? Such a use would undoubtedly be 
non-standard and as I have argued in an earlier 
section33  would provide insurmountable falsification and 
confirmation problems for science. Science has no way 
of investigating the active presence or otherW;ise of 
30 	John Gill, however, overlooks this in 'Miracles with 
Method'. Sophia. Vol. XVI, No. 3, October 1977, p. 25. 
31 	The fundamental regularity is that part of the law 
covered by the universal quantifier, e.g. (x)(i2x 	Gx) 
in the law: L = (ceterisparibus)(x)(Fx---i.Gx). 
32 	See Section 5 above. 
33 See Chapter Three, Section 3. 
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God, it could never establish the truth or falsity 
of its laws. Furthermore, if the laws of science did 
have such a rider the concept of physical impossibility 
would have to be radically altered or even abandoned, 
since any physical event could be said to be i iiI  
the confines of the law, nothing - not even 
contradictory events - need Ee excluded. 
Young, perhaps with this difficulty in mind, does 
not (unlike Lewis) commit himself to the view that all 
Oaws of nature necessarily include a ceteris paribus 
rider. He distinguishes between two types of laws: 
Firstly, there may be laws which specify 
a genuine sufficient condition of an effect. 
There will be no cases under such laws in 
which the antecedent is satisfied but not 
	--- the consequent. Secondly, there may be laws 
whose antecedent does not specify a genuine 
sufficient condition of the effect (for the 
other conditions of the effect are only 
tacitly specified). Thus given an instance 
of the antecedent without the consequent the 
law has not been disconfirmed if one of the 
tacit conditions is not satisfied. 34 
Since Young commits himself to the view that there 
are laws which do not have tacit conditions, it would 
seem that God's intervention would not make such 
antecedent clauses inapplicable. Thus, since the 
34 	Robert Young. Op. cit. p. 121. 
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antecedent clause makes no implicit or explicit 
reference to the action or o-t-h—diaise of God, it cannot 
be rendered inapplicable if God does in fact act. 
Consequently, if the causal action of God does in fact 
prevent what is specified in the consequent clause 
from happening there would be a violation of the law. 
Yet, this notwithstanding, Young claims that there is 
no violation of laws which do not have tacit 
conditions when 'God is an agent factor in the 
occurrence of the miraculous'. How does Young justify 
this conclusion? 
Gill 35 suggests that there may be a means by which 
Young could establish his conclusion and at the same 
time maintain a standard view of laws. The argument 
is outlined as follows: 
(a) God's action in working a miracle would always 
be 	not insignificant agent factor'. 
(b) The addition of a 'not insignificant agent factor' 
would mean a change in the antecedent conditions 
(even in a fully explicit law). 
(c) But if there is a change in the (antecedent) 
conditions then we would no longer have the 
antecedent conditions mentioned in the initial 
law. 
35 John B. Gill. 'Revamping the Violation Concept'. pp. 
23-24. 
(d) If we no longer have these conditions then the 
law fails of application. 
(e) Therefore, a fortiori, it is not violated. 
The validity of this argument for the claim that, when 
God intervenes laws are not violated, depends on there 
being two interpretations of (c) above, and in 
particular of the phrase 'no longer have the antecedent 
conditions mentioned in the initial law'. The first 
interpretation is to be understood as 'no longer having 
all and only the original conditions'. The second 
interpretation is to be understood as 'no longer 
having even all of the original conditions'. 
On the first interpretation statement (c) above is no 
doubt true but what is required by Young is the second 
interpretation, viz, that we no longer have one or 
another out of the original set of conditions. This is 
required because whereas the first interpretation 
demands that laws as such be necessary and sufficient 
condition statements, the fact is that laws may be 
and often are simply statements of sufficient conditions. 
With sufficiency, given that (P---*R), adding any factor 
to P, no matter how mighty it might be, does not 
increase the efficiency of the expanded set; that is, 
[(P • God)---0-19]. Likewise if P is really sufficient 
to bring about R then adding any factor to P, no 
matter how powerful, cannot prevent P from bringing 
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about R. Thus adding God's active presence to P does 
not alter the antecedent factors so that the law fails 
of application. It would, therefore, seem that Young's 
argument, that God's interference rules out the 
violation of the law, is incorrect. 
Faced with this apparent clear cut refutation of his 
position Young might attempt a justification in the 
following manner. Taking it for granted that 
traditionally in logic P—.R does entail (P • Q)--0-R 
nevertheless certain examples suggest that there may 
be more here than meets the eye. Suppose, for example, 
a certain poison is sufficient for death. Suppose 
further that after administering poison to an 
individual we administer the antidote. Do we want to 
say that in such a case what is sufficient for death is 
(poison and 	antidote)? If this is so the formulation 
will have effects on the standard account of natural 
law. 36 
Clearly Young's example does have a cutting edge, 
however, I do not think it is sufficiently persuasive 
to redeem his position. To make this clear it is 
necessary to clear up an ambiguity in the use of the 
term 'sufficient conditions'. In one sense something 
P may be sufficient to bring about R in any and all 
possible worlds. In the second sense something P may 
36 	The gist of this example was suggested by R. Young in 
correspondence. 
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be sufficient to bring about R in particular well 
described circumstances. If the administering of 
poison to an individual is sufficient (sense one) to 
bring about death the introduction of other factors 
cannot alter the result. However, if it is sufficient 
(sense two) any change in the conditions surrounding 
the event could bring about a different result. 
In Young's hypothetical example of poisons and 
antidotes he is clearly using 'sufficient conditions' 
in the second sense. However, what should be clear 
is this: if the antecedent of a law is only sufficient 
in this second sense, the law must be accompanied by 
tacit conditions and/or a ceteris paribus clause if it 
is to be a law statement at all. This cannot help 
Young, however, since he was attempting to show that 
even laws which do not have tacit conditions cannot be 
vialated. Young it seems is caught in a vicious circle 
from which there is no escape. 
Langtry who supports a non-violation interventionist 
concept of miracle somewhat akin to that of Young places 
a great deal of stress upon the con(t]extual considerations 
of miracle claims. Langtry believes that the relevant 
question to iocus on in the circumstance of the extra-
ordinary is 'what is the best explanation of this 
extraordinary occurrence?' According to Langtry it will 
be the existe*e or otherwise of a religious context 
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which will have a major influence on the decision 
whether or not the extraordinary is miraculous. 
There is no doubt that religious context is significant 
but to cut the question of miracle adrift from the 
scientific backing provided by the violation 
(scientifically inexplicable) claim has a number of 
serious drawbacks. Firstly, it would appear, under 
this presentation, that all and not just some un-
explained events occurring within suitable religious 
contexts would be picked out as miracles. Yet un-
explained but ultimately explicable events would on 
general statistical grounds be sometimes expected to 
occur in religious contexts. In order to avoid this 
problem one requires some criterion to differntiate 
the miraculous extraordinary from the non-miraculous 
extraordinary. In rejecting the violation model it 
seems that this very criterion has been rejected. We 
need to combine the contextual considerations with a 
positive scientifically based argument that the event 
is incapable of scientific explanation. 
Furthermore, Dhanis 37 argues that to disregard the 
element of physical transcendence or violation in the 
definition of miracle is to weaken the evidential 
37 	E. Dhanis. 'Qu'est-ce qu'um miracle?' Gregorianum XL. 
1959, pp. 201-241 and E. Dhanis. 'Un chainon de la 
preuve du miracle' in Problemi scelti di teologia  
contemporanea. Rome, 1954, pp. 63-86. 
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value of the argument from miracles in apologetics. 
For 	order to prove with certainty that a particular 
prodigy is a divine sign, it is not sufficient that 
it occur in conjunction with a religious context; it 
must also be demonstrated that similar prodigies are 
not found in non-religious contexts. Only then is it 
possible to rule out the possibility of chance co-
incidence. Dhanis concludes: but how can we be quite 
certain that the prodigy is confined to religious 
contexts unless we establish that it is a physically 
transcendent fact? 38 
7. 	CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have outlined and analysed the major 
attacks upon the violation model which stem from the 
claim that the violation model and the scientific 
enterprise are in conflict and that consequently the 
concept of a violation of a law of nature could nre jier 
be legitimately predicg.Ved on an observable occurrence. 
I have shown that the major arguments put forward by 
Robinson, Diamond and Young fail but that the dilemma 
suggested by Gill is more difficult to solve. The 
problem for the violation theorist lies in the difficulty 
of ascertaining that the conditions surrounding the 
extraordkroccurrence are not themselves extraordinary 
when the theorist relies on the use of 'garden-variety' 
38 	E. Dhanis. 	'Qu'est-ce qu'un miracle?'. pp. 224-228. 
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laws. One possible solution to this difficulty is 
to give up the violation model in favour of a non- 
violation interventionist model. However, I conclude 
that such models as suggested by Lewis, Young and 
Langtry 39 create more difficulties than they overcome. 
The unresolved difficulty associated with 'garden 
variety' laws raised in Section 5. will therefore be 
taken up again in the next chapter. 40 
39 
George Landrum in 'What a Miracle Really Is'. Religous  
Studies. .12, 1976, pp. 49-57, outlines an alternative 
non-violation model which rests on an interesting 
distinction between natural laws and non-natural laws. 
I raise a number of points relating to this paper in my 
next chapter. 
40 	See Chapter Seven, Section 5. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
1. INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters I have investigated the concept-
ual and epistemic appropriateness of defining a 
miracle as a violation of a law of nature. Despite 
the fact that I have indicated two unresolved 
questions 1 at this stage I wish to move to the 
following question: 'How does one distinguish a mere 
violation of a law of nature from a miracle?' In 
order to answer this question I shall look at a 
number of factors including the action of God; 
religious setting; sign and faith. I then move on 
to offer a solution to the second of the unresolved 
questions. 
2. THE ACTION OF GOD 
A miracleb is not simply a violation of a law of nature 
but one brought about by the action of God. Nowell-
Smith 2 and Nielsen 3 are two writers who have 
vigorously ctiticised the coherence of explanations 
1 	See Chapter 5, note 24 and Chapter .6., note 40. 
2 	P. Rowell ,-Smith. 'Miracle' reprinted in New 'Essays  
in Philosophical 'Theology ed by Flew and MacIntyre, 
London, 1955, pp, 243-252. 
3 	Kai Nielsen. 'Empiricism, Theoretical Constucts and 
God'. Journal of aeIlion. 54(3), JUly 1974, pp. 199- 
217. 
Kai Nielsen. 'Is God So Powerful That He Doesn't Even 
Have to Exist.?' Religious 'EXTierienCe and 'Truth ed. S. 
Hook, N.Y.: 	N.Y.. Univ. Press, 1961,. pp. 270-81. 
Kai Nielsen. ''Christian Positivism and the Appeal to 
Religious Experience!. jcilirriaa of 'Religion. 42, 
October 1962, pp. 248-61. 
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in terms of God's action causing such and such to 
happen. Nowell-Smith argues as follows: 
(a) For an explanation of an event to be considered 
adequate it must be stated in terms of predictive 
scientific laws. Thus, if supernatural causation 
is to be an adequate explanation for a given 
event, we must be able to stipulate in 
connection with which predictive laws God brought 
this eventabout. 
(b) But a predictive scientific law must be: (i) 
based on evidence; (ii) be of a general type — 
'under such and such conditions, so and so will 
happen', and (iii) be testable by experience. 
(c) Thus, an inescapable dilemma can be generated for 
anyone who wishes to claim that an event has a 
supernatural explanation. On the one hand, if 
such a person wishes to claim that such an 
explanation is adequate, he cannot maintain that 
it is truly supernatural. Such adequacy entails 
that the explanation be formulated in terms of 
laws which are based on experlence, universal in 
scope, and testable by experience. But if the 
supernatural explanation is stated in these terms, 
then it loses its supernatural identity and 
becomes indistinguishable from its natural 
c8unterpart. On the other hand, if such a 
person wishes to maintain that a given supernatural 
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explanation is distinguishable from its natural 
counterpart .; then by arguing in reverse, we 
can obviously show that such an explanation 
cannot be adequate. In either case the concept 
of an adequate supernatural explanation is 
rendered inconsistent and confused. 
(d) Therefore, the use of supernatural hypotheses as 
a criterion for identifying acts of God is in-
defensible. 
Nowell-Smith's argument is only as strong as his 
initial premise: that for an event to have an adequate 
explanation it must be stated in terms of predictive 
scientific laws. It may well be that Nowell-Smith is 
providing a stipulative premise. Now if this is the 
case the apologist must simply say 'on this under-
standing of what an adequate explanation is I will 
refer to events caused by God, not as an explanation 
of the event but as a quasi-explanation of the event'. 
However, in this case it would be clear that Nowell-
Smith's argument has no bite. If, on the other hand, 
Nowell-Smith is simply claiming that there is only 
one type of adequate explanation - the scientific one - 
the apologist has only to reply as goes Swinburne 
that this is simply not the case. Swinburne establishes 
that there are a number of types of explanations 
R. Swinburne. The Concept of Miracle. London: 
Macmillan, 1970, Ch.. 5, PP. 53-60. 
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Including explanations in terms of the act of an agent. 
Likewise Sugden 5 argues that on the basis of a 
coherence theory of truth, rather than on a theory 
,based on a rigid adherence to uniformity, one can 
validly posit the resurrection of Jesus from the dead 
as an explanation of data which belong) to space-time 
history and which are claimed to be the consequences. 
and effects of an act of God. 6 Nowell-Smith's 
argument I conclude is unsound. 
Nielsen, arguing bn the verificationist tradition 
attempts to present a much more radical attack than 
that made by Nowell-Smith. He claims that such claims 
as: God loves manki4; God hates mankind; God 
caused Peter to walk on water; God did not cause 
Peter to walk on water' need an empirical anchorage. 
That is, we need to know what purely empirical states 
of affairs count for or against their truth so that 
we can distinguish the conditions under which we would 
be justified in asserting that •there is an infinite 
saviour transcendent to the world and the conditions 
under which we would not be justified in making such 
5 Christopher M.N. Sugden. 'The Supernatural and the 
"Unique in History'. Theological Students Fellowship  
Bulletin. Vol. 67, 1973, pp. .1-5. 
6 C.S. Lewis. Miracles. London, 1947, p. 47 asks who 
has the right to presuppose uniformity. He states 
that the naturalist bases his position on reason, but 
cannot establish the validity of reasoning. For the 
theist the orderlines of nature is derived from the 
reason of the Creator, and the human mind in the act 
of knowing is illuminated by the divine reason. 
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a putative assertion. 7 Nielsen is vigorous in his 
denial that such an anchorage exists as a matter of 
fact and also denies that it could exist as a matter 
of principle. Nielsen states: 
It might be responded that even if all my 
objections against empiricists and 
cognitivists in religion are sound, I have 
only given good evidence for the claim that 
there is no possible decision procedure for 
these theistic claims: there is no possible 
way of deciding which are true or probably 
true. But I have not shown that the 
alise-ver"7-1's, statements are meaningless. 
To this my reply is t,,hat I have not said or 
implied that they were meaningless; indeed 
I have stressed that they are meaningful. I 
have only shown - given nonanthropomorphic 
use of God-talk, talk involving what is 
thought to be a transcendent reference - that 
they are factually meaningless ... They 
simply do not come off as factual statements. 
Indeed, I would maintain that they are pseudo-
factual ideological statements, and have the 
kind of meaning and illocutionary and per-
locutionary force appropriate to ideological 
statements. If there can be no conrc'eivable 
tests that would, either directly or in-
directly, singly or in conjunction with other 
statements, give us empirical grounds for 
asserting the theistic claims and retracting 
the non-theistic ones or retracting the 
7 	Kai Nielsen. 	 Op- cit. p. 199. 
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theistic claims and asserting the non-
theistic ones, then these claims are 
without factual content, that is, they 
do not succeed in making factual claims 
or claims about what there is. 8 
One might attempt to undercut the force of Nielsen's 
argument by observing that (a) he is too much of a 
verificationist and (b) that he is too rigid in his 
classification of types of statement. There are, it 
might be maintained, factual statements that are in 
no way confirmable or disconfirmable even in principle. 
There are empirical facts and non-empirical facts. 
To this charge Nielsen offers the following rebuttal: 
I am, with regard to factual statements, 
an unrepentant verificationist, and I do 
believe that in an important sense 
'empirical fact' is a redundancy. I shall 
simply throw out this challenge: can we 
give a case of a statement whose factual 
status is accepted by all parties as quite 
unproblematic which is not at least con-
firmable or disconfirmable in principle? 
I do not think we can. And if we cannot, 
does this not at least give some prima 
facie plausibility to the contention that 
a statement to be factual must be con-
firmable or disconfirmable in principle? 9 
As was the case with Nowell-Smith's argument Nielsen's 
conclusion - 'that theistic claims do not succeed in 
8 	K5i Nielsen. Empiricism •.. Op. cit. pp. 208-209. 
9 	Kai Nielsen. Empiricism ... Op. cit. p. 209. 
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making factual claims about what there is' - is only 
as good as his premise - 'that a statement to be 
factual must be confirmable or disconfirmable in 
principle'. One may object to the verificationist's 
hypothesis on at least two grounds, viz. (a) argue 
against the hypothesis itself and (b) test the 
hypothesis by its own criteria. I shall only look at 
(b) here. The problems for the verificationist is 
that his own position fails to meet the requirements 
it establishes as necessary criteria for what is 
factually meaningful: To be factual the verificationist 
criterion of factual statementsis that there must be 
some conceivable test that would either directly or 
indirectly, singly or in conjuction with other state-
ments, give us empirical grounds for asserting the 
verificationist prinicple. The fact that there is no 
agreement over the soundness of the verificationist 
theory of truth and meaning atself2illustrates that 
there is no such test either in fact or in principle. 
Therefore, by his own criteria the verificationist 
has no empirical grounding for his own position and 
therefore by his own criteria he defeats himself. 10 
10 	This conclusion might well be termed the 
verificationist's paradox. E.E. Sleinis 'Quine on 
Analyticity' Philosophy 48, 1973, pp. 79-84 points out 
a similar paradox generated by the statement: 'Any 
statement is in prinCiple rejectable'. One sees the 
paradox straight off when one considers the question 
'Consider the above statement, is it in principle 
rejectable or not?' The same paradox confronts the 
verificationist who makes the claim that: 'All factually 
meaningful statements are in principle confirmable or 
disconfirmable'. Consider then the question: 'Is the 
above statement confirmable or disconfirmable in 
principle?' 
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I conclude that both Nowell-Smith and Nielsen fail 
in their attempts to show that explanations in terms 
of God's actions are incoherent, inadequate or 
factually meaningless. The miracle stands apart from 
a mere violation of a law of nature in that whilst the 
violation may be an event not caused by the primary 
action of God (or may perhaps be uncaused), the 
miracle is a violation caused (at least in part) by 
the primary 11 causal activity of God. 12 
3; 	RELIGIOUS SETTING 
That historically religious context has been central 
to the concept of miracle may be seen from a quick 
overview of the Biblical understanding of miracle. As 
I pointed out in Chapter Two the biblical conception 
of nature and laws of na4:ure differed significantly from 
the predominant view since the period of the 
11 	I use the term 'primary' in the sense that the event 
could not have occurred without the direct causal in- 
volvement of God. That is, it cannot be adequately 
explained by reference to {-the (secondary) causal powers 
of human beings, physical objects, etc. 
12 	I have deliberately avoided two questions within this 
section. The first, an altgmpt to elucidate the concept 
of 'God'. I have avoided this because it is really a 
thesis on its own, yet the cconcept has enough general 
acceptance to be understood by the reader.. The second 
is the question whether or not a violation brought 
about by an Lod, not just by God, is a miracle. This 
is really a theological question and so falls outside 
the competence of this writer. However, on the 
assumption that some god - example, Satan - could work 
a violation of a law of nature, wholly independent of 
the will of God, we could simply stipulate that such an 
event was a quasi-miracle and only those violations 
worked by God, whojay or in part, are miracles. 
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Enlightenment. The biblical realisation of the 
organic unity of the cosmos which receives its most 
definite and systematic expression in the account of 
creation does not Lead to anything like the climate 
' of thought in which the mind of modern man moves. 
So far from the cosmos coming to be considered as a 
rigid mechanical system, its order and unity are 
felt to testify to the constancy and steadfastness of 
God's creative purpose yearning to reveal its inherent 
ilory in both man and nature. All is felt to depend 
upon the personal will of the creator God who longs 
to manifest His goodness and set up His kingdom at 
the heart of His creation. The splendours and terrors 
of nature are the garments in which He clothes Himself 
as He comes to judge he world and establish His 
righteousness. 
This dynamic approach to nature as a theatre which 
testifies to the immanence and nearness of the living 
God forms the background for an understanding of the 
biblical conception of miracle. In a world of thought 
where the wholr6 of creation is conceived as rooted in 
the steadfast purpose of God to reveal Himself and 
manifest His glory, and would cease to exist apart 
from the continuous operation of that purpose, miracle 
cannot be sufficiently explained as a temporary 
suspension or violation of he laws of nature in the 
interest of some higher object, or as a wonder 
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surpassing, if not contradicting, the normal ordered 
,r) propesses of nature. Miracle is seen rather as an 
intensified supreme expression of that which is the 
fundamental meaning of nature or creation as a whole. 
It is seen as the manifestation of the divine glory 
in mIgkt„y acts or phenomena which arouse in man the 
emotions of awe and amazement, and subdue his heart 
to adoration and submission. The very words used in 
the Hebrew suggest such an interpretation. Thus we 
have the term beriy'ah13 (a product of creative 
action) implying that miracle is a fresh revelation of 
the creative energies of God pointed now to some 
concrete situation of human need and s-S'41ication. 
Niph e la'ahl4 ( wonder or marvel) suggests the power 
of miracle to arouse astonishment, nora' 15 (a terrible 
thing), its capacity to subdue the human heart with 
fear and awe, g eburah16 (a deed of power) its 
manifestation of the plentitude of divine power, 
mat e lal and mal e seh l7 (an action) its aspect as a deed 
flowing from the output of divine energy. Likewise 
in the New Testament account the miracles of Jesus 
were felt by their witnesses to be mighty deeds 
exciting awe, fear and amazement in the beholders and 
were characterized by Jesus Himself as the works of God. 
13 	Exod. 34:10; 	Jer. 31:22. 
14 	Exod. 3:20; Judges 6:13. 
15 	2 Sam. 7:23. 16 	P (63. 20:7, 106:2. 
17 	Ps. 9:12; 	Isa. 12:4. 
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Thus miracle, according to this biblical conception, 
should be seen as the special quality of 4n event 
in which faith apprehends the answer of God to human 
need, the coming of God to transform a human 
situation, the finger of God pointing to some 
ultimate dimension of meaning in human affairs. There 
is a suggestion of a whole complex of rich religious 
significance, an adumbration of a cycle of events in 
which man is tensely confronted by the self-revealing 
will and action of God. It is the religious 
significance of the event's contextual setting, which 
points beyond itself to the dimension of infinity 
and eternity in which it is ultimately set. 
Without miracle the immanence of God in nature is less 
apparent and we are left with an ultimately meaningless 
interplay of natural and human cause and effect, and 
history resolves itself into a series of patterns and 
rhythms which cry aloud for some absolute and 
comprehensive meaning and truth which of themselves 
they are powerless to yield. Miracle is therefore to 
be seen as essentially the sudden revelation of 
transcendent truth and reality, the conviction of the 
challenge of God and the activity of God at the heart 
of human life. Quite clearly the miracle, whether 
defined along biblical lines or along modern scientific 
lines, cannot be cut adrift from the essential element 
of religious context. Indeed, 'it is hard to imagine 
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how any wondrous event outside of a religious context 
could serve as a sign of the su*rnatural'. 18 
'Extraordinary events lacking religious significance 
are more appropriately characterised as magical or 
psychic phenomena rather than as miracles'. 19 
4. 	MIRACLE AND SIGN 
As long as miracles are defined only in terms 
of transcendence, we have indeed a norm to 
distinguish miraculous phenomena from extra- 
ordinary natural events. But the norm is 
mostly negative, eliminating the presence of 
a natural agency. Whereas if we add the 
concept of miracle as a divine sign, we have 
at hand an index to determine the miraculous 
not only negatively, by the exclusion of 
nature, but positively, by giving evidence 
of the purposeful presence of God. 20 
This claim that the sign or semeiological aspect 
should be included in any adequate definition of 
miracle has gained wide acceptance among theologians 
during the last twenty years. Beaudry, for example, 
18 	James C. Carter. 	'The Recognition of Miracles'. 
Theological Studies. Vol. XX, 1959, p. 195. See also 
Kevin McNamara. 'The Nature and Recognition of 
Miracles'. Irish Theological Quarterly. Vol. 27, 1960, 
p. 299. 'A. miracle makes its appearance in a religious 
'context and apart from this context it cannot be 
adequately understood.. The total miracle is not 
simply the physical prodigy but that prodigy clothed 
in its religious circumstances.. 
19 	R. Swinburne. fto. Cit. pp. 8-9. For a sharp 
discussion of the concept of 'religious significance' 
see Swinburne pp. 7-10. 
20 	John A. Hardon. 'The Concept. of Miracle from St. 
Augustine to Modern Apologetics'. Theological Studies. 
15, 1954, p. 250. 
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claims 'that the time is ripe to propose a well-
balanced theory of miracle which would integrate its 
religious intentionality with its physical, preter-
natural aspect' 21 Likewise, Dhanis claims: 
If a miracle really has the structure of a 
divine sign given it by God, this function 
should not be omitted from its definition. 
Most of the objections against the 
possibility of miracles arise from the 
fact that the objections wrongly conceive 
the whole essence of a miracle to cOnsist 
in its quality of prodigious transcendence. 
Viewed in this way, a miracle seems to be 
some kiqqI of arbitrary exception and un-
acceptable deordination. (Medieval) 
scholastics gave a handle to this sort of 
objection; so that the definition of 
miracle which they propose needs to be 
complemented by the express mention of its 
semeiological aspect, which the scholastics 
themselves admit on the basis of 
Scripture ... 22 
Still, the practice of including the semeiological 
aspect of miracle in its definition is by no means 
general and even where it exists, there is no general 
agreement on the precise nature of the sign aspect of 
a miracle. Landrum 23 argues against the inclusion of 
21 	J. Frederick Beaudry. 'Miracle and Sign'. StUdia  
MCntis Regii. Vol. 3, 1960, (pp. 65-94), p. 67. 
22 E. Dhanis, TradtatiO d.e Miradulo. 8. (An unedited 
set of graduate ,course notes on miracle .given at the 
Gregorian cited. in. J. Eardon. 0 -ij. Cit. p. 254). 
23 
	
	George Landrum. 'What .a Miracle Really Isl. Reli gious  
Studies.: 12, 1976, pp. 49-57. 
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the sign aspect in the definition of miracle in the 
folrawing passage. 
Nowadays it is common to add a third 
condition ... to the effect that miracles 
are signs. One concentrates on the 
nature of the revelation involved in the 
miracle and not on the nature of the event 
that constitutes the miracle. 
In keeping with this way of doing things, 
one might insist that miracles reveal God's 
divinity, or something of this nature. One 
would, after all, feel a reluctance to 
speak of a miracle if God should bring it 
about that a certain worm should deviate 
ten degrees from the path it would other-
wise follow. But I think that this 
reluctance stems not from any problems in-
volved in the nature of miracles, but rather 
from a notion of the appropriateness of 
God's performing such a trivial act. It is 
not that we are reluctant to say that his 
trivial acts are miraculous, but that we 
are reluctant to say that he acts trivially. 
Therefore, if we clearly separate what it is 
to be a miracle from what it is to be a 
miracle performed by the sort of God one is 
disposed to worship, I think hat we will 
feel no need to insist that miracles, as 
part of their nature, be signs of a certain 
sort.. It is not part of the nature of a 
miracle that it should be a sign, though 
miracles function° as signs. 
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Even if it is insisted that every miracle 
should be a sign, there is no reason to 
make that part of the definition of 
'miracle' 24 
No-one seems to question the fact that miracles are 
divine signs. Traditionally speaking, from Augustine 
to the present day, miracles have always been so 
regarded, and this view is entirely in keeping with 
the evangelical concept of miracles. Yet neither in 
Augustine nor Thomas Aquinas is miracle defined as a 
divine sign. It was not until the eighteenth century 
that the semeiological aspect of miracle became a 
part of its definition. The reason for this in- 
corporation at that time was based on the practical 
necessity of finding a means of distinguishing miracles 
from diabolical prodigies. Its inclusion by apologists 
today stems from the similar practical difficulty of 
separating the permanently scientifically inexplicable 
from the mere presently scientifically inexplicable. 
Theis.,e is a clear need for an index which will 
successfully divide the true miracle from the purely 
natural occurrence whose cause is not yet known. 
Without necessarily denying the convenience or even the 
legitimacy of this pragmatic view, some recent 
theologians have affirmed that there is an intrinsic, 
rather than merely functional, reason why miracles 
24 	George Landrum. Op. cit. pp. 49-50. 
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should be defined as signs and that an adequate 
theological view of them demands that they be so 
defined. For them the semeiological value of miracle 
belongs to its very essence; it is not something 
extrinsically connected to it and brought into its 
definition simply to meet an ad hoc apologetical 
need. Whereas in this case an adequate definition 
of miracle must necessarily include its signgficative 
aspect, no such necessity exists in the pragmatica- 
view. What has to be determined, therefore, is whether 
or not the semeiological aspect is intrinsic or 
extrinsic to the definition of miracle. 
In order to answer this question it is helpful to make 
a division of the concept of sin, established on its 
relation to the signified, into natural@A conventional. 
If the order existing between a sign and its signified 
results from the laws of nature, such for example as 
smoke with regard to fire, one is said to be in the 
presence of a natural sign. If, on the contrary, the 
order of sign to signified is the result of a voluntary 
decision, which in fact will often be a collective one, 
the sign is called conventional. In any analysis of 
the nature and division of sign in the miracle context 
it is necessary to extend the notion of natural signs 
beyond the realm of nature to include those phenomena 
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which are 'beyond nature' or 'supernatural'. 25 In 
order to incorporate this move it has become standard 
amongst theologians to rename the 'natural' sign of 
the philosopher as 'spontaneous' sign, so as to be 
able to include not only phenomena which occur 
according toWiordinary course of tia -t-u—r-e but also 
those which go beyond it. A spontaneous sign is one 
which points to something other than itself by reason 
of its own internal tendency or ordination to it. 
It is to be contrasted with conventional sign which 
has its meaning stamped on it from some external 
agency. 
A miracle is no doubt at least in part a spontaneous 
sign in so far as it is an event which is irreducible 
to natural efficient causes and which lacks meaning 
without reference to the primary causal activity of 
God. 
Exactly what proportionate finality is spontaneously 
signified by the transcendent causality of a miracle 
is less easily determined. The very least that can be 
demanded of a miracle is that it be a sign addressed to 
a person; for it is absolutely without meaning to 
25 	Although I use the concept of 'supernatural', here and 
in other places I do not offerCa precise account of 
what the supernatural is. I consider that the concept 
is widely enough accepted to.allow.m.e.to introduce it 
but too difficult to allow for a simplet precise 
definition.. An. outline of the historical evolution of 
the concept of 'supernatural) may be found in De Broglie 
'La Vraei Notion Thomiste. Des 'Praeambula Fidei', 
Gr60/'iAturri4. 34. 1953, Pp. 141-162. 
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beings incapable of knowing in some degree the network 
of laws of nature operating in nature.. It is thus not 
a spontaneous sign in the limited and accidental way 
that the footprint of an animal is a sign of its past 
presence. Further, as a sign addressed by God to men, 
a miracle appears as an intermediary enabling God to 
enter into special relations with men; it must, 
therefore, be a religious sign. In other words, under 
penalty of having no raison d'etre, a miracle necessarily 
postulates the ordination of its prodigious aspect to a 
religious end. Viewed concretely, this religious 
finality or intentionality must be able to be inferred 
from the context and circumstances surrounding a miracle. 
Why should miraculous phenomena spontaneously 
be recognized as signs of God's intervention? 
The reason is, first of all, because they are, 
ex hypothesi, extraordinary and naturally un-
expected events. But, more specifically, they 
always occur under circumstances which indicate 
that God is here, speaking in a special way to 
men, in answer to their invocation of His aid. 
Historically these religious adjuncta which 
identify miracles as 'divine response are of 
two kinds: the circumstances preceding the 
phenomena are such as( -Oirlehow petition for an 
answer from God, and thrmiracles themselves 
possess qualities which are clearly proportion-
al to this petition. 27 
27 	J. Hardon. Op, cit.. p.252. 
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Hardon claims that the adjuncta or circumstances 
preceding a miracle exhibit a petitional quality that 
is unmistakable. Often an explicit prayer is addressed 
to God, asking for a certain prodigy. 28 At other times 
a person's communion and union with God is so constant 
as to be a kind of living prayer which invites the out-
pouring of God's miraculous power. The public 
ministry of Jesus Christ offers a perfect example of 
this type of petition. 29 
According to Hardon the close correspondence between 
the petition and the fulfillment of the equest is the 
most striking feature of miraculous phenomena COs divine 
signs. There are two aspects to this close 
correspondence. Negatively, the prodigy does not occur 
indifferent to the petition or contrary to what had 
been 	 j7iI ) Clearly, this does not mean that a 
miracle always follows a petition, but when it does 
occur it is in harmony with the petition. Positively, 
the prodigy always occurs in a way that shows a causal 
connection with the antecedent circumstances. 30 
In line with the above analysis, the solution to the 
question under investigation - whether or not the 
semeiological aspect is intrinsic or extrinsic to the 
definition of miracle - seems clear. The spontaneous 
28 	Peter, for example, before. curing the. cripple at the 
gate. called Beautiful, prayed: 'In the name of Jesus 
Christ of Nazareth, arise and walk'. Acts. 14:10. 
29 	J. Hardon. 'Ibid.: 
30 	J. Hardon. 
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signification of a miracle is essential to it 
because it is part of the defining characteristics of 
miracle (is intrinsic to it). On the other hand, the 
conventional signification is related to the 
accompanying characteristics of miracle (is extrinsic 
to it) and is therefore not part of its essence or 
definition. It follows that by providing a fitting 
explanation for the exceptionality to the laws of nature 
of 'a prodigious phenomenon, the semeiological aspect 
of miracle constitutes a valuable criterion for dis-
cerning a true miracle from a false one, whether this 
latter be a diabolical prodigy or an extraordinary, 
not yet explained, natural happening. With this in 
mind it is time to take up the unresolved question 
from the previous chapter. 31 
5: VIOLATION, RELIGIOUS CONTEXT AND RECOGNITION OF MIRACLE 
In the previous chapter I indicated that the adoption 
of 'garden-variety' laws of nature bringsforth 
difficulties in knowing with reliability that the 
extraordind.ry event has not occurred as a result of 
special conditions. In the face of this difficulty a 
number of 'solutions' have been proposed by various 
writers. I propose to look at two of these. 32 
31 	Chapter 6, note 40. 
32 	The two 'solutions' which I investigate assume that it 
is necessary to retain the element.of physical 
transcendence in the definition of. miracle. Some, how-
ever, who claim that it is.hardly.ever possible to prove 
physical transcendence have opted.. to. emphasise the 
' semeiological aspect of. miracle and to reduce the 
emphasis on the. aspect of physical transcendence. 
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(a) The first 'solution' is characterized by varying 
degrees of scepticism about the possibility, at 
least in practice, of establishing that a 
violation has occurred independent of a 
consideration of the religious context. 
The qualification 'at least in practice' 
is necessary as there can be no doubt 
that, given certain happenings, e.g. a 
dead man raised to life, the feeding of 
thousands of people with a few loaves, 
it would readily be conceded that the 
impossibility of a natural explanation 
can be established with certainty. In 
reality, however, such facts are not 
given, strictly speaking. We depend 
for our knowledge of them on observation 
and testimony and this immediately opens 
the door to various possibilities which 
militate against a certain judgement. 
Appeal is made to the religious context, 
therefore, for evidence of a free and 
intelligent being acting for a religious 
purpose. Until such evidence is clearly 
discernible one can scarcely ever be 
certain that the prodigy is not the 
result of natural causes. In other words 
one can never be sure of physical 
transcendence until one has taken account 
of the sign-structure of the prodigy. It 
is the coincidence of an apparently 
transcendent effect with significant 
religious circumstances that unmistakably 
points to divine causality. Order, 
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finality, the framework of a 
religious dialogue between God and 
man - these cannot result from the 
chance operation of natural 
forces. 33 
Thus, according to this view it is the sign-
structure of the event which guarantees that 
the extraordinary event is a miracle. That is, 
the religious context, together with the 
semeiological aspect of the event ensures its 
physical transcendence. 
(b) The second 'solution' is characterized by the 
claim that it is possible and necessary to 
establish physical transcendence without any 
aid from the religious context. According to 
this view once physical transcendence is 
established, the religious context then points 
to the adequate reason which makes it worthy of 
divine wisdom to depart from that system of 
secondary causes establhed at the beginning 
for the ordering of the univ&se. 
Suppose, then, we have a scientist 
who, though rigorously faithful to 
scientific method, grants the 
possibility at least of a direct 
supernatural intervention in nature. 
What conclusion can he reach about 
33 	K. McNamara. Op. cit. p. 311. 
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Peter's walking on the water, or 
about the instantaneous disappearance 
of a cancerous tumour? According to 
some, of whom Dhanis is a notable 
representative, he can be certain 
that these events are preternatural, 
strict exceptions to the natural order. 
They do not merely lack a natural 
explanation in our present state of 
knowledge; they are naturally in-
explicable and in that sense violations 
,of the laws of nature. But what of the 
possibility ... of statistical 
fluctuations or some other, as yet un-
known,explanation? To this question 
Dhanis replies ... that the fantastic-
ally remote possibility of a statistical 
exception (this is the 'explanation' he 
Ms considering) cannot rob the mind of 
genuine certainty that no such exception 
will be witnessed. In the practical 
affairs of life we do not allow the mere 
abstract possibility of error to 
influence us when we have sufficient 
positive grounds for making a certain 
judgement. 34 
Thus according to this view one can be certain 
that the event is (scientifically inexplicable, a 
violation of a law of nature, without direct 
recourse to the sign-structure of the event. 
Such certainty is based on the process of in-
duction; 'experience of millions of instances, 
constantly subject ta fresh verification by men 
34 	K. McNamara. Op. cit. p. 309. 
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everywhere, provides within certain limits 
sure knowledge of what given natural causes 
must inevitably, or on the other hand, cannot 
at all accomplish. 35 
Both of these 'solutions' make an appeal at some 
stage to the light thrown upon the prodigy by 
its sign-function. They both agree on the need 
to take the sign-function into account if one 
is finally to rest secure in affirming that the 
extraordinary event is a miracle. They differ, 
however, on the question: At what moment is 
assent to physical transcendence justified? 
It is to the resolution of this difficulty that 
I now turn. 
Is it possible and necessary to establish physical 
transcendence without any aid from the religious 
context as Dhanis suggests? As we have seen 
Dhanis claims that given a major religious 
prodigy, one is certain from an examination of 
the fact itself and of its physical circumstances 
that it has a transcendent cause. But such a 
phenomenon lacks meaning as long as there is no 
explanation of the extraordinary departure from 
the normal order of the universe. The religious 
context, however, supplies the explanation. In 
35 K. McNamara. 01i— cit— p. 310. 
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these circumstances, one wonders how it is possible, 
while conceding that the prodigy as a physical event 
remains unintelligible apart from the religious 
character of the context, to qualiTy as certain the 
judgement which affirms this physical ttanscendence 
prior to a recourse to the context? Is it possible 
to affirm the truth of the claim yet at the same time 
not see how it makes sense? Is it not more likely 
that the absence of intelligibility - at the precise 
moment under consideration - in what one is being 
led to affirm prevents one from actually affirming it? 
It would seem to me that apart from a recourse to 
the total context there is a conflict between the 
certainty of physical transcendence which the nature 
of the effect seems to justify and the puzzlement 
which the admission of such transcendence entails. 
How then is it possible to affirm physical transcendence 
with certainty without regard to religious contextual 
factors? It seems clear in fact that predominantly 
one cannot affirm it with final security - a further 
question of intentionality remains to be answered. 
One cannot predominantly have certainty that any 
purported event is a miracle without backing for the 
claim from the area of science (that the event is 
scientifically inexplicable) and from the area of 
religion (there is a religious intentionality in the 
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event). It seems, however, that if one could 
separate out the various stages involved in the 
complex recognition of the miraculous and allow no 
reciprocal action between them, the situation would 
be as Dhanis has presented it: In the first place 
a certain judgement of physical transcendence on 
the basis of human experience of what natural 
forces can and cannot accomplish; secondly, 
amazement at the implication of this judgement, viz. 
disorder introduced into the universe, and finally, 
recognition of the presence of an explanation for 
this disorder in the religious context of the 
prodigy. However, in practice these stages act and 
react on one another and one can hardly feel certain 
about physical transcendence until recource to the 
religious context has conferred final intelligibility 
upon it. 
There is no point in inventing arbitrary 
and undefined theories, when all the 
circumstances of a miraculous event 
sufficiently indicate that the phenomenon 
is the effect of a free and transcendent 
agent, namely, God Himself. Certainly, 
if no antecedent circumstance renders a 
prodigy intelligible, we should abstain 
from passing judgement and admit that the 
cause is unknown. But if the finality 
and semeiology of a phenomenon clearly 
identify it as belonging to the religious 
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sphere, it is there we must look for its 
'raison d"6tre' and not postulate the 
36 action of an unknown cause. . 
6. CONCLUSION  
In this chapter I have indicated that a miracle is not 
merely an event which violates a law of nature. A 
miracle is a complex mesh of elements. It is an 
event brought about at least in part by the direct 
action of God; it occurs in a religious context and 
is a divine sign. That is, the miracle has both a 
scientific and a religious aspect. I have indicated 
further that predominantly one cannot know that an 
event is a miracle without recourse to both the 
scientific and the religious aspect and that there 
exists a dynamic interplay between the two. One 
cannot claim to know that a miracle has occurred 
wiPbhout strong backing from both the scientific and 
the religious aspect. The existence of strong 
backing from both provides good reason to believe that 
a miracle has occurred. 
MD 36 	A. Van Hove.. La doctrine der -MiraCIe 	TA-0as_L 
taris, 1927, p. 376. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
1. INTRODUCTION  
In the preceding chapter I indicated that miracle is 
a complex phenomenon not simply a violation of a law 
of nature. We do not recognize a miracle because 
of its exceptionality alone but rather we see the 
miracle in the complex: scientifically inexplicable 
event, religious context, sign from God. It is this 
complex mesh of elements which is transcendent, 
which demands the (special) intervention of God as its 
adequate explanation. Only God communicating His 
message can account for the complex. In this chapter 
I offer a solution to the difficulty noted in Chapter 
Five l and a final refinement of the violation model. 
2. IN WHAT SENSE CAN A LAW OF SCIENCE BE VIOLATED? 
Let us assume that there is a law of science of the 
form L s = (x)(Fx--4-Gx). This might be read for 
example as: for all x if x is a crow then x is black. 
If on a partjgular occasion John Smith observed a 
crow that was white this could be represented as an 
event E where E 	(Fa • 	Ga). That is an object a 
was both a crow and was not black. We now have: 
(a) ( x) 	Gx) 
(b) (Fa 	' Go) 
1 	See Chapter Five and particularly Section 4. 
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In terms of the violation model (a) represents the 
law and (b) represents the violation of that law. 
Simply and absolutely (a) and (b) are incompatible 
and therefore their conjunction is logically im-
possible. If we are to make sense of this situation 
it seems that we are faced with a number of alternate 
hypotheses. 
Either (a) Miracles when defined as violations cannot 
occur. 
Or 	(b) Miracles are not violations of a law of 
science. 
Or 	(c) Miracles are violations of a law of science 
differently conceived. 
Of course the violation theorist cannot accept either 
(a) or (b) and must therefore adopt hypothesis (c). 
At this point he has two possibilities open to him. 
He can accept: 
Either (a) The law is universal and violation is only 
prima facie - the occurrence of (b) is a 
violation of what was held to be a law but 
now needs revision. 
Or 	(b) The law is not universal, but has a 
restrictive clause (that is L =  
(Fx--,..Gx)) and an event C* (Fa ' Go) 
constitutes a violation. 
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Of these two broad possibilities alternative (a) is 
quite unacceptable to the violation theorist. This 
follows from the fact that it fails to distinguish 
between violations and falsifications of the law. It 
simply admits all falsifying evidence as violations. 
The violation theorist is left with possibly (b) and 
the only question that remains is what sense can be 
given to the restrictive condition r :,c? I will 
investigate the following possibilities: 
(a) There is nothing else relevant (ceteris paribus). 
(b) God does not intervene. 
(c) There is a law covering the particular 
circumstances. 
(d) There is an alternative law covering the 
particular circumstances. 
(e) The situation is scientifically explicable. 
(a)- As I have argued in earlier sections ceteris 
paribus clauses tend to be very slippery and 
pose severe difficulties for the theorist 
attempting to confirm or falsify laws. Further-
more, by the use of the ceteris paribus clause 
any universal statement can be made true. For 
example: Iceteris paribus, all attempts to walk 
on water are successful'. I, therefore, conclude 
that this possibility is unsatisfactory. 
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(b) There are a number of substantial difficulties 
associatedith this possibility. In the first 
place I would maintain that the laws of science 
are areligious; they operate independently of 
any religious circumstance, and depend entirely 
on the natural conditions being rightly placed 
to evoke a definite predictable effect. It is, 
therefore, out of place to attach such a 
condition. Furthermore, such a condition makes 
it necessary for the scientist to have an in-
dependent way of establishing whether or not God 
intervenes. That is, an exception to the 
universal statement cannot, of itself, be evidence 
that God has intervened, unless previously there 
has been evidence that God has not intervened. 
Quite clearly the body of science has never 
claimed to have such evidence and I, therefore, 
conclude that this possibility is unsatisfactory. 2 
(c) As I noted in Chapter 5, Section 5, Swinburne 
argues that in cases where we have a well confirmed 
law and a well confirmed counter-instance E such 
that if we leave L unmodified, it will, we have 
good reason to believe, give correct predictions 
in all other conceivable circumstances we must 
either say that if there is any law then it is L 
2 	George. Landrum. 'What a Miracle.. Really ia'. —Religious  
• Studies. 12, 1976, p. 51 provides a .concise attack upon 
the use of. a rider such as 'if God does not intervene' 
• attached to laws of nature. 
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or that there is no law. 3 However, as I have 
pointed out this explanation does nothing to solve 
the apparent contradiction between the law 
statement and the existence of a counter example. 
Landrum illustrates this point well: 
Miracles are not supposed to be violations 
of what scientists think natural laws are: 
they are not supposed to be violations of 
formulations of natural law; they are 
supposed to be violations of actual natural 
laws. Consequently any heuristic practices 
scientists employ in arriving at natural 
law are simply irrelevant to what natural 
laws actually are. Doubtless it is sound 
scientific practice to discount one piece 
of apparent evidence that is inconsistent 
with everything else one knows. But that 
does not change the fact that a single white 
raven is inconsistent with its being a law 
that all ravens are black. One ought not 
be overly impressed by a report from a non-
scientist of the existence of a single 
whitdDraven; but one will not insist on 
two white ravens in one's laboratory. 4 
What Landrum establishes is that the scientist 
may express the laws of nature, as they are known 
to him, in a variety of ways. Some of these 
statements will be more acceptable to the scientist 
than others according to various criteria. However, 
3 	Richard Swinburne. The . COA.delit . df .MiPadle. London: 
MacMillan, 1970, pp. 26-28- 
4 	G. Landrum. Op- . Cit.- pp. 51 - 53. 
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there is always the more fundamental question 
involving the actual ontological status of the 
law. If there are laws of nature which, so to 
speak, actually attach onto the ontological 
things that exist, then there should be, I would 
maintain, a precise way of expressing these laws. 
It is a question of whether it makes sense to 
talk of a violation of such a law not a violation 
of a law statem6iit made:Tor reasons' of 
practicality or simplification that is at issue. 
Gill 5 , recognizing this issue, sought to offer a 
solution involving the notion of a false but best 
law which while expressed - an, universal form allows 
for exceptions to it. The (violating) exception 
is proof that the law is false. The fact that the 
law cannot be replaced indicates.that it is best. 
The difficulty with this position is that there 
does not seem to be any good reason why the false 
but best universal law cannot be adequately re-
placed by a true and best statistical law. But 
once the law is statistical the 'violation' is 
explained or covered by the law rather than 
contrary to it. I, therefore, conclude that while 
Gill's suggested remodelling of the violation 
concept does overcome some of the difficulties 
inherent in Swinburne's treatment, it does also 
5 	See Chapter Five, Section 5. 
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create certain problems and is, therYfore, not 
fully satisfactory. 
(d) According to this possibility it is suggested that 
the restrictive0clause , q> in the law of science 
takes the form 'there is an alternative law 
covering the particular circumstances'. What is 
not so obvious about this possibility is that it 
actually allows for two interpretations depending 
upon the sense applied to 'law' in the restrictive 
clause. 
On the one hand it might be interpreted as saying 
that unless there is an alternative (natural) 
law ... Now on this view it hardly makes sense to 
call a non-falsifying exception to the law a 
violation since the exception simply indicates 
that the wrong law or set of laws is being used 
to predict or explain the event which has occurred. 
The event is as a matter of fact explainable 
61iihthe use of natural law - known or unknown. 
The apologist certainly does not wish to conceive 
of violation in this sense! 
On the other hand the interpretation might be - 
unless there is an alternative (non-natural) law 
covering the circumstance: Landrum in suggesting 
that a distinction can be made between natural and 
non-natural laws offers the following illustration: 
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Let us tentatively suppose that a 
coherent natural/non-natural 
distinction can be drawn. It has 
certainly seemed to many philosophers 
hat this is a perfectly clear 
distinction, or if it is not a clear 
distinction it has seemed clear that 
there is such a distinction. The 
distinction is supposed to generate 
two classes of predicates: natural 
and non-natural. Further, it is 
supposed that predicates from one of 
these classes can not be defined in 
terms of predicates from the other 
class. Apparently all natural laws 
can be formulated using only natural 
predicates, though, as I have argued, 
lawlike generalizations can be 
formulg:ted which involve non-natural 
predic4es. If these remarks are 
more or less correct, they would seem 
to provide a basis for the claim that 
A 'Heretics are to be punished' could 
not formulate a natural law: neither 
'heretic' nor 'punish' is a natural 
predicate. (But it could formulate a 
non-natural law with the corresponding 
counter-factual 'If anyone were to 
commit heresy he would be punished'. 6 
Landrum's interesting suggestion rests on a number 
of fundamental assumptions. Firstly, he claims 
that there is no reason why miracles should not 
be repeatable in the same circumstances: the 
6 G. Landrum. MO. cit. p. 54. 
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natural circumstances are only part of the 
circumstances. 7 Secondly, he says 'one tends 
to think of miracles as being rare ... but I can 
not see that it is part of the concept of a 
miracle that they are rare'. 8 Thirdly, he says 
'On the conception I am recommending, a universe 
with miracles is still a universe that can be 
understood, a universe that can be explained ... 
but not a universe that can be explained by 
science alone'. 9 Now while I have no argument 
with the third of these assumptions the others 
are open to criticism. 
In the first place there is perhaps no doubt that 
if God exists and He wills it, he could repeat 
miracles in similar circumstances. However, if 
this were in fact the case we would have to know 
the 'mind' of God if we were to be able to 
formulate the circumstances in which God would 
work a miracle. Secondly, throughout history, 
purported miraculous events have not appeared to 
follow any discernable pattern at all. In modern 
times the extraordinary cures at Lourdes offer a 
remarkable example of the lack of uniformity and 
regularity in the purported occurrence of miracle. 
Yet if miracles occur according to law - natural 
7 	G. Landrum. Op., cit.. p. 52. 
8 	G. Landrum, 
9 	G. Landrum. -0 -0.Cit. 	p. 57. 
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or non-natural surely one would expect to discern 
some regularity. After all the notion of 
regularity is deeply interwoven in the concept of 
law. 
If the cause which effects the truly 
remarkable cures at Lourdes were a 
purely natural, impersonal and un-
intelligent cause we should expect 
that, like all such causes, it would 
act in a uniform and constant manner. 
Having observed its behaviour over the 
space of a century, having analysed 
and compared one with another, the 
thousands of cures it has effected, 
we should now be able to formulate the 
law according to which it works. And 
in the light of this we should be able 
to predict with some certainty how and 
how not it will act in the future. We 
should be able to say wtth some measure 
of confidence that given the same 
circumstances this cause will invariably 
produce the same effects. We should 
expect, too, that some regular pattern 
would be discernible either in the 
type of disease which is cured or in 
the type of person who is cured or at 
least in the circumstances of the cure. 
But nothing of all this is revealed in 
the cures at Lourdes. No law, 
uniformity, regularity or pattern can 
be discovered in them. Far from being 
limited to a particular type or even 
types of disease, this mysterious cause 
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ranges at will over the entire field 
of disease and cures the most diverse 
ailments. Yet, it is an accepted 
medical principle that diverse ailments 
require diverse remedies and treatment. 
Nor is there any law or pattern dis-
cernible in thetyype of person who is 
cured, neither in their age, sex, 
temperament, way of life or religious 
disposition. And the same is true of 
the circumstances of the cures ... 
These cures, then, bear the character 
not of uniformity and regularity but 
of diversity and multiplicity. 10 
Thirdly, although it may not be part of the concept 
of miracle that they are rare, nevertheless, it is 
partly the rarity of the miracle that mgs it off 
from other events. If one were not to hold that 
miracles must occur infrequently it would perhaps 
be enough to claim that they do as a mattr of 
fact. In fact a world in which miracles occurred 
regularly would be a world with a much higher 
amount of uncertainty than our own. However, 
contrary to this, in the view of many theologians, 
there is ample scriptuflasupport for a high degree 
of uniformity in the present cosmos. 11 
On the basis of these criticisms I conclude that 
aen this aecond interpretation of law is un-
acceptable and that as a consequence this possible 
10. 	John J.. McGreevy.. 'The Lourdes. Miracles'. - Irish  
—ECCIealaStiCai.aeCOrd,. Vol. 89, Febtuary 1958, p. 116. 
11 	henry M. Morris. 'Biblical Naturalism and Modern Science Bibliotheca Sacra. July 1968, pp. 195-204. 
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interpretation (d) of the restrictlive clause cCI, 
is unacceptable. 
(e) Throughout the history of intellectual reasoning 
many writers and thinkers have attempted to define 
the aims and methods of science. That there has 
been a vast range of opinion on this is well 
known. However, there does appear to be a general 
agreement among theorists that science will never 
be able to fully unravel the ontological or 
epistemological mysteries of reality. 12 For one 
thing the scientific enterprise is largely 
descriptive; for another, it is limited by its 
own methodology and apparatus. In so far as it 
is capable of investigating physical phenomena it 
investigates only part of reality since it is 
incapable by definition, of investigating non- 
physical (or non-empirically investigable) 
phenomena. Consider the following opinions: 
The very common idea that it is the 
function of natural science to explain 
physical phenomena cannot be accepted 
as true unless the word 'explain' is 
used in a very limited sense ... 
Natural science describes, so far as 
iitcan, how, or in accordance with what 
rules, phenomena happen, but it is 
12 	Margaret A. Baden. 1 Miracles.-and Scientific Explanation' 
' Ratio, Vol. 11, Na. 2, 1969, p. 137, argues that the 
properties. or the. nature of the.. universe as a whole are 
conceptually debarred from scientific explanation. 
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wholly incompetent to answer the 
question why they happen. 13 
In Hellenistic times, scientists 
came to see their tasks as restricted 
to mathematical forecasting: what 
( followed ? aTs disastrous. For most 
of us nowadays the task of under- 
standing nature is a wider one. 
Prediction is all very well; but we 
must make sense of what we predict. 
The mainspring of science is the 
conviction that by honest, 
imaginative enquiry we can build up 
a system of ideas about nature which 
has some legitimate claim to 'reality'. 14 
If the scientific enterprise is largely descrii5tive 
in its natute, then so too must be the laws it 
establishes. 15 But if the ('laws which science 
establishes are descriptive they can only 
approximate reality. Even a theoretical 'best' 
science could not accurately predict and explain 
everything that happens, all of the time, if some 
of the things that happened were not subject to 
its investigatory techniques. 
I would argue° that the laws of science have as a 
basic underlying assumption that they apply only 
to events, phenomena, processes,'regularities and 
14 	Stephen Toulmin. Foresight and Understanding: An  E'g.uiry into the Aims of Science. New York: Harper 
and Row, 1960, p. 115. 
15 	On this point see for example A.J. Ayer 'What is a Law 
of Nature?' in Ayer •The Concept of a Person and Other  
Essays. London: Macmillan, 1973, pp. 209-234. 
• 43 
• 
't J 
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o on, which are capable of scientific explicability 
If, for example, an event was beyond the ability 
of a 'best' science to explicate, science would 
have to remain silent on it. Is this not the 
position of science vik7a-vis an occurrence of 
an event, brought about by the direct primary 
action of God, which does not fit the expected 
pattern established by scientific theory? 
On the traditional view, a miracle is an 
observable event which cannot be explained by 
natural law. However, he fact that the phenomenon 
is observable distinguishes the concept of 
'miracle' from the religious concept of 'mSOtery'. 
Furthermore, its observability is that feature in 
virtue of which we regard the phenomenon of 
mirre as falling within the natural world. 
Since miracle falls within nature it is the sort 
of event which prima facie seems to be capable of 
scientific explicability yet turns out to be 
scientifically inexplicable. It is inexplicable 
because it is contrary to that which, according 
to the laws of science, should have occurred yet 
no unusual natural characteristic can be found 
which would explain the recalcitrant event. The 
natural cause cannot be found! Furthermore, the 
recalcitrant occurrence cannot be experimentally 
repeated. The 	(its contrary nature) is 
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simply inexplicable in scientific terms but is 
explicable in religious terms. 16  
If my reasoning is correct it would appear that there 
is an implicit restrictive clause attached to a law 
of science such that we should understand that when 
L is stated in the form L 	(x) (Fx---)Gx) it should 
be read as: In so far as the relationship between 
F-ness and G-ness is scientifically explicable all 
x's which have F-ness will also have G-ness. 
Explicitly stated L should be written as 
L = 	(Fx 	Gx), where C is 'the situation is 
scientifically explicable'. An event that occurs 
contrary to the regularity (x) (Fx 	, but which 
is not currently explicable, may fall into two 
classes: those which are set aside as anomalies and 
those which are regarded as violations. From among 
the latter class some events will fall into the 
sub-class of miraculous. Miracle is therefore to be 
understood as that which is a violation or that 
which is permanently scientifically inexplicable. 17 
3. 	LAWS OF SCIENCE AND LAWS OF NATURE  
Throughout this thesis I have for the most part used 
the concepts of 'Laws of Science' and 'Laws of Nature' 
16 	M.A. Boden. Op. cit. p. 138 offers a similar appraisal. 
17 	It shouldbe clearly understood that while all miraculous 
events are scientifically inexplicable events this does • 
not necessarily imply that all scientifically inexplicable 
events are miracles. 
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fairly interchangeably, however, at this stage I wish 
to draw out some distinctions. 
Traditionally it seems, apologists have used the term 
'Law of Nature' in preference to that of 'Law of 
Science' when they have involved themselves in the 
miracle debate. On the other hand those writers 
arguing against the coherence of the concept of 
miracle and more particularly against the violation 
concept have used the two terms fairly interchangeably. 
What is the significance, if any, of these differences? 
In Chapter Two I pointed out that Hume in proposing 
his definition of miracle in terms of a violation 
attempted to cut adrift the theistic overtones which 
had tied arguments for miracles to arguments for the 
existence of God. Nevertheless, since Hume, the 
violation concept has been the predominant one. However, 
it seems to me that whereas the sceptics have willingly 
accepted the non-theistic conceptions of scientific 
law the apologists have in general maintained a wider 
formulation of law of nature. This distinction has 
created tensions which rest largely on the fact that 
the concept of miracle hinges the realm of science 
and religion. This mediatory role of miracle has, I 
believe, special implications for the application of 
the concepts of 'Law of Science' and 'Law of Nature' 
within the context of the concept of miracle. 
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Throughout Section 2 above I argued that the sense 
of violation that is applicable to the violation 
concept of miracle rests on the assumption that the 
law is not universal, but has a restrictive clause - 
that is: L = C--, (x)(Fx---Gx) - and an occurrence 
'AC • (Fa • ' Ga) constitutes a violation. 0 f course, 
in most contexts the law of science would be expressed 
simply as L = (x) (Gx 	. Within the context of 
discussion about the concept and possibility of 
miracle it is essential to draw out this distinctiOn 
c-e.) 
between the strict and loose formulation of laws of 
science. The loose formulation or law of science 
L s = (x)(Fx---o.Gx) is in fact the law regularity from 
the strict formulation or law of nature Ln = 
(Fx-->Gx). Since the law of nature L n has a built-in 
restriction C which limits the application of the law 
to those events, phenomena and so on that are 
scientifically explicable strictly speaking such a law 
cannot be viol.. If a scientifically inexplicable 
event E occurs which is an exception to what might 
have been expected in the circumstances, E is strictly 
speaking a violation of the regularity (x)(Fx—Gx) 
expressed by the law, rather than a violation of the 
law itself. By regarding the law regularity as a law 
of science, however, (rather than a law of nature) it 
makes sense to talk of a violation of such a law. 
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It may be argued here that what I am proposing is 
mere stipulation. Clearly what I am proposing does 
in fact suggest a change in common practice but I 
would argue that it is a change which helps to clear 
up a fundamental misunderstanding in the miracle 
debate. Furthermore, I would maintain that it makes 
sense to refer to the law regularity as a law of 
science since 'textbook' laws of science are in- 
variably expressed without added tacit conditions. On 
the other hand many writers have argued - sometimes 
for mistaken reasons - that laws of nature do include 
tacit conditions. 
ARE MIRACLES PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE? 
It is nongally (kccepted that the event E is physically 
impossible if and only if the Statement that the 
event occurred is logically incompatible with the 
statement of the law that expi-esses what is johysically 
possible. By drawing out a distinction between the 
statemeht of a law of nature and the statement of a 
law of science I have at the same time iMplicitly 
drawn a.distinction between what is physically possible 
and that which is scientifically possible or explicable. 
cl 
That which is logically incompatible with a law of 
nature is physically impossible because the statement 
of the law of nature expresses the ultimate regularities 
in nature. I have argued that a miracle is not a 
violation of a law of nature and hence l 'Aithen a miracle 
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occurs the physically impossible does not occur. On 
the other hand if a violation of a law of science 
occurs it makes sense to talk of the occurrence of a 
scientifically inexplicable event or of the occurrence 
of the scientifically impossible. Let me draw out 
this distinction in the following manner. 
The very question of the possibility of miracles rests 
on the prior question of the existence of God and on 
His ability and willingness to intervene in nature. 
Clearly, if there is no God who fits this description 
then, on the further assumption that nature is as a 
matter of fact regular, every event that occurs does 
so in conformity with a law of nature. In this case 
it makes no sense to talk of the physically impossible 
actually occurring. Likewise, if the laws of science 
were formulated by a hypothetical 'best science' it 
would not make sense to talk of the scientifically 
impossible occurring. Science, being able to explain 
everything that happens would, by definition, never 
be faced §'y something that it could not explain. In 
this hypothetical model the physically impoAsible and 
the scientifically impossible would be identical. 
On the. other hand, it may well be the case that there 
is a God who fits the above description.. Now it seems 
to me that if this is the case the laws expressed by 
'best science' cannot be regarded as reflecting the• 
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ultimate fundamental regularities in nature simply 
because they do not include those occasions when God 
does intervene. In this situation only science plus 
God can explain all that occurs. The limits of the 
physically possible are, therefore, not open to science•
alone •to determine. What is scientifically impossible 
is not, therefore, to be equated with that which is 
physically impossible. Once again the distinction is 
between what is possible in ,a theistic universe and 
what is explainable in a thei4ic universe. 
5. CONCLUSION  
In this chapter I have argued that it makes sense to 
talk of a violation of a law of science. I have also 
argued that such a violation is physically possible 
though scientifically impossible or scientifically in-
explicable. Furthermore I have suggested that in the 
context of the miracle discussion it makes good sense 
to draw out a distinction between the concept of a 
'law of science' and that of a 'law of nature'. 
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to show that 
arguments designed to illustrate the incoherence of 
the violation concept of miracle cannot be 
substantiated. I have also argued that if a miracle 
were to occur it would be possible to identify and 
to distinguish it from the non-miraculous. I have 
therefore argued for the logical and. epistemological 
coherence of the violation concept. At the same time 
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I have observed that the traditional violation concept 
requires certain modificationand refinements in 
order to withstand certain of the charges against it. 
However, I have shown that these modifications are 
quite acceptable to the apologist. Lastly, I have 
demonstrated that the giolation concept of miracle is 
a complex mesh of elements deriving substance from 
both the scientific and religious enterprise. Part 
of the strength of the violation concept is to be 
found in the fact that it rests for its coherence and 
applicability on these two, rather than on either one. 
I conclude this thesis by offering the following 
definition of miracle: 
A Miracle is a violation of a law of science 
brought about by the primary action of God, 
occurring in a religious context as a divine 
sign. 
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